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Abstract
The INCENTIVE study: a mixed-methods evaluation of an
innovation in commissioning and delivery of primary dental
care compared with traditional dental contracting
Claire Hulme,1* Peter Robinson,2 Gail Douglas,3 Paul Baxter,4
Barry Gibson,2 Jenny Godson,5 Karen Vinall-Collier,3 Eirini Saloniki,1
David Meads,1 Paul Brunton3 and Sue Pavitt3
1Academic Unit of Health Economics, Leeds Institute of Health Sciences, University of Leeds,
Leeds, UK
2School of Clinical Dentistry, University of Sheffield, Sheffield, UK
3School of Dentistry, University of Leeds, Leeds, UK
4Division of Biostatistics, University of Leeds, Leeds, UK
5Division of Population Health and Care, Health and Wellbeing Directorate,
Public Health England, London, UK
*Corresponding author c.t.hulme@leeds.ac.uk
Background: Over the past decade, commissioning of primary care dentistry has seen contract currency
evolving from payment for units of dental activity (UDAs) towards blended contracts that include key
performance indicators such as access, quality and improved health outcome.
Objectives: The aim of this study was to evaluate a blended/incentive-driven model of dental service
provision. To (1) explore stakeholder perspectives of the new service delivery model; (2) assess the
effectiveness of the new service delivery model in reducing the risk of and amount of dental disease
and enhancing oral health-related quality of life (OHQoL) in patients; and (3) assess cost-effectiveness of
the new service delivery model.
Methods: Using a mixed-methods approach, the study included three dental practices working under the
blended/incentive-driven (incentive) contract and three working under the UDAs (traditional) contract. All
were based in West Yorkshire. The qualitative study reports on the meaning of key aspects of the model for
three stakeholder groups [lay people (patients and individuals without a dentist), commissioners and the
primary care dental teams], with framework analysis of focus group and semistructured interview data. A
non-randomised study compared clinical effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of treatment under the two
contracts. The primary outcome was gingivitis, measured using bleeding on probing. Secondary outcomes
included OHQoL and cost-effectiveness.
Results: Participants in the qualitative study associated the incentive contract with more access, greater
use of skill mix and improved health outcomes. In the quantitative analyses, of 550 participants recruited,
291 attended baseline and follow-up. Given missing data and following quality assurance, 188 were
included in the bleeding on probing analysis, 187 in the caries assessment and 210 in the economic
analysis. The results were mixed. The primary outcome favoured the incentive practices, whereas the
assessment of caries favoured the traditional practices. Incentive practices attracted a higher cost for the
service commissioner, but were financially attractive for the dental provider at the practice level.
Differences in generic health-related quality of life were negligible. Positive changes over time in OHQoL
in both groups were statistically significant.
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Limitations: The results of the quantitative analysis should be treated with caution given small sample
numbers, reservations about the validity of pooling, differential dropout results and data quality issues.
Conclusions: A large proportion of people in this study who had access to a dentist did not follow up on
oral care. These individuals are more likely to be younger males and have poorer oral health. Although
access to dental services was increased, this did not appear to facilitate continued use of services.
Future work: Further research is required to understand how best to promote and encourage appropriate
dental service attendance, especially among those with a high level of need, to avoid increasing health
inequalities, and to assess the financial impact of the contract. For dental practitioners, there are
challenges around perceptions about preventative dentistry and use of the risk assessments and care
pathways. Changes in skill mix pose further challenges.
Funding: The National Institute for Health Research Health Services and Delivery Research programme.
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Plain English summary
In 2006, a new type of contract was introduced for NHS dentists. The contract incentivises dentaltreatment through payment of an annual sum in return for delivering an agreed number of ‘courses
of treatment’, weighted for complexity. An alternative to this contract is one that provides an incentive
to shift from treatment and repair to prevention and oral health by introducing a new clinical pathway
and new remuneration models. However, there is limited evidence on the impact of this type of contract.
The aim of this project was to evaluate a new blended/incentive-driven model of dental service provision
implemented in West Yorkshire. The project compares three dental practices under the 2006 contract with
three under the new contract. Within the project a qualitative study reports on the meaning of key aspects
of the model for patients and non-patients (i.e. individuals without a dentist), commissioners and the
dental teams using data from observations, focus groups and interviews. The clinical effectiveness (does it
improve health outcomes?) and cost-effectiveness (is it value for money?) of treatment under the two
contracts are assessed.
The results favoured the new contract, which was associated with improved health outcomes but
increased costs for commissioners. However, the results should be treated with caution as a large
proportion of people who had access to a dentist did not follow up on oral care. These individuals are
more likely to be younger males and have poorer oral health. Further work is required to understand how
best to promote and encourage appropriate dental service attendance, especially among those with
high level of need, to avoid increasing health inequalities.
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Scientific summary
Background
Commissioning of primary care dentistry in the NHS has seen contract currency evolving from payment for
units of dental activity (UDAs) towards incentive-driven or blended contracts that include incentives linked
with key performance indicators such as access, quality and improved health outcome. There is limited
evidence on the impact of these changes in dental oral health outcomes and patient, commissioner and
workforce acceptability.
Objectives
The aim of this study was to evaluate a blended/incentive-driven model of dental service provision. To:
1. explore stakeholder perspectives of the new service delivery model
2. assess the effectiveness of the new service delivery model in reducing the risk of and amount of dental
disease and enhancing oral health-related quality of life (OHQoL) in patients
3. assess cost-effectiveness of the new service delivery model.
The intervention
In the UK, current dental contracts are based on payment for UDAs. The new blended/incentive-driven
contract and service delivery model evaluated here is based on contracts incentivising quality and oral
health improvement (OHImp) in addition to UDAs. Sixty per cent of the contract value is apportioned to
delivery of a set number of UDAs. The remaining 40% is dependent on the delivery of quality (systems,
processes and infrastructure, 20%; and OHImp, 20%). The blended/incentive-driven contracts are aimed at
ensuring evidence-based preventative interventions are delivered in line with identified needs for a defined
population, increasing access to dentistry and ensuring that care is provided by the most appropriate team
member to encourage skill mix. The new contract was designed to encourage a care pathway approach in
which all patients have an oral health assessment (OHA) on joining the practice and at each subsequent
recall. Four sets of information [age group, medical history, social history (e.g. self-care, habits/diet) and
clinical assessment] are used to inform a traffic light system for patients with high (red), medium (amber)
or low (green) risk of oral disease.
Methods
Using a mixed-methods approach, the study included three dental practices working under the blended/
incentive-driven (incentive) contract and three working under the UDAs (traditional) contract. Traditional
practices, included in the study as comparators, were matched with incentive practices by deprivation
index, age profile, size of practice and ethnicity profile. All practices were based in West Yorkshire.
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Qualitative study
Objective 1 uses focus groups and semistructured interviews, supplemented with observations of dental
appointments of the delivery of dental care in the incentive practices and traditional practices. Purposive
sampling via a sampling matrix supported recruitment of participants with different experiences of the
model. The three stakeholder groups were lay people (patients and individuals without a dentist), dental
teams and service commissioners. Interviews and focus groups followed a topic guide, partly informed
by Andersen’s behavioural model of access, but supplemented with themes that emerged from the
observations and previous interviews. Interviews with dental team members took place at the dental
surgery and those with patients took place in patients’ homes. All were recorded and transcribed verbatim.
Effectiveness study
A non-randomised study design compares the effectiveness (objective 2) of incentive practices with that of
traditional practices. The primary outcome was the percentage of points bleeding on probing (BoP).
Secondary outcomes were percentage of sound surfaces; percentage of extracted and filled teeth; and
OHQoL [Oral Health Impact Profile (OHIP-14)] total score. Exploratory analysis was undertaken of the traffic
light risk assessment system.
Sample size was powered using BoP. We estimated the standard deviation (SD) in percentage sites BoP
across a UK cohort to be 27.5%, assuming a within-patient correlation in baseline to follow percentage
sites BoP of 0.5 and a common variance in practices. We assumed a mean difference in percentage sites
BoP baseline to follow-up in incentive practices of 10%, versus a mean difference in percentage sites BoP
baseline to follow-up in traditional practices of 0% (i.e. a clinically meaningful difference in mean
differences of 10%). We fixed a type I error rate of 0.05 and a power of 0.8. A design effect was included
to account for clustering of patients within incentive and traditional practices, assuming an intracluster
correlation of 0.2. A two-sided two independent samples t-test identified a total of 550 patients to be
recruited (allowing for a 10% loss to follow-up).
Multiple linear regression was used to model the primary and secondary outcome measures. Given the
reduced sample size because of loss to follow-up, to improve power, we use an analysis of covariance
approach with follow-up measurement as the outcome and baseline measurement as a covariate. We first
analysed the matched pairs separately before combining in a single analysis. Owing to reduced sample
size and staff turnover, we were not able to include practitioner-level variables in our analyses.
Cost-effectiveness study
Within objective 3, primary analyses take the perspective of the commissioners of the service (contractual
payments). Secondary analysis takes the perspective of the service provider including the cost of dental
practitioners’ time and treatment materials. The price year is 2012. A discounting rate of 3.5% was used
for costs and outcomes.
The analyses used the incremental cost per unit change in OHIP-14 score and the cost per quality-adjusted
life-year (QALY) (derived from the European Quality of Life-5 Dimensions questionnaire, 3-level version,
EQ-5D-3L). Incremental cost-effectiveness ratios (ICERs) are presented, together with cost-effectiveness
plane scatterplots showing the uncertainty surrounding the estimates and cost-effectiveness acceptability
curves, to illustrate the probability that each treatment would be cost-effective given a range of acceptable
threshold values. Sensitivity analyses were further carried out to account for uncertainty in the cost values.
For the quantitative studies, missing data for the OHIP-14 were imputed using median imputation if only
one or two OHIP-14 item scores were missing. Participants in whom more than two components of the
OHIP-14 were missing or in whom EQ-5D-3L scores at baseline and follow-up were missing were excluded
from the analysis.
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Inclusion criteria and timing of assessments
The inclusion criteria for the quantitative studies were age ≥ 16 years; willingness to be followed up for
24 months and to give informed consent; being new to the dental practice; and able to complete the
patient questionnaires. All new patients attending the practice for the first time were invited to participate.
Patients were asked to complete the OHIP-14 and EQ-5D-3L at their first visit and at the follow-up visit
24 months later. The dentist undertook the clinical assessment of teeth and gingivae using the
International Caries Detection and Assessment System (ICDAS) instrument and BoP at both visits.
Family/social history was taken at the first visit only. The OHA, using the traffic light system, was completed
at baseline and 24 months by incentive practices. Appointment and treatment history were collected
retrospectively using patients’ dental records held at the practices.
Patients were contacted by the dental practice 6–8 weeks prior to their 24-month follow-up date to
arrange an appointment by telephone, short message service (SMS) and letter in order to optimise
follow-up. Patients were contacted a minimum of three times to arrange the appointment.
Ethics approval
Ethics approval was received from Bromley Research Ethics Committee (reference number 12/LO/0205) on
5 April 2012. The study was sponsored by the University of Leeds, Leeds, UK.
Results
Qualitative study
Observations were made of 30 dental appointments. Eighteen lay people, 15 dental team staff and a
member of the commissioning team took part in the interviews and focus groups. Data were collected
between August 2012 and February 2014.
We found perceptions that the blended/incentive-driven contract increased access to dental care, with the
contract determining dentists’ and patients’ perceptions of need, their behaviours, evaluated and
subjective health outcomes and patient satisfaction. These outcomes were then seen to feed back to
shape people’s predispositions to visit the dentist.
The data hint at appreciable challenges related to a general refocusing of care and especially to
perceptions about preventative dentistry and use of the risk assessments and care pathways. There are also
obstacles to overcome to realise any benefits of the greater deployment of skill mix.
The ratings from the OHAs were seen to influence patients’ perceptions of need, which led to changes
in preventative behaviour. There was evidence that dentists’ behaviours had responded to the contract in
the desired direction with greater emphasis on prevention, use of the ratings in treatment planning,
adherence to the pathways and the utilisation of skill mix. Participants identified increases in the capacity
of practices to deliver more care as a result. These changes were seen to improve evaluated and perceived
health and patient satisfaction.
Effectiveness study
Within the quantitative studies, recruitment started on 1 June 2012; the first patient entered the study on
14 June 2012 and recruitment finished on 31 January 2013. A total of 550 participants were recruited
to the study at baseline. However, only 291 participants attended a follow-up appointment at 24 months.
Although there were no statistically significant differences in age, sex or ethnicity between those who were
included in these analyses and those lost to follow-up, those who were lost to follow-up were generally
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younger and more likely to be male. In addition, those lost to follow-up had worse oral health, although
this was more variable (as there was a higher mean and SD).
Blood on probing was measured at baseline in 529 of the 550 participants recruited, but at both time
periods in only 270 participants. Following quality assurance, 188 participants were included in
the BoP analysis (incentive, n= 90; traditional practice, n= 98). For BoP pooled across practices, the
95% confidence interval (CI) for the effect size was 3.23% to 17.25%, indicating a positive effect for
incentive but with considerable uncertainty in magnitude. Traditional practices had a higher proportion of
sound surfaces (defined as caries free and initial ICDAS codes 1 and 2; n= 187) at follow-up (4.68%),
although in two of the pairings there was no non-significant difference in the proportion of sound
surfaces. Overall, traditional practices had a higher follow-up OHIP-14 score (n= 176) by 3.5 points
indicating worse OHQoL. Again, for two of the three pairings there was no significant difference. For the
OHA (incentive practices only), for those who attended both baseline and follow-up (n= 111), there was
an improvement with 68% red at baseline and 44% red at follow-up.
Cost-effectiveness
A total of 210 patients were included in the cost-effectiveness analyses. Patients in incentive practices had
more appointments, on average, than those in traditional practices (8.89 vs. 6.63, respectively). Patients
who were lost to follow-up (and for whom we had appointment data) attended, on average, slightly fewer
appointments. Among the loss to follow-up group, the average number of dental appointments per
person was 7.97 (SD 5.34; n= 152) in the incentive practices and 4.99 (SD 3.53; n= 131) in the
traditional practices.
The incentive arm attracted a higher cost for the service commissioner (mean per-person cost of £459.77
vs. £281.57). Incentive contracts were financially attractive for the dental provider at the practice level
(costs less contractual payments equated to a mean per-person cost of –£209.26 vs. –£116.21, i.e. on
average the payment the dental surgery receives is greater than the cost to them of providing the
treatment). The mean OHIP-14 score was 7.11 and 8.00 points in the incentive and traditional groups,
respectively. The ICER using the OHIP-14 from the commissioner’s perspective was £199.22 (indicating a
cost of £199.22 for an increase of 1 point in the OHIP-14 score); from the service provider’s perspective,
incentive dominates traditional (less costly, better mean outcomes). The ICERs using the QALYs from the
commissioner’s perspective show incentive to be dominated (more costly, lower mean QALY), and from
the service provider’s perspective the ICER was £122,089.48 (indicating a cost of £122,089.48 for an
increase of 1 QALY).
Patient and public involvement
Patient contributors were integral members of the research team from conception of the research through
input into the research and design questions, the ethics application including patient information sheets
and as members of our advisory group. They ensured our research was of relevance to patients and the
NHS and would contribute to shape and improve reform of the dental contract to maximise a service
designed to address patient needs in terms of improved oral health outcome through a paradigm shift
from restorative to preventative oral health care and access to NHS services.
Conclusions
The blended/incentive-driven contracts were perceived to increase access to dental care, with the contract
determining dentists’ and patients’ perceptions of need, their behaviours, evaluated and subjective health
outcomes and patient satisfaction. Although the results of the quantitative analysis were mixed and should
be treated with caution given the high loss to follow-up, the study findings have implications for both
practice and future work in assessing these types of contract.
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A large proportion of people in the study who had access to a dentist did not follow up on oral care. These
individuals are more likely to be younger males and have poorer oral health. The evidence suggests further
work is required to understand how best to promote and encourage appropriate dental service attendance
especially among those with high level of need, to avoid increasing health inequalities, and to consider from
a policy perspective the care pathway approach recommended in the Steele report (Department of Health.
NHS Dental Services In England: An Independent Review Led by Professor Jimmy Steele. London:
Department of Health; 2009), which legitimises irregular dental attendance for those who choose it.
For dental practitioners, there are challenges within the blended/incentive-driven contracts related to a
general refocusing of care around preventative dentistry, risk assessment and a care pathway approach
rather than the focus on treatment inherent in the UDA-based contract. There are also obstacles to
overcome to realise the benefits of the greater deployment of skill mix. Intuitively, the delegation of
treatment to staff specialised in only a specific range of treatments could reduce costs and increase access
to care but there may be financial barriers that prevent the profitability and effective use of skill mix.
Further work is required to validate the red–amber–green assessment as a risk assessment, communication
aid and contract-monitoring tool, and as a tool for evaluation; and to further assess the financial impact of
the contract and particularly the increase of skill mix on the individual practitioner in order to support
the model.
Data quality and dentist data recording, particularly dentition charting, was challenging. This supports
the view that there should be a strong driver in the contract for data to be collected accurately and
appropriate training and support provided to practices. Further work is required to explore the utility of
BoP as a surrogate for other oral health outcomes and both the utility and the validity of recording dental
caries and treatment experience with an indicator such as ICDAS as a contract outcome.
Funding
Funding for this study was provided by the Health Services and Delivery Research programme of the
National Institute for Health Research.
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Chapter 1 Background
Use of incentives in dental care
There is an increasing trend towards the use of incentives in NHS primary care including dentistry.1
Although dentistry has long been incentivised, over the past decade commissioning of primary care
dentistry has seen the introduction of refinements, with contract currency evolving from payment for units
of dental activity (UDAs) towards incentive-driven or blended contracts that include incentives linked
with key performance indicators such as access, quality and improved health outcome.2 This includes
(as part of the Department of Health dental contract reform programme) a series of NHS dental contract
pilots which opened in 2011 with the aim of exploring how the focus could shift from treatment and
repair to prevention and oral health through the introduction of a new clinical pathway and new
remuneration models.2 Although there is a burgeoning field looking at the impact of these blended
contracts on the process of care, there remains limited evidence on the impact of changes in dental oral
health outcomes and patient, commissioner and workforce acceptability.
The policy context
In 2003, the Department of Health set out changes in governance as part of the Modernisation Agenda in
order to create the right context, incentives and operational environment for their staff and frontline teams
to transform patient services.3 The changes transformed the NHS from a centrally directed service to a
more complex system with devolved local commissioners [notably, primary care trusts (PCTs)] and a delivery
structure composed of diverse providers.4 In 2002, Shifting the Balance of Power: The Next Steps5 and its
subsequent delivery document gave greater authority and decision-making power to patients and front-line
staff, and changed organisational roles and relationships, giving PCTs new commissioning powers. This was
then followed in 2005 by Commissioning a Patient Led NHS,6 which further strengthened the lead role of
PCTs as commissioners of services to meet the needs of their local communities.
NHS Dentistry: Options for Change7 set out a vision for dentistry with prevention at its heart, which was
widely supported by the dental community. Personal Dental Services (PDS) pilots tested these new ways of
working between 1998 and 2006. In 2006, a new dental contract emerged, essentially devolving the
commissioning of dental services locally to PCTs to meet the needs of their local population. The currency of
the new General Dental Services (nGDS) contracts was UDAs divided into three levels of treatment bands,
with the total number of UDAs in each contract based on historical activity and agreed between PCTs and
dental practices. The nGDS contracts meant that the payment mechanism changed from a one-off fee per
item of service to a system whereby providers were paid an annual sum in return for delivering an agreed
number of ‘courses of treatment’, weighted for complexity (UDAs). PCTs became the local commissioners of
dental services and were charged with demonstrating their competencies as ‘world-class commissioners’.
The PDS pilots (1998–2006) encompassed a wide variety of configurations and were widely evaluated.8–12
Although the evaluations were largely positive there were concerns about whether or not the PDS
agreements met local needs, the absence of measures of success or appropriate goals for commissioning
and missed opportunities to harness skill mix.9,12 More recently, the health committee implicitly rejected the
PDS agreements as a precursor of the nGDS contracts when it criticised the lack of piloting of the latter
contracts.13 There has been little research to date on the implementation of nGDS contracts. There were
some concerns among dental practitioners,14,15 particularly on whether the nGDS contracts would allow
more time for prevention16 or restrict access to new patients and those requiring complex treatment.17
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The Steele report2 examined how dental services in England could be developed over the next 5 years.
The review advocated a commissioning approach to align dentistry with the rest of the NHS services, to
commission for health outcomes and to develop blended contracts rewarding not only activity but quality
and oral health improvement (OHImp). It recommended that payments explicitly recognise prevention and
reward the contribution of the dental team to improvements to oral health, reflected in patient progression
along the pathway, adherence to nationally agreed clinical guidelines and the achievement of expected
outcomes.2 Commissioners were asked to support dentists to make the best and most cost-effective use of
the available dental workforce.2
Following the Steele report2 proposals were set out to pilot different types of dental contract.18 Alongside
these proposals was the Dental Quality and Outcomes Framework (DQOF), which advocated quality as a
necessary part of future dental contracts.19 Within the framework, quality consisted of three domains:
clinical effectiveness, patient experience and safety.19
A series of NHS dental contract pilots began in 2011. The aim was to shift focus from treatment and repair
to prevention and oral health through the introduction of a new clinical pathway, supported by new
remuneration models.20 The new pathway begins with an oral health assessment (OHA), following which
the patient is advised of their oral risk status using a red–amber–green (RAG) traffic light rating system and
given advice on maintaining or improving their oral health. A follow-up appointment or review is then set
based on their risk status.
The needs assessment tool (RAG) was underpinned by the Salford and Oldham primary dental care service
redesign project2 which found that the RAG scores:
l ‘Enabled the capture of oral health improvements as patients move RAG status. The project has learnt
that, as some risk/modifying factors do not change, only the clinical components should be used as
outcome measure
l Motivated dentists to deliver clinical care appropriate to need through robust, consistent clinical and
risk assessment
l Incentivised dentists to perform detailed assessments and to value all patients the same through
completing the same consistent, comprehensive assessment
l Aided communication with patients through the use of the RAG status.’18
Three remuneration models were proposed in the pilot sites to identify the optimal single remuneration
model. Dentists were not required to carry out a given number of UDAs but were required to adhere to
the DQOF.18 The three pilot contract types were based on (1) time spent on providing care for NHS
patients as measured by the appointment time; (2) capitation payments weighted for individual patients
(age, sex, deprivation) based on all care (preventative, routine and complex); and (3) capitation payments
weighted for individual patients based on preventative and routine care only.18 However, while a small
element of remuneration within the models was weighted based on the DQOF, remuneration adjustments
were not applied as the indicators required testing and refinements before they could be used.18
Evidence of the effectiveness of incentive-driven contracting
Overall, the evidence of the effectiveness of use of contracting and incentives by health providers is still
emerging. The Christianson and colleagues21 review found mixed results of the effect of payer initiatives
that reward health-care providers for quality improvements. O’Donnell and colleagues22 found that the
Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF) within the new General Medical Services contracts in primary care
incentivised performance, motivating staff towards QOF targets. Similarly, McDonald and colleagues1
found incentives to be powerful motivators in the primary care workforce. A more granular view suggests
that the process-based nature of incentives may limit their long-term effects on health outcomes.23 There is
also a risk that important activities lacking a target may be underemphasised.23,24
BACKGROUND
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Within dentistry, the Tickle and colleagues’25 analysis of longitudinal data of English adults explored the
impact of the nGDS contracts and found that changes to incentive structures had a substantial impact on
dentists’ behaviour with respect to their treatment prescribing patterns. Significant numbers of dentists
were attempting to hit their UDA contract targets in the most efficient way possible (from their
perspective), by shifting towards treatments with high rewards relative to costs, as opposed to selecting on
the basis of clinical factors alone. This echoed the results of Chalkley,26 who found that the introduction
of the nGDS contracts in England generated a large and significant increase in activity. However, these
results are tempered by a recent Cochrane review27 that found generally low-level evidence from the two
randomised controlled studies included28,29 (both were UK-based studies). Brocklehurst and colleagues27
concluded that changes to remuneration may change clinical activity in primary care dentistry, but further
experimental research is needed – specifically into the impact on patient outcomes.
Early findings from the most recent dental contract pilots introduced following the Steele report2 have
focused on patient and practitioner views of the new clinical pathway, reporting them to be strongly
supportive.30 More recent findings20 focus on adaptation to the new system but also report positive
indications about clinical benefits in terms of a reduction of risk and health improvement (measured
through the RAG status and a basic periodontal examination). However, the authors have quite rightly
added the caveat that there are few comparable data from outside the pilot sites.20
Structure of the report
The project aims to evaluate a blended/incentive-driven contract model compared with traditional contracts
on dental service delivery in practices in West Yorkshire, England, UK. Although the blended/incentive-driven
dentist contract model pre-dates the most recent national dental contract pilots and the Steele report,2 its
specification was innovative and contributed to the ethos and recommendations of the report. The model
was cited within the report as an example of good practice with regard to an emphasis on quality of
care, achieving health outcomes and patient-reported outcome measures (PROMs)31 while improving access
to NHS dentistry. Its introduction thus widens the evidence base underpinning the proposed introduction of
blended contracts in NHS primary care dentistry.
In the INnovation in Commissioning primary dENTal care delIVEry (INCENTIVE) study we used a
mixed-methods approach with three interlinked projects to evaluate a blended/incentive-driven model of
NHS dental service delivery compared with contemporaneous traditional contracting. These three projects
addressed questions of acceptability, dental efficacy and cost-effectiveness. Included in the study were
three new dental practices with a blended/incentive-driven contract and three practices under the
traditional contracts (see Chapter 2).
Our qualitative work (see Chapter 3) addresses questions of acceptability using focus groups,
semistructured interviews and observations with stakeholders. Qualitative exploration is useful when there
is little pre-existing knowledge, in this case when it was important to find out what changes to services
meant to participants. The number of stakeholder groups and budget constraints necessitated a broad,
policy-focused ‘framework’ approach, useful for a structured exploration of participants’ perspectives, and
provided an advantage because findings were induced from their original accounts.32,33 This approach
enabled us to cover the broad tapestry of experiences emerging from this intervention.
Our quantitative work (see Chapter 4) includes an assessment of the clinical effectiveness of the blended/
incentive-driven contract comparing three newly commissioned dental practices with three existing
traditional practices. In addition, we used an exploratory study to assess whether or not the traffic light
(RAG) risk assessment within the model was fit for purpose.
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A key question within the study is whether or not the blended/incentive-driven model of service delivery
provides value for money, and our third project (see Chapter 5) assesses the cost-effectiveness of the
new model compared with the traditional contract. The report concludes with a synthesis of our main
findings (see Chapter 6) and a timely discussion of the implications for designing and commissioning
future NHS dental services in light of the planned dental contract reform and further national testing of
prototype models.
BACKGROUND
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Chapter 2 Research objectives and intervention
Aim and research objectives
The overall aim of the INCENTIVE research study is to evaluate a blended/incentive-driven model of dental
service provision implemented in West Yorkshire in the north of England. An ideal commissioning model
will complement population-based health improvement measures with sufficient capacity to meet
population needs using effective and efficient prevention and treatment to enhance the clinical status and
patient-reported outcomes in the patient base. The model evaluated here uses a blended/incentive-driven
approach to commission improved health outcomes through the incentivised delivery of evidence-based
prevention, care pathways, skill mix and increasing access to dentistry in response to identified needs.
The implementation of this novel contract provided an opportunity to evaluate an innovation in health-care
delivery that was already being piloted and applied ideas from other settings offering substantial potential
benefit for patients and the future commissioning and delivery of dental services throughout England.
Our primary objectives in the INCENTIVE study were to:
l explore stakeholder perspectives of the new service delivery model
l assess the clinical effectiveness of the new service delivery model in reducing the risk of and amount of
dental disease and enhancing oral health-related quality of life (OHQoL) in patients
l assess the cost-effectiveness of the new service delivery model in relation to OHQoL.
Over the course of this study, although our objectives have remained true to our original aim, there was a
substantial move towards the introduction of blended/incentive-driven contracts in NHS primary care
dentistry subsequent to the Steele report,2 specifically the introduction of the national dental contract
pilots and more recent prototypes. It is important to note that the blended/incentive-driven contracts
evaluated here pre-date the national dental contract pilots and the Steele report.2 However, the
specification was innovative and reflected the ethos and recommendations of the Steele report2 with
regard to an emphasis on quality of care, achieving health outcomes and PROMs.31 This evaluation
therefore complements the national pilots and recent prototypes by not only providing insight into the
acceptability of blended/incentive-driven contracts for all stakeholders, but also adding the important
perspective of clinical effectiveness and cost-effectiveness.
The intervention
In 2007, NHS Bradford and Airedale commenced a dental service delivery procurement for three new
dental practices. Providers were sought through a national procurement exercise. There was considerable
interest from a wide range of providers. Nineteen pre-qualification questionnaires were submitted and,
of these, 12 were invited to tender, with seven subsequently interviewed. The PCT was actively seeking
bidders who both understood the principles of the Bradford and Airedale service delivery model with its
focus on the delivery of OHImp, quality and activity, and had a robust business case and operational plan
for delivery. The successful bidders came from a variety of provider models, an independent contractor,
a dental body corporate and a not-for-profit corporate.
In 2011, 522,500 people lived in Bradford and Airedale, and population projections expect this to increase
at a much higher than average rate to approximately 600,000 by 2030. The three new dental practices
were carefully sited to address both oral health needs and demands for NHS dental care. The largest
practice was located in an area with a predominantly white population with high levels of material
deprivation; the second was also located in an area of material deprivation but with an ethnically diverse
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population; and the last practice was located in an affluent area (the ward is among the 10% least
deprived in the country) with a predominantly white population but lacking access to NHS dental care.
These communities represented a rich diversity in terms of ethnicity, material deprivation and age profile,
allowing the service delivery model to be tested with a variety of practice populations and a range of
providers which in turn allowed the findings to have a wider generalisability and applicability.
The Bradford and Airedale service delivery model instigated in 2007 was based on blended/incentive-driven
contracts to address local NHS dental access needs and deliver quality and OHImp in addition to UDAs.
The procurement remained timely and in line with subsequent recommendations of the review of NHS
dentistry in Equity and Excellence: Liberating the NHS,34 that commissioning should be focused on health
outcomes. This delivery system enables quality to be rewarded with payment linked to evidence-based
management and monitoring of oral health outcomes. It also allows for continuous improvement through
thresholds for payments and emphasis on outcomes by weighting payments. The service was, additionally,
implementing quality and outcome measures that allowed us to evaluate their implementation and use.
The three practices operating under blended/incentive-driven contracts were matched with three practices
operating under the traditional UDA-based contracts, by demographics, list size and number of dentists.
Table 1 details differences between contracts and reimbursement as a result of the new commissioning
together with the incentives and levers and how these were expected to impact on process and
service delivery.
In detail, within the new practices, 60% of the contract value is apportioned to delivery of a set number
of UDAs. The remaining 40% is dependent on the delivery of quality: 20% systems, processes and
infrastructure [e.g. cross-infection, policies, Standards for Better Health (latterly becoming Care Quality
Commission domains)] and 20% OHImp. The blended/incentive-driven contracts were aimed at ensuring
evidence-based preventative interventions (based on Delivering Better Oral Health: An Evidence Based
Toolkit for Prevention35) were delivered in line with identified needs for a defined population, increased
access to NHS dentistry, and that care was provided by the most appropriate team member to encourage
skill mix. It was intended that all the incentive-driven practices would fully utilise skill mix including, for
example, dental therapists and hygienists and extended duty dental nurses.
TABLE 1 Key characteristics of the practices using traditional or incentive-driven contracts under evaluation in the
INCENTIVE study
Characteristics Traditional practices Incentive practices
Contract type nGDS contract A blended/incentive-driven contract
Mode of reimbursement Activity-based, weighted bands of dental
activity
Activity: 60% of contract value – UDAs
Contract currency UDAs Incentives: 40% of contract value. (1) 20%,
quality (systems, processes and infrastructure);
(2) 20%, OHImp
Incentives and levers Driven by delivery of UDAs, with no
incentives for preventative approach
Allocation of payment allows commissioners
to incentivise key structures, processes and
outcomes for quality and OHImp
Health professional
responsible for delivery
of care
Dentist (with no incentives for therapist and
hygienist support)
Blended contract incentivises use of skill mix
to deliver preventative focused care
Care pathway and recall Prescribed by individual performers Risk-assessed (using the RAG system)
evidence-based preventative care pathway
Risk-assessed recall interval variations recorded
Stakeholder feedback
on delivery and impact
of care
Standard complaints/comments Patient forum
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Skill mix
One area of potential advantage in the blended incentive-driven model of delivery is more effective use
of the dental team. For example, dental hygienists/therapists can carry out courses of treatments
recommended by the dentist who has examined the patient. Dental hygienists can carry out treatments
such as scaling and polishing, oral health promotion and fissure sealants. A dental therapist can perform
additional treatments such as fillings, pulp treatment/stainless steel crowns and extractions on children.
Additional skills dental nurses may be trained and competent to give preventative advice and apply
preventative fluoride varnishes to teeth. Intuitively, the delegation of treatment to staff who specialise in
only a specific range of treatments could reduce costs and increase access to care but this hypothesis
needs testing.36
Skill mix is advocated in several current proposals that continue a trend seen in UK dentistry over the
last 20 years.2,7,37,38 For example, dental therapists may now work in general dental practice7 and their
clinical remit has expanded.39,40 The number of training places has increased and several educational
establishments have instituted programmes. The potential contribution of dental therapy is considerable.
Evans and colleagues41 found that, within their current remit, therapists could undertake the treatment
provided in 35% of dental visits and in 43% of clinical time. Yet dentistry has not harnessed this potential.
Dentists may need models to help them employ dental hygienists/therapists profitably and fully use their
skills and there have been calls to develop a system that encourages dentists to use dental hygienists/
therapists differently.42,43 The PDS pilots failed to fully involve the wider skill mix available (i.e. dental care
professionals or improve their conditions to recruit and retain them).9
Although there are few hard data to support skill mix in dentistry36 some data are beginning to emerge.
A recent practice-based study found the success of fissure sealants to be comparable whether placed by
dentists, hygienists or therapists.44
There is a trend towards greater professional acceptance of therapists,43,45–49 with approximately 60–70%
of dentists prepared to consider employing a therapist in the more recent studies.50,51 Despite this,
some dentists remain uncertain of the role of dental therapists.51,52
There is also some uncertainty about public acceptance of dental therapists. Two recent surveys and a
qualitative study suggest that few lay people are aware of dental therapists as a professional group.53,54
Furthermore, even after the training of dental therapists was explained to them, only 61% of adults were
willing to receive simple restorative treatment from a therapist.53,54 The provision of dental care is
influenced by the NHS contract for dentists. The existing UDA contract does not make any allowance for
treatment provided by dental therapists, although since 2013 dental hygienists and therapists can carry out
their full scope of practice without a prescription or the need for the patient to first see a dentist; this is
known as direct access and the impact of this on dental team delivery is yet to be realised. Research is
therefore needed to assess if new models of delivery and service design will encourage their use and
whether or not they are acceptable to dentists and patients.
Care pathways
The Bradford and Airedale new service delivery model (incentive) was designed to encourage a care
pathway approach in which all patients have an OHA on joining the practice and at each subsequent
recall. Four sets of information [age group, medical history, social history (self-care, habits/diet) and clinical
assessment] are used to inform a traffic light (RAG) risk assessment for patients with high (red), medium
(amber) or low (green) risk of oral disease (Table 2).
Within the model, each patient follows a care pathway according to the protocol. The care pathway
includes evidence-based preventative treatment and advice, suitable recall interval and restorative care as
appropriate (e.g. the red risk category limits patients to stabilisation and lowering their risk status).
The care pathway’s evidence base was based on the Department of Health’s Delivering Better Oral Health:
An Evidence Based Toolkit for Prevention.35 Each patient’s status is reviewed on their next OHA.
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Patients may therefore move between risk categories. Monitoring in practices ensures that evidence-based
preventative interventions are delivered in line with identified needs and monitored access to dentistry.
OHImp is assessed through the delivery of a performance framework. This framework is based on
the transfer of ideas from the general practitioner contract QOF. (It is of note that this contract pre-dated
the DQOF.19)
There is little literature regarding care pathways in primary dental care, though the concept has been
around for a number of years. The concepts and benefits of the care pathway approach in dental primary
care were described by Hally and Pitts.55 As a result of recommendations within NHS Dentistry: Options for
Change,7 the first widely disseminated care pathway in UK dental primary care was the OHA within the
National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) guidance on dental recall intervals.56 The OHA care
pathway was designed to enable more prevention within personalised care plans taking into account
patients’ social and dental histories as well as clinical findings.
The type of risk assessment (the RAG traffic light system) included in the blended/incentive-driven contract
in our study has hitherto not been fully evaluated. Examination of different RAG models in other dental
settings is ongoing in the north-west of England.57 Early findings from the NHS dental contract pilots
suggest small improvements in risk reduction over the short term.20
In summary, the incentive dental contracts are aimed at ensuring that evidence-based preventative
interventions are delivered in line with identified needs for a defined population; ensuring increased access
to dentistry; and ensuring that care is provided by the most appropriate team member to encourage skill
mix. Quality indicators linked to contracts and payments have been used widely in other branches of
health care, and the results are complex. The indicators can drive organisational change towards best
practice, but may also be a disincentive to important but non-rewarded activities.24 Used alongside
demographic data, the indicators can measure practice performance, identify areas for development and
assist sharing of best practice.58 The indicators often increase the quantity of service provision, but not
always the quality.59 Furthermore, the indicators can affect the dynamic of professional relations and the
doctor–patient interaction.60 Although offering great potential, the DQOF with embedded quality
indicators has not been comprehensively evaluated in dentistry. A recent systematic review was only able
to provide a framework for how such indicators might work.61 The blended/incentive-driven contract in
West Yorkshire provides an opportunity for a comprehensive evaluation to inform the next dental
contract reform.
TABLE 2 Traffic light (RAG) risk assessment
Risk Descriptor Example indicators
Red: high High risk of disease identified through clinical
assessment and social history
Clinical: active decay in more than one tooth,
BPE
Social history: never brushes teeth
Amber: medium Medium risk of disease identified through
clinical assessment and social history
Clinical: active decay in one tooth, BPE score of
> 2 in two sextants
Social history: brushes once per day
Green: low Low risk of disease identified through clinical
assessment and social history
Clinical: no active decay, BPE score of 2 confined
to one sextant
Social history: brushes twice a day
BPE, basic periodontal examination.
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Chapter 3 Stakeholder perspectives of the
blended/incentive-driven service delivery model
Introduction
As outlined in Chapter 2, in 2007 the PCT in Bradford and Airedale commenced procurement for three
new dental practices to address access to NHS dentistry and to pilot a new service delivery model. The
model was based on a blended/incentive-driven contract and, although it pre-dated the Steele report2 and
the NHS dental contract pilots, its specification although innovative actually reflected the ethos and
recommendations of the report placing an emphasis on quality of care and achieving OHImp in accordance
with the Steele report2 and Equity and Excellence: Liberating the NHS34 that followed. The successful
bidders represented three provider models: an independent contractor, a dental body corporate and a
social enterprise organisation.
The contract blends novel incentives to demonstrate quality and OHImp as well as volume of service
(measured in UDAs) and, therefore, shares features with the reformed dental contract piloted by the
Department of Health.18 Most of the contract’s value (60%) arises from the delivery of UDAs. The remainder
is divided equally between delivery of quality including systems, processes and infrastructure (e.g. infection
control) and on OHImp (implementation of Delivering Better Oral Health: An Evidence Based Toolkit for
Prevention35). Thus, the contract is intended to promote evidence-based preventative interventions,
widen access to dentistry and encourage the use of skill mix.
A central feature of the contract is a ‘care pathway’, whereby an initial OHA for each patient joining a
practice determines the risk of poor oral health and guides treatment and the frequency of recall
appointments. These decisions are informed by the patient’s age, medical history, social history (e.g. self-care,
habits or diet) and the clinical assessment. Patients are categorised according to RAG status with high,
medium or low risk of oral disease. The treatment protocols consist of evidence-based preventative care and
advice, restorative care and designated recall intervals. Patients who are considered ‘red’ are limited to
stabilisation and lowering risk status. Statuses are reviewed at future appointments with the potential for
patients to move between groups, for example moving from ‘red’ to ‘amber’ (see Table 2).
The three newly commissioned dental practices were in areas of high oral health need and with high
demand for NHS dental care. The largest practice (practice 2) was located in an area of Bradford with a
predominantly white population with high levels of deprivation. Practice 1 was in a neighbouring town
in an area of material deprivation but with an ethnically diverse population (over 50% of Pakistani/
Bangladeshi origin). Practice 3 was the smallest practice with only two surgeries. It was located in a
predominantly white affluent area (among the 10% least deprived wards in the country), yet lacked access
to NHS dental care.
In this chapter we report on the qualitative research to explore stakeholder perspectives of the new service
delivery model. We describe meanings of key aspects of the model across three stakeholder groups
{lay people [i.e. patients and non-patients (non-patients are defined as individuals not having a dentist)],
commissioners and the primary care dental teams}, with framework analysis of focus group and
semistructured interview data.
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Methods
Our focus lies on the three newly commissioned dental practices working under the blended/incentive-
driven contracts (incentive practices) and three dental practices working under traditional nGDS contracts
(traditional practices). The traditional practices were included in the study as comparators and were
matched with the incentive practices by deprivation index, age profile, size of practice and ethnicity.
Details of all six practices are given in Table 3.
The qualitative study uses focus groups and semistructured interviews, supplemented with observations
made during dental appointments of the delivery of dental care in the incentive practices and the
traditional practices.
Purposive sampling via a sampling matrix supported recruitment of participants with different experiences
of the model. The three stakeholder groups were lay people (i.e. patients and non-patients), dental teams
(i.e. dental practitioners, dental care professionals and practice managers) and service commissioners.
TABLE 3 Characteristics of the three incentive and three traditional practices
Demographics Incentive practices Traditional practices
Type of contract Blended contract: UDA and incentives for health
promotion/prevention activity
Working under 2006 NHS dental contract
(nGDS contract)
Practice Practice 1 Practice 2 Practice 3 Practice 4 Practice 5 Practice 6
Established 2008 2009 2009 > 10 years > 10 years > 10 years
Operated as Part of a large
corporate
provider
Independent
provider
Part of a social
enterprise
organisation
Part of a large
corporate
provider
Independent
provider
Independent
provider
Location Centre of
large town
South-east
Bradford
In an affluent
market town
Centre of
large town
North-west
Bradford
South-west
Bradford
Percentage of
households with at
least one dimension
of deprivation
(employment,
education, health and
disability, housing)a
74.6 71 42. 74.6 51 53.9
Number of GDPs 4 5 2 6 7 2
Multidisciplinary team
(e.g. hygienists or
therapistsb)
1 therapist 2 therapists 1 therapist 2 hygienists 1 hygienist None
Number of surgeries 5 5 2 7 6 2
Population ethnicitya 51.3%
Pakistani/
Bangladeshi
79.4%
white British
94%
white British
51.3%
Pakistani/
Bangladeshi
92.8%
white British
89.2%
white British
GDP, general dental practitioner.
a Taken from 2011 Census (www.postcodearea.co.uk/postaltowns/bradford).
b The composition changed over the course of the project as staff changed. For example, practice 1 included a hygienist,
therapist and oral health educator over the study lifetime.
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Encounters were observed in two incentive and two traditional practices. Staff were purposively sampled
across the range of skill mix so that similar numbers (15 each) of dentists and dental hygienists/therapists
were observed. All eligible adult patients (aged ≥ 18 years) with appointments with the participating staff
on the scheduled day of observation were invited to participate. At 2 weeks before their appointments,
patients were sent a letter informing them of the study, a study information leaflet and a consent form.
Patients who expressed interest in the observations were given the opportunity to ask any questions and
give consent on the day of their appointment. The ‘non-participant’ observer attended appointments
passively at a distance close enough to hear the conversation to take comprehensive field notes. A brief
analysis of observations was conducted as soon as possible after the observation (the same day or the
following day).
Observations were followed by interviews with clinicians, resulting in the participation of four dentists and four
dental hygienists/therapists that took place on the same day. Staff were asked to comment on the observed
encounters and share their views on what had taken place. Questions asked at the post-observation interview
were influenced by the nature of the activity in the encounters and the team member’s attitude, expectations
and impressions and reflections on the experience. Interviews were recorded and transcribed verbatim.
Interviews were also conducted with patients, lay people recruited through community settings,
commissioners and dental team members (see Tables 4 and 5).
Lay people were recruited for the interviews in two ways. The research team gave practices information
packs to mail to patients. Potential participants indicated interest in the research by returning their contact
details in a Freepost envelope and were then contacted to arrange an interview. Lay people who were
not patients included representatives of community groups in the locality. The researcher contacted the
gatekeeper of community organisations to explain the study and provide research information and enlisted
their help in recruitment. Focus groups were held with groups attending a community centre, including
one aimed at parents with young children and another attended by older residents. In addition, snowball
sampling entailed existing participants passing the study information and the researcher’s contact details
on to acquaintances to invite them to take part.62 The inclusion criteria for lay people were that they
should be aged ≥ 16 years and willing to be interviewed. People with no natural teeth were excluded.
Ethics approval
Ethics approval was obtained from the National Research Ethics Service (NRES) Committee [London –
Bromley, Research Ethics Committee (REC) reference 12/LO/0205] on 5 April 2012. Informed consent was
obtained from all participants prior to any qualitative enquiry. The study was sponsored by the University
of Leeds, Leeds, UK.
Data were collected between August 2012 and February 2014 by two research associates, who were social
scientists rather than dentists. Interviews and focus groups followed a topic guide, partly informed by the
theoretical framework (see Appendices 1 and 2) but supplemented with themes that emerged from
the observations and previous interviews. Interviews with dental team members took place at the dental
surgery, while interviews with patients took place in patients’ homes. All were recorded and transcribed
verbatim. Interviews lasted between 15 and 70 minutes.
Theoretical framework
The Andersen behavioural model of access was employed as the theoretical framework for the qualitative
analysis (Figure 1 shows a simplified depiction). The model sees access as ‘the use of personal health
services and everything that facilitates or impedes their use’63 and distinguishes between ‘potential’ and
‘realised’ access. Potential access is measured according to enabling variables such as the availability
of care or supply of health-care workers. ‘Realised access’ refers to services actually used or ‘utilisation’.63
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Originally developed 40 years ago as a model of health-care utilisation, the model has evolved in line with
advances in understanding that have moved from an individual focus to incorporate the interaction
between the individual, the health-care system and the external environment.63–65 The revisions have not
altered its basic foundations, but have added components to it. Later versions introduced health and
patient satisfaction as desirable outcomes of health care, which were said to be determined by
predisposing and enabling factors, behaviours and need. Findings from studies in many areas of health
care, and dentistry in particular, support its use.66,67
Enabling factors relate to the policies, facilities, staff and the organisation of services that might influence
utilisation.65 It is helpful to consider enabling factors as a spectrum, with different qualities of the same
factors either facilitating or challenging service use. Policies, guidelines, rules, practices, contracts, resources
and reform define the nature and delivery of care. Financial factors can include the funding and
affordability of health care. Organisational factors refer to the structures and processes that influence the
availability and distribution of health services, and the personnel and how accommodating they may be to
patients’ needs.
From this perspective the blended/incentive-driven contract being evaluated in this study is an enabling
factor with health policy, financial and organisational facets. The government has made policy commitments
to oral health and dentistry with focus on improving the oral health of the population, particularly children,
introducing a new NHS primary dental care contract and increasing access to NHS dentistry.18,68 Other
relevant drivers included the recommendations of the Steele report2 and the evidence-based prevention of
Delivering Better Oral Health: An Evidence Based Toolkit for Prevention.35
The contract replaces some of the financial emphasis on the volume of treatment with incentives for
quality and changed outcomes. These incentives were based on the concept of providing care for a
population rather than patients via organisational changes such as the use of care pathways, the provision
of evidence-based care and the use of skill mix.
Health-care need may be seen as the potential to benefit from care and requires both a health problem
and an effective intervention.69 Health needs may include health education, disease prevention, diagnosis,
treatment, rehabilitation and palliative care.
The Andersen behavioural model distinguishes between evaluated (professionally defined or normative)
and perceived (personally defined or felt) need70 but recognises that there are social aspects of evaluated
need, which can be influenced by technological developments and clinical guidelines.
In some versions of the model predisposing, enabling factors and need are distinguished at the contextual
or individual levels. Contextual characteristics operate at a population or combined level, drawing attention
to the environment or the circumstances in which health care is delivered. The most recent versions of
the model have seen the context and individual levels arranged sequentially with contextual predisposing
and enabling factors and need influencing similar factors for individuals.
Predisposing
Demographic 
Social
Beliefs
Enabling
Health Policy
Organisation
Need
Population
Subjective
Behaviours
Personal
Process of care
Use of services
Outcomes
Perceived health
Evaluated health
Patient satisfaction
FIGURE 1 Andersen’s behavioural model of access (adapted from Baker63).
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In turn, these components could influence personal and professional health behaviours. Personal
behaviours are activities that shape health status, such as oral hygiene, diet and tobacco use. Health
service use is treated as behaviour in itself. Professional behaviours relate to the processes of medical care,
such as health education, clinician–patient communication and prescribing behaviour. Both personal and
professional behaviours may be amenable to changes via enabling factors and will influence the nature
and volume of treatment provided.
The outcomes are (1) perceived and evaluated health status and (2) patient satisfaction. The maintenance
and improvement of health should be the primary outcome of access and is a central target of the dental
contract reform programme.68 Perceived health status indicates how much an individual can live a
‘functional, comfortable and pain free existence’.65 This definition is akin to OHQoL, which may be defined
as ‘the impacts of oral disorders on everyday life that are important to people and of sufficient magnitude
to affect perception of their life overall’.71 However, other patient-reported outcomes could be used,
such as general health perceptions. Evaluated health status requires a professional assessment of clinical
status. Patient satisfaction has a bearing on patient health outcomes, with greater satisfaction being
related to health improvement via adherence, involvement with treatment and continued use of services.
An important feature of the model is its recursive nature, with feedback loops so that the outcomes of
access have the potential to influence future predisposing and enabling factors, population needs and use
of services.
Analysis
Data were analysed in two phases. First, pen portraits of the practices are used to give the data context.
Within the second phase the principal approach used framework analysis to induce the results from the
variety of original accounts across stakeholder groups within the structured policy focus of the research.32,33
The focus of the analysis was to explore the effect of the contract as it interacted as an enabling factor
with other stages of the model. Analysis adhered to the following process:
1. familiarisation with the data
2. identifying the thematic framework
3. indexing
4. charting
5. mapping and interpreting.32
A member of the research team (MH) studied the field notes and transcripts of the post-observation
interviews. This process of familiarisation (familiarisation with the data) enabled identification of emerging
themes in the data set.72 Although Andersen’s behavioural model guided the thematic framework in
principle, data were not forced into an a priori model. Instead, the framework was refined as required
(identifying the thematic framework). Data generated from the post-observation interviews were indexed
according to the particular theme to which they corresponded (indexing) and lifted from their original text
and placed under subheadings derived from the framework (charting). The themes were flexible and
modified as necessary. Data were organised by theme to enable a process of constant comparison across
themes and cases. The framework analysis served to either confirm or challenge the model. A form of
deviant case analysis was intended to be used to add new categories or revise the model.
The validity of the findings was supported by discussion of interim and final results for triangulation and
corrections with participants in focus groups. The results were also compared against existing knowledge,
such as the evaluations of the NHS dental contract pilots.30
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Results
Pen portraits of the practices are presented in Table 3 to set the context of the study. The qualitative
results of the principal analysis are presented in two stages. First, the major themes in the data are
outlined. Second, the interactions between the themes, focusing particularly on the interactions between
enabling (i.e. service organisation) and other factors, are described.
Three study practices (1, 2 and 3) were using the blended/incentive-driven contract approach, referred to
as incentive. These were matched to three control practices (4, 5 and 6) operating nGDS contracts,
referred to as traditional, according to the number of general dental practitioner (GDP) surgeries in the
area, list size and the deprivation index and ethnicity of the local populace.
Practice 1
Practice 1 is situated in the centre of a large town several miles from Bradford. The practice is based within
the one of the 10% most deprived wards in the country, with associated adverse income, living
environment, education, health and employment indicators. The practice estimates that approximately
80% of its patients are eligible for benefits and a similar proportion are white British, despite the ethnicity
of around 50% of the local population being of Pakistani/Bangladeshi origin. The practice was established
in 2008 and is operated by a very large national corporate provider. Its team consists of four GDPs and one
dental therapist.
Practice 2
Practice 2 is located at the south-east edge of Bradford, adjacent to a large council estate. Bradford ranks
16th in the most deprived local authority areas in England. The area served by the practice originally had a
white British population, although it has become more ethnically diverse in recent years and has a traveller
community. The people of this area had experienced difficulties with access to dental care for many years,
with limited care available in the area and a local unwillingness to travel for care.
Established in 2009, the practice is owned by an independent contractor with two other practices (not part
of the blended/incentive-driven contract). The practice has five surgeries, a separate decontamination room
and staff training room. It employs five dentists and two dental therapists. Almost all of its treatment is
provided under the NHS (99.5%).
This practice experienced a higher staff turnover than the other study practices, which was attributed
anecdotally to the associates being early-career dentists eager to take up a post but not necessarily
a commitment to practising in the locality in the long term. Lack of opportunities to carry out complex
treatments was also thought to be a factor.
Practice 3
Practice 3 is located in an affluent market town several miles from Bradford, which has lacked NHS
dental provision. It was established in 2009 and the provider is part of a social enterprise organisation.
It has two surgeries, two dentists and one dental therapist. During the research, one GDP left this practice.
The original practice manager was replaced, but later returned.
Three comparison practices (4, 5 and 6) continued to work under the terms of the 2006 NHS dental
contract and were matched to the blended/incentive-driven practices according to the number of GDP
surgeries, list size, and the deprivation index and ethnicity of the local populace.
Practice 4
Practice 4 is close to practice 1 and part of a group that operates more than 200 practices in the UK. With
more than 10,000 NHS patients the practice is not currently taking on any new patients. Almost all (96%)
of the work is provided under the NHS. There are seven surgeries, staffed by six GDPs. Two dental
hygienists are employed.
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Practice 5
Practice 5 is an independent practice on the outskirts of Bradford and is the longest serving practice in the
study (over 30 years). It has six dental surgeries with seven GDPs and one dental hygienist, who is available
on a private basis. One dentist’s services include non-surgical procedures such as fillers.
Practice 6
Practice 6 is an independent practice run by two dentists. There are no dental hygienists or therapists, but
the practice provides a full range of NHS treatments (except orthodontics) to all members of the public.
It also provides private treatment including sedation for anxious patients.
Qualitative results
Observations were made during 30 dental appointments. Eighteen lay people, 15 dental team staff and a
member of the commissioning team took part in the interviews and focus groups (Tables 4 and 5).
TABLE 4 Brief descriptions of 18 lay participants
Pseudonym Practice Details
Michael 2 In his early forties, recently made redundant, former army, cohabiting
with partner
Shazia 2 Community worker, in her thirties, married with children
Katie 2 Mother of two, in her twenties, lives with partner, receiving benefits
Tony 2 Tony and Jeanette are a married couple. Tony is aged 66 years and is
visually impaired. Jeanette (aged 65 years) is in a wheelchair following
a stroke. Moved to practice 2 because their previous dentist lacked
wheelchair access
Jeanette 2
Ian 3 Married couple in their mid-forties
Grace 3
Martin 3 Married police officer, in his forties, with two children
Lara 1 Housewife, in her thirties, married with children
Nanush 1 Married housewife with three children, in her thirties
Alison Patient at a traditional practice Working mother of one, in her thirties
Carol Patient at a traditional practice Stay-at-home mother of two, in her forties
Kat Patient at a traditional practice Stay-at-home mother of two, in her twenties. Her children attend an
incentive practice
Natalie No dentist Mother of two, in her twenties, lone parent, receiving benefits
Johanna No dentist Focus group with three women in their seventies and eighties.
Each had dentures to varying degrees
May No dentist
Mary No dentist
Ann Discontinued incentive patient Housewife in her fifties
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The Andersen behavioural model framework was sustained in the data, with the only revision being the
addition of trust as an outcome of access. During the analysis, the implications of the epistemological
position of the model became apparent. A wider debate may be required about enabling the use of social
resources for health and the position of health services within that. This debate is introduced in the
discussion. The results described are supported by anonymised quotes from the data.
The qualitative results are presented in two sections. The first demonstrates the fit between the data and
the Andersen model and the second examines the effect of the new contract as interactions between
enabling and other factors in the model.
Predisposing factors
Predisposing factors could be characterised as demographic and social characteristics and beliefs.
For example, family commitment could facilitate or hamper service utilisation and one participant (Grace)
noted the effect of changing attitudes over time.
I can’t remember where I go, I wish I could. My daughter takes me to all my appointments.
Mary, no dentist
I think the danger is when you’re a professional this is what you do for a living, it’s a danger as its
making an assumption that everybody else thinks it’s as important as you, and it is down to education
and you know we see ourselves very much as a practice set up to educate and to inform. When you’re
dealing with the demographic and you know the type of community we are working with, you’ve got
to be very careful not to be patronising, you have to be very careful because you know everybody’s
need is different and everybody’s circumstances, you know we shouldn’t just assume that because we
think it’s important that they will.
Sarah, incentive dentist
I think and it’s something that kind of you’re very aware for your children as well aren’t you? I think
when I was younger there was a different kind of attitude towards it and I only went to the dentist if
there was a problem and I think attitudes have changed now and I think that its, you know you’re
much more proactive in making sure that your children go and they get seen and that type of thing.
Grace, incentive patient
These data suggest that from the patients’ perspectives predisposing factors are things that either hamper
or enhance their ability to access care. For the providers it involves fitting the service to what the dentist
thinks the patient needs. The last quotation indicates a generational change and changing attitudes to
the dentist.
TABLE 5 Participants professionally associated with dentistry
Participants n
Traditional practice dentists 4
Incentive practice dentists 8
Dental practice managers 2
Dental therapists 1
Commissioners 1
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Enabling factors
Compatible with the underlying framework, enabling factors fell into three subthemes of health policy,
finance and organisations. The influence of health policy appeared in the data between the extremes of
the changes associated with implementation of the blended/incentive-driven contract right through to
an apparent lack of policy in some practices.
There’s going to be challenges in terms of its new, so you’ve constantly got perhaps a more
demanding type of commissioning process. From a commissioner’s perspective as I mentioned earlier it
takes more time.
Service commissioner
We don’t have any guidelines or anything.
Dentist at feedback event, traditional practice
A key part of the contract was the remuneration of dentists and thus finance was a rich theme. On the
one hand traditional models of service use were problematic for the treatment of complex cases, whereas
the problem for incentive practices became much more focused on the costs of OHAs and building
relationships with patients that would enable more prevention.
The current [2006] contract works to an extent but means treating complex cases is difficult. I’m here
to make a profit and a living. There’s no point me being here if that’s not going to happen. I’ve
trained for a long time, I have laboratory costs to cover, I need to make money. Complex cases are
difficult in this contract.
Adam, traditional practice dentist
The cost of doing that [OHAs] is far higher than was first anticipated, so if we were to put that as a
separate issue we would say that it’s the costs prediction. The estimation of what it would cost to run
this has been very underestimated, because it does take more time. It takes us away from doing,
because we’re trying to get patients, encourage them, chase them so much it actually takes an hour
for a clinician to build that relationship in the first place and then it’s about compliance and so that
was collaboration, its maintaining that, it’s very hard to do.
Business manager, incentive practice
Computing problems featured as organisational factors.
Some of the challenges around things like the software I think have been hard and that’s been
symptomatic because we’re using a software system that has to generate, its geared up for payment
system as well as a clinical and reception management, patient management system and we’re trying
to alter it to continue to provide some of the data that the contract demands around UDA generation
but also around capturing some of the data that we want and because we’re such a small customer,
it’s hard to influence that.
Service commissioner
The only disadvantage is I think in my opinion is the software, there are so many different varieties of
software around and they have not prepared themselves to be really in tune or to deliver the type
of things which are needed for this pilot, for this kind of service so that is very generic dental software,
dental services software. Well in my opinion, the software should have been tweaked much before
implementing this contract.
Amiya, incentive dentist
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Need
Evaluated and environmental need and population health indicators were manifest in the data.
Two localities in the study are characterised by material deprivation, poor oral health and long-standing
undersupply of care. Unsurprisingly, this influenced dental treatment needs in these areas.
It would add up to perhaps eight dental visits just for one course of treatment and that will be just to
stabilise the patients. There were an awful lot of extractions that were needed. Some patients do
struggle obviously with substance misuse, and smoking is quite a major factor as well . . . We still do
get those new patients who come in more or less the same state who require an awful lot of
dental treatment.
Jennifer, incentive dentist
Treatment needs are so high and there’s a lot of neglected mouths. Some haven’t seen a dentist in
years. Some have lost the motivation to maintain their oral health because of this. So there’s a lot of
preparatory work.
Donna, incentive therapist
Health behaviours
Health behaviours involve personal health practices (such as teeth brushing or sugar consumption), the
process of care (e.g. the delegation of care or other dental team behaviours) or the use of health resources
(such as attending or not attending appointments). Personal practices can influence oral health positively
or negatively:
There’s relationship between what you eat and your teeth and your health . . . They told us about
what toothpaste to use and gave us some. They told us about drinking fizzy, time of day to brush
teeth. I’ve changed it a bit and drink water now.
Jennifer, incentive patient
A novel aspect of the process of care involved the assessing patient’s risk of disease. Dental team members
commented on the relative imprecision of the traffic light system and its three categories. However,
concerns about imprecise systems were not restricted to the risk assessments.
Patients who are amber may be very red because of their diet and because of other things so a couple
of amber should make it red, not amber. The software doesn’t pick out some of the differences.
Suneeta, incentive dentist
Focusing on UDAs, the three bands I think can be an issue, some of the dentists have said they think
there should be more bands obviously just lumping all restorative work, apart from that needing lab
work, into band 2, it could be anything from a simple filing to a very complex molar re-root canal
treatment, it does seem a bit wacky.
Business manager, incentive practice
Attitudes and practices towards prevention varied appreciably among the dental teams:
All the dentists do give advice, you know the preventative advice, to all the patients whether under
the contract or not.
Suneeta, incentive dentist
I have been here 12 years and have well-established relationships with my patients. I do find it hard to
talk about their health – I’m trained to drill and fill.
Ian, traditional practice dentist
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The use of health resources might involve attending or not attending appointments and accessing the
wider dental team such as a dental hygienist.
I went through like a stage where I didn’t go for about 3 years but that was, I went back about
5 years ago, I don’t know why I didn’t go, I just stopped going and I think then you get thrown off
the register.
Alison, traditional patient
They gave me an appointment because I need a filling and when it came day before I were panicking
and worrying, I just cancelled it because at end of day I’m not going through that you know tight
chest and I’m not going through all that because at end of day it’s not my fault is it? Sweets I’ve had.
Ann, incentive patient
I’ve started going to this one I’ve actually seen an oral hygienist, whilst I was private dental care I was
never even offered to see somebody so this is the first time I’ve actually seen one.
Holly, incentive patient
Outcomes
Evaluated or perceived health and satisfaction with care were present in the data, as was the concept of
trust. A dentist noticed his patients’ improved health and patients trusted and were satisfied with their
dentist, although one disliked an interval of 2 years before they could have another assessment:
I think according to recalls they have improved their brushing, they are using fluoride toothpaste more,
they have started smoking less so there is general improvement in their oral health as well and their
attitudes towards oral health.
Manish, incentive dentist
They’re really good. I think they’ve got more of a modern approach there whereas the other ones still
a bit, I don’t know seems a bit dated.
Kat, parent of an incentive patient, patient at a traditional practice
I do trust them here – they treated me, gave me root canal treatment and saved my tooth, without
them, I’d have been minus a few teeth and my appearance would not have been good.
Nanush, incentive patient
The effects of the blended/incentive-driven contract: interactions in the data
The blended/incentive-driven contract changes the finance and organisation of dental practices to
implement health policy. Its effects can therefore be seen as interactions between these enabling factors
and other stages in the model.
Enabling and predisposing factors and need
The incentive practices were located in areas of high need, either associated with deprivation and disease
or with the poor availability of NHS care.
We’d carried out quite a robust oral health needs assessment prior to commissioning these practices
and we’d looked very closely at equity in terms of access to dental care, so we’d looked for places
where there was very poor oral health and also looked at areas where there was limited access to
services and we wanted a combination of those. The sites of the practices therefore were chosen on
oral health needs, current access to NHS care, transport systems and so on.
Service commissioner
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For some participants, the incentive practices marked a shift from no dental care, whereas others moved
from private to NHS provision. Participants reported the impact of the new services that suited their needs
in terms of location, personnel and ease of getting an appointment. Participants referred to the difficulties
they had encountered accessing a NHS dentist:
Finding an NHS dentist has been really, really difficult and that’s why I have quite strong views on that
to be honest with you. We lived somewhere else and we had an NHS dentist and then when we
moved, you know what it’s like and then you lose your place and then you end up on a waiting list
waiting for absolutely ages. Then we heard about this one.
Jane, incentive patient
Enabling and behaviour
The effects of the new contract could be detected on the processes of care, on personal health practices
and the use of personal health resources. In turn, the process of care appeared to be affected in three
ways: by the use of the care pathway, by increasing the amount of prevention and the use of skill mix.
The care pathways form an important feature of the Steele report,2 the reformed NHS contract pilots18 and
the blended/incentive-driven model reported here. Initial OHAs for each patient guide treatment and the
frequency of recall appointments. Participants reflected on their experiences with the pathways. Benefits
included the clear link between the risk assessment and care pathways.
I think some of the people were saying you know if you have a red patient there’s only limited
treatment options available for that patient until they start moving from red to amber or green,
whichever. And I think that was quite a contentious issue, just to leave them in the state and then
wait until they got more progressed through from each stage before you can start doing treatments.
But I mean the actual process makes sense in the sense that you know there’s no point carrying
out such complex treatment on someone who can’t, who is failing to kind of maintain that level of
oral hygiene because it can just make it worse.
Amiya, incentive dentist
The blended/incentive-driven contract formalised Department of Health guidance35 from the perspective
of clinicians. As treatment plans incorporated preventative treatment, these approaches became
standard procedure.
Red, amber or green and then they do get the fluoride varnish, the smoking cessation and alcohol use
is being taken automatically. And then obviously depending on the age groups with the fluoride
varnish, depending on the categories, while the schedule of the appointments are set then and the
recalls so it’s kind of, it’s part of our contract. We don’t do anything else.
David, incentive dentist
The blended/incentive-driven contract can be contrasted directly with the traditional practices (i.e. those
operating under the 2006 contract). In this case the focus of care in the incentive contract had penetrated
a traditional practice, causing them to reflect on their processes of care:
We are pushed towards UDAs rather than improving oral health . . . The prevention emphasis is an
issue – we are expected to talk about perio disease and smoking and diet and have to squeeze that in.
We did that before under the old system and it worked to an extent, but we have to do more and
more without getting paid anymore. We have to do more in less time.
Sidney, traditional practice dentist
STAKEHOLDER PERSPECTIVES OF THE BLENDED/INCENTIVE-DRIVEN SERVICE DELIVERY MODEL
NIHR Journals Library www.journalslibrary.nihr.ac.uk
20
The feeling about the incentive/blended-driven contract as an enabler of preventative approaches was
echoed by clinicians in all three incentive practices. Although such systems are not specific to the incentive
model and reflect long-standing guidance,35 the formalisation of such procedures under this model was
valued by service providers. Practitioners felt that it gave them time and space to care for patients.
By contrast, communication of the ratings was not always apparent in the observations. Moreover, patients
might not be aware of it:
I: Thinking back to your initial assessment as well, I don’t know if your dentist, do they use the traffic
light system?
K: No, what’s that?
I: There’s nothing where they kind of rate your oral health or anything like that?
K: No.
Katie, incentive patient
The incentive practices were not required to use multidisciplinary teams, but the successful bidders
employed business models that utilised dental hygienists and dental therapists to deliver prevention-focused
care. This wider use of skill mix has been advocated by repeated policy documents but not widely
implemented.7,37,73,74 One novel approach was for dentists to examine the patients and formulate treatment
plans, but the practices did not deduct the value of the delegated treatment from dentists’ incomes.
The biggest advantage as well is, is that, it’s about mind set as well, if you are working in a normal
practice your dentists, your associate will be charged with using the therapist, the hygienist and so
therefore your dentist is, your associate is less likely to use your therapist and hygienist because they
don’t want to pay for them. Here they get it for absolutely free.
Anna, incentive practice manager
They readily work with each other. I mean our therapist and the hygienist are generally busy the whole
day, which they say they don’t normally get in other practices so, and we pay them on a fixed rate
and the therapists are very happy with that because they’ve got full time work, they’re busy, the
associates are happy because they’re not having to pay for them . . ., the patients get benefit because
they get access to a therapist, . . . it may cost more for us to do it but it’s a more sensible way of
running a business because everybody is working together for the same aim.
Claire, incentive practice manager
That’s definitely an advantage obviously because there’s more appointments available now so you can
see more patients.
Fiona, Dentist, incentive practice
The new contractual arrangements were seen to influence personal health practices and the use of
personal health resources. Lara changed her personal routines and attended the dental hygienist.
I’ve been prescribed Duraphat® [(Thepenier Pharma Industrie, SAS, Mortange, France)] fluoride
toothpaste, I use interdental brushes and see the hygienist. I take advice on board and I don’t want to
get told off. So I’ve changed my routine. I didn’t know you could go to a hygienist until I came here.
Lara, incentive patient
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Enabling and outcomes
The blended/incentive-driven contract also influenced outcomes of perceived and evaluated health and
patient satisfaction.
They managed to sort my mouth so that I can actually smile now and feel confident about my smile,
I don’t feel like it’s, or people are looking at my teeth anymore which, I mean it’s a massive
improvement, it makes you confidence so much more, it makes you feel better about yourself when
you know that someone is helping you sort something that you know is a big problem. You feel
self-confident about it.
Shazia, incentive patient
I have been working here for 2 years plus so I can see that the patients from the deprived area, yes,
I think according to recalls they have improved their brushing, they are using fluoride toothpaste more,
they have started smoking less so there is general improvement in their oral health as well and their
attitudes towards oral health.
Jane, incentive dentist
Generally making you feel better at going, I feel much happier going to the dentist now than I did a
year ago.
Carol, incentive patient
That’s really good because I don’t know maybe the hygienists have got a bit more time and if it’s
something they’re trained to do that’s fine rather than taking up the dentist time which is more
specialist work. I mean I know my daughters been to see the hygienist, you know about brushing her
teeth and they gave her some Duraphat cream.
Grace, incentive patient
Far-reaching effects
The interactions could ripple throughout the model to have far-reaching effects. For example, the RAG
ratings could influence patients’ perceptions of their own needs, leading to personal behaviour changes
and satisfaction (an outcome).
I think it’s good because if you know, if someone says to you, you know on this rating you are more
at risk, you’re more likely to do something about it aren’t you, as opposed to someone not saying
anything to you, you know, I think you are likely to be more active. I would be more active but I think
it gives people that, again it’s about having that bit more choice and a bit more involvement in your
own kind of care which I think is a good thing.
Grace, incentive patient
Using the ratings to determine recall intervals liberated more time for the process of care and allowed
observation of increased health but influenced patient satisfaction both positively and negatively:
The recall intervals will be according to the risk assessments that we are doing and the risk assessment
is based on their medical, their social and their clinical domains and patient to understand it and they
are really happy, the majority of them 99% are very happy to have the recall intervals as dictated by
their risk assessment . . . The recall intervals of 2 years and a year for the green and the amber patients
so we are definitely seeing more patients and as the amber ones move towards green or the reds
move towards green so we would be having more appointments for the patients to be seen.
Manish, incentive dentist
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2 years seemed a long time to wait . . . I sort of think umm would I be prepared to pay a premium
price and go back to private care as a result of that and that’s something that I’ll have to
consider really.
Martin, incentive patient
These data suggest a need to reconcile contrasting views. From the dentist’s perspective there is the ability
to see more patients and hence increase access. At its best, the incentive model seems to enable greater
access because it prioritises those who need treatment and rebalances appointments around need.
However, the patient was not happy with waiting 2 years for another assessment and may consider
seeking alternative or additional care.
In a wholly positive example, a patient satisfied with her own care encouraged her partner to attend so
that professional behaviour enhanced satisfaction to change predisposing factors to increase access
to care.
. . . fantastic and the dentist themselves are really friendly. They’re really understanding, I mean for me
I’m not somewhat scared of the dentist as my partner and it’s made a real improvement for my
partner because he’s terrified of them so, and we’ve actually managed to get him there and he’s
having work done there which is an improvement, usually trying to get him through the door of the
dentist was a real effort, it took a day to get him there, get him sorted and get him home again.
So I mean from that point of view they’ve just been absolutely fantastic with both him and me.
Holly, incentive patient
In summary, participants’ observations are compatible with existing knowledge of access to care, but
highlight possible effects of the incentive contract (Figure 2). In particular, patients’ needs were seen to
influence the siting of practices. The contract had a number of direct effects on practice orientation and
costs. However, participants related these effects to better health-related behaviours on the part of
patients and changes in dental practice behaviours regarding assessments, prevention, patient
communication, the use of skill mix, the number of patients seen and recall intervals. In turn, these
changes were related to improvements in perceived and evaluated health, patient satisfaction and trust.
Predisposing
Demographic 
Social
Beliefs
Outcomes
Perceived health
Evaluated health
Patient satisfaction
Patient trust in team
Contract
Practices sited
to meet need
Preventative
orientation
Need
Patient 
perceptions
Case volume
Case complexity
Behaviours
Oral hygiene
Diet and tobacco
Use of services
FIGURE 2 Summary of stakeholders’ perspectives on the incentive contract.
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Discussion
This chapter has reported the exploration of stakeholders’ views of the new contracting arrangements.
There were perceptions that the blended/incentive-driven contract increased access to dental care,
with the contract determining dentists’ and patients’ perceptions of need, their behaviours, evaluated and
subjective health outcomes and patient satisfaction. These outcomes were then seen to feed back to shape
people’s predispositions to visit the dentist. The data hint at appreciable challenges related to a general
refocusing of care and especially to perceptions about preventative dentistry and use of the risk
assessments and care pathways. There are also obstacles to overcome to realise any benefits of the greater
deployment of skill mix. Dentists may need support in these areas and to recognise the differences
between caring for individual patients and caring for segments of the population, such as that formed by
the patient base of a practice.
The impact of the contract is evident as interactions with other stages in the model. There was ample
evidence of such interactions.
The ratings from OHAs were seen to influence patients’ perceptions of need, which led to changes
in preventative behaviour. There was also ample evidence that dentists’ behaviours were adapting in
response to the contract in the desired way with greater emphasis on prevention, use of the ratings
in treatment planning, adherence to the pathways and the utilisation of skill mix. Participants identified
increases in the capacity of practices to deliver more care as a result. These changes were seen to improve
evaluated and perceived health and patient satisfaction. These findings are compatible with the patient
and staff feedback on the first year of the NHS dental contract pilots, with almost three-quarters of
patients saying they had a better understanding of their oral health and had changed their behaviour.30
Furthermore, the Department of Health has analysed matched pairs of OHAs and oral health reviews
between 2011 and 2013 that suggest improved RAG ratings for small numbers of patients, even within
this relatively short time span.20
Moreover, better health and satisfaction fed back with explicit examples in which people were more
predisposed to visit the dentist. These findings demonstrate the potential for the new contract to increase
access to high-quality services and to improve health and provide support for the continued use of contract
reform in the forthcoming prototypes.75 However, dentists may need support and training to maximise
this potential.
Several areas of the contract were also identified as requiring more careful consideration, for which NHS
England, dental teams and the public may need more support if this potential is to be realised.
The practices were placed in areas of high need, in some cases related to social deprivation, although in
the case of one practice unmet need had been associated with low levels of NHS dental provision in an
affluent area. As well as meeting immediate needs, the perception of low availability of care may also be a
barrier to access in areas that have been underserved in the past. Evidence of new services is therefore
needed to break this cycle.
The geographical location of the practices was based on addressing both unmet need and local NHS
demand for dental care. The commissioning process described the blended/incentive-driven contract and
asked bidders to describe their business model to deliver the contract requirements. The results
demonstrate direct benefits of the needs-led service commissioning that has been in place since the
inception of the 2006 dental contract and which allows for local commissioning arrangements.7,76
The forthcoming prototypes, which represent the next stage in the evolution of the NHS dental contract
reform programme,75 will lack these local flexibilities. Although these local flexibilities remain with regard
to dental commissioning by the NHS Executive, they are utilised less in the current commissioning
arrangements. This may be a result of commissioning using a single operating model with less local
knowledge applied to practice commissioning. In addition, the new system is expected to use standardised
STAKEHOLDER PERSPECTIVES OF THE BLENDED/INCENTIVE-DRIVEN SERVICE DELIVERY MODEL
NIHR Journals Library www.journalslibrary.nihr.ac.uk
24
national values for capitation and activity, with weightings based on patient characteristics
of age and deprivation status. The level of these weightings will be important in influencing the
commissioning of new practices in areas of high need.
Successes in prevention were prominent in the data, with participants adopting a variety of preventative
professional and lay preventative behaviours leading to better evaluated and perceived health. This refocus
of care had also penetrated into traditional practices, with one dentist acknowledging that they were
pushed towards volume of treatment rather than improving health. However, there were concerns over
offering preventative advice, the complexities of accounting for the patient’s context, the time this took
and the difficulties of effective prevention, especially in areas with high levels of disease.
It is interesting that these aspects of dentistry are so often presented as problems, sometimes beyond the
scope of practitioners, rather than part of their job. Unlike the challenges of, for example, a difficult
restoration, some dentists regard particular aspects of preventative dentistry as beyond their remit.
One dentist declared ‘I do find it hard to talk about their health – I’m trained to drill and fill’. Earlier
research has indicated that some dentists regard prevention as ‘not their job’ and so there is still a case for
refocusing care towards prevention.50 This is a key issue if dentistry is to achieve the necessary change
indicated in the Five Year Forward View.77 These and other data indicate that change is possible if it
is encouraged by the right contractual model. Educational interventions may also be required to support
contractual drivers. Neither one alone is likely to be sufficient. A Cochrane review78 concluded that
educational meetings had a small effect on professional practice and health outcomes but the effects were
likely to be smaller still for complex behaviours. Both a systematic review of incentives to follow best
practice in health care79 and a Cochrane review of the effect of remuneration on primary care dentists’
behaviour cited within it27 concluded that financial incentives can have a ‘modest’ effect on improving the
quality of health care.
The emphasis on OHAs and pathways was a key feature of the blended/incentive-driven contract and the
NHS contract pilots.30 Some patients were not aware of the RAG ratings, whereas others perceived the
ratings as alerting them to their preventative needs and as a motivator. Others perceived them to be
potentially disempowering. Interested to find out how the dental teams were using the RAG ratings, we
specifically enquired about them when triangulating the data in focus groups with dental staff. There was
near universal use of the ratings as a decision aid (as evident in the data), but their use in patient
communication was said to have decreased over time. The use of RAG ratings in communication therefore
remains an opportunity that might be exploited. Dental teams will clearly benefit from clarification of if
and how the ratings are supposed to be communicated to patients.
The small number of categories within the rating system was a concern among dentists, especially for
patients who had risk factors such as general health problems, which would not change. Some
participants erroneously attributed this to the software rather than to the purpose of the OHA. Dentists’
concerns might be alleviated by the addition of new categories. Alternatively, they may become used
to this system and gain confidence in over-riding the rules of the pathway. Their reluctance to do this
may stem from the requirement to justify doing so. Dentists who engaged in the NHS contract reform
requested reassurance about exercising clinical judgement so that ‘there would be no medicolegal
repercussions arising from deviating from software recommendations provided there was evidence of
clinical justification’.80 Respondents wanted to be reassured that ‘over-riding’ software recommendations
would not subsequently be used to penalise dentists. An additional category of ‘light green’ was added to
the national contract pilots for instance, but dentists may need more training in working with
the pathways.
A prominent feature in the data was adherence to guidance on recall intervals. There was evidence that
both dentists and patients could be unhappy with longer recall intervals, although both groups were able
to adapt to it, which created more space, increasing access to other patients. One view was that the
extended recall intervals were too long. A dentist in a focus group acknowledged that he tended to adopt
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a maximum interval of annual recall, and this view was echoed by a Local Dental Committee in the recent
Dental Contract Reform Engagement Exercise: Detailed Findings.80 The dentist in the focus group could
distinguish between the stakes and the probability of missing new disease with a longer recall period but
did not recognise that missed diagnosis was less likely at a time of lower disease incidence. Neither the
review leading to the NICE guidance56 nor a Cochrane review on recall intervals81 could find any evidence
in favour of a particular time, thus the guidance was based on assessment of the risks associated with
different intervals. Although there is weight of history behind the 6-month dental check-up, its risks in
terms of the chances of overdiagnosis and reducing capacity may not be visible to practitioners. Dentists
may require a better understanding of these population effects to help them adapt to the new system.
The World Dental Federation has proposed dental education to emphasise these types of public
health perspectives.82
To some extent these problems may reflect the difficulties of any organisational change. Furthermore,
dentists may be mourning their loss of individuality and clinical freedom. Again, they may need support on
the nature of working with a system based on clinical guidelines and care pathways and on how to
deviate from the pathways including overcoming the medicolegal implications of doing so.
One aspect of working within a framework of care pathways involves incorporating the wishes of patients
with relatively strict guidelines. Participants were able to do this and indeed one patient referred to it as
‘modern’. The task of incorporation is illuminated by the work of Timmermans,83 who described how the
interventions used to resuscitate people created new identities for them. For example, the passive victim
receiving cardiopulmonary resuscitation with his shirt ripped open for defibrillator pads has essentially no
identity, but with luck becomes a recovering middle-aged man with modesty and personal worries
about family, work and recovery. These identities are primarily defined by the ‘scripts’ or protocols of
resuscitation that specify the relationships of the participants (passive victim, passer-by, rescuer, paramedic,
etc.). Paramedics and patients become tightly coupled to the technology, rendering the man’s more social
identities less relevant, to the point where they ‘disappear into the margin of the script’.83
Timmermans83 describes two key categories of marginality to the script. Some people may deliberately try
to set themselves aside from the script, by not wishing to be resuscitated. On the other hand, there are
those people (typically already in hospital) who do not get fully enrolled into the script because the medical
staff determine that they are not eligible.
Of course, dental treatment is rarely so dramatic as resuscitation, yet the script can be likened to the
pathways, and from this perspective an understanding of the effects of the script are helpful. First, people
may exercise a legitimate right not to engage with the pathway and may choose simply to have treatment
for the relief of pain, as was recognised in the Steele report.2 Second, as patients must be active
participants in their own care, dentists must reconcile the competing needs of adhering to the script and
not marginalising the wishes of their patients.
Dental team members in this research talked of the need to listen to and understand their patients,
and there were clear signs that patients appreciated that. Patient satisfaction and feeling sufficiently
involved in decisions about their care will be indicators of patient experience in the dental prototypes.75
This suggests a need for dental professionals to reconcile the tensions of integrating patients’ wishes into
evidence-based pathways. This would involve them acquiring a stronger understanding of evidence-based
care and the communication skills to listen to and negotiate with patients.
Dental therapists increased the availability of care and patient satisfaction. However, the use of skill mix
is exquisitely sensitive to contracting and practice finance.84 Practices increased the utilisation of dental
therapists by not reducing the payments to individual dentists who referred their patients to them.
Although seemingly paying two staff members for the same treatments, this approach incentivised referral,
thus liberating dentists’ time for patient OHAs and more remunerative complex treatments. This might be
further explored and evaluated in the evaluations of the forthcoming contract prototypes.75
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The impact of funding arrangements on dental practice is well known, and dentists must reconcile the
business and other elements of their practices.85,86 Revenue was a key factor in these data. Dentists could
see how the new contract carried the potential for greater value for money and the reduction of
unnecessary treatment. By contrast, there were concerns that the time spent with patients and therefore
the costs had been underestimated. In part these additional costs were associated with longer patient
OHAs, high levels of treatment needs and the need to work more quickly to maintain activity. The time
taken for the OHAs was also perceived as a problem in the NHS dental contract pilot sites and was evident
in reduced patient access.75,80 Other factors were also thought to be associated with decreases in patient
access in the pilots, including initial learning curves, culture change, the new pathway approaches,
information technology issues and the inability of providers to monitor access. Some of this reduction in
access was also attributed to the lack of financial risk carried by the practices, which will be overcome
in the forthcoming prototypes by placing up to 10% of contract value at risk if there is underdelivery.
This financial risk may be particularly relevant to new practices. The NHS dental contract pilots were
conducted in existing practices and experienced falls in access. However, the challenges may be even more
severe in new practices (such as the blended/incentive-driven practices included in this study), where all the
patients required comprehensive initial assessments and were more likely to have high treatment needs
necessitating more visits. This consideration goes further than dentists’ incomes as concerns about costs
were seen to influence practitioner behaviour.
These concerns support the notion of assigning contract values according to patient needs, which in the
contract prototypes will be achieved by weighting the capitation element by patient characteristics of age
and deprivation status.75
Software problems loomed large in the data as they have in the national pilots. To some extent, these
observations are not specific to this blended/incentive-driven contract, but reflect the difficulties of piloting
any new way of working. In this case, the software was developed for a relatively small number of
practices and may have needed further development. These comments echo those in the Dental Contract
Reform Engagement Exercise: Detailed Findings80 in which many participants commented on software that
needed to be simpler and less ‘click-heavy’. Our participants also wanted systems and software that were
easier to use, more flexible and responsive than the current ones. The software used in the national pilots
was refined in response to feedback like this.
The Andersen model provided a useful taxonomy for the data and allowed identification of the effects of
the new contract. This fit is unsurprising as the model was developed over a 40-year period and remains
among the most widely cited models of access to health care.64,65,67,87
Theoretical models may be tested empirically or by looking for logical coherence.88 The Andersen model is
somewhat general with overlapping dimensions (need and perceived health) and others (social capital,
culture, trust and social resources) not explicitly incorporated.67 Very little is said about the demographic
variables sex, age and marital status other than the fact that a particular community might have greater
proportions of older people that will affect their access to health services,87 with little detail on how this
might work and why. A new factor present in these data (‘trust’) is not explicit in the model but could be
regarded as both a belief and an outcome of care.89 Dimensions also overlap in the model where dissimilar
concepts are grouped together (personal health practices and health service use, perceived and evaluated
health and satisfaction). This is important because empirical testing demands careful specification of
inclusive relationships and to a certain extent this confounded testing of this model.67 One consequence of
this might be that the model yields very different results when cross-national comparisons are made.90
The basic taxonomic relationships in the later versions of the model place contextual before individual
characteristics (Figure 3).87 However, the variables within the demographic characteristics (socioeconomic
status, ethnicity, migrant status and educational attainment) could also be properties of individuals, so the
distinction between them is not always clear. An alternative approach might be to collapse this distinction
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and emphasise the predisposing factors and enabling resources. Figure 4 adopts this approach and allows
conceptualisation of both predisposing factors and resources as proximal, mesial and distal to individuals.67
Adding this dimension allows qualitative distinctions between broad demographic variables that are
characteristics of populations and those at individual level. It also enables us to place wider social and
environmental predisposing factors such as the levels of inequality in particular societies including broader
social policy into the model.91 Predisposing characteristics can also take the form of social factors that are
mesial to individuals, including social capital and individual deprivation and social support networks.92–95
In a similar vein, collapsing the distinction between contextual and individual characteristics allows us to
focus on what aspects make up enabling resources and how they impact on access to services. Health
policy includes the distribution and availability of resources. Thus, one strength of the Andersen model is
that it forces us to think about how social resources are configured and places their configuration and use
as central to population health outcomes. In this regard it can be characterised as a model of access
that focuses on the success and failure of social resources for health.96 With respect to oral health,
however, it also includes the methods and techniques for delivering optimum levels of fluoride to the
whole population. This might be achieved through public programmes of water fluoridation or
through consumerism.
The positioning of some variables within the causal chain might also be revised. Need is seen as a function
of predisposing characteristics and enabling resources. Need here can refer to the relief of symptoms or a
comprehensive service including preventative care.90 This creates difficulties in accounting for need as its
effect was masked because of its relationship to predisposing characteristics and enabling resources.67
Likewise, outcomes may overlap with need.67 Some measures of oral health are applied both as outcomes
and as indicators of need.97 Thus the content and meaning of need at different points in the model should
be considered. Harris90 argued that consumption of health services does not always reflect need as those
who might benefit most might not have access to services.98,99
Process of 
medical
care
Personal
health
practices
Use of
personal
health 
resources
Evaluated
health
Perceived
health
Consumer
satisfaction
Predisposing Enabling Need Health
behaviours
Outcomes
Demographic
Social factors
Social support
Distal
Mesial
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Health policy
Financing
Organisations
Environmental
Population health
indicators
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Evaluated
FIGURE 4 Revising Andersen’s behavioural model of access (adapted from Baker63).
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Conclusions
In conclusion, the blended/incentive-driven contract influenced access to dental care. Participants
associated it with increased access, greater use of skill mix and improved health outcomes.
These outcomes fed back to shape predispositions to visit the dentist.
Contractual drivers to change might be supplemented with educational efforts to support the refocusing
of care, perceptions about preventative dentistry, internal practice business models on the use of skill mix,
the role of evidence-based dentistry, working with care pathways, communication skills and the need for a
greater understanding of the difference between caring for individual patients and a population.
The Andersen model of access was broadly sustained in the data but might be enhanced by greater
conceptual clarity, by not regarding contextual and individual factors in sequence and by the incorporation
of additional factors.
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Chapter 4 Effectiveness of the blended/incentive-
driven service delivery model
Introduction
The focus of the blended/incentive-driven contracts introduced in West Yorkshire, and evaluated in this
study, lies on delivery of OHImp. Although there is a burgeoning field looking at the impact of these
blended contracts on the process of care,1,100,101 there remains limited evidence on the impact of changes
in dental oral health outcomes.
The work of Harris and colleagues100,101 and McDonald and colleagues1 provides valuable insights into the
processes by which dental teams provide treatment, but evidence is needed on the health outcomes of
different ways of incentivising appropriate oral health care. Sequential systematic reviews (e.g. for the
Department of Health Clinical Effectiveness and Outcomes group) have found no studies that relate
methods to implement best practice on oral health outcomes. Yet such evidence is much needed to
support the requirements of all recent NHS strategy documents.34,102 Indeed, Equity and Excellence:
Liberating the NHS34 focuses on improving health-care outcomes so that ‘The NHS will be held to account
against clinically credible and evidence-based outcome measures, not process targets’.
One reason that other researchers may have focused on processes is because the selection of outcomes for
oral health care is difficult for both theoretical and practical reasons. This study attempts to overcome
these difficulties by using a series of complementary clinical measures and PROMs, which are linked by a
robust and validated theoretical model.
Aim
The aim of this part of the study was to assess the effectiveness of the incentive model in reducing the risk
and amount of dental disease and OHQoL in patients.
In order to assess the clinical effectiveness of the incentive model, a non-randomised study within the
project compares the effectiveness of treatment in the three blended/incentive-driven dental practices with
that of three existing (traditional) practices working under the nGDS contract. The traditional practices
have been matched by deprivation index, age profile, size of practice, ethnicity and taking on new
patients. In addition, the evaluation assesses the new risk assessment model for fitness for purpose.
The effectiveness of the new model is assessed using indicators of gingivitis and an OHQoL measure, the
OHIP-14. Data are collected from patients on each of these indicators at their first visits (baseline) and then
24 months later (follow-up). A nested exploratory study assessed the dental caries experience in which
enamel and dentinal caries and their treatment was recorded using the International Caries Detection and
Assessment System (ICDAS) coding.
Rationale for choice of outcome measures
Wilson and Cleary103 link clinical variables to symptoms and functional limitation (analogous to
health-related quality of life). Their model is directly applicable to oral health.104,105 Changes to clinical
factors (tooth decay and periodontal diseases) cause symptoms which lead to variations in OHQoL.
However, individual and environmental factors intervene in these relationships by exerting independent
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effects. For example, the ability to understand one’s situation strongly predicted OHQoL.105 Studying both
clinical and OHQoL outcomes provides the potential not only to identify health benefits, but also to
elucidate how the blended/incentive-driven contract might deliver those benefits.
Any clinical measures to assess differences in clinical status between groups must be valid, reproducible
and responsive over a relatively short period of time to changes brought about by preventative treatments
or improved oral health behaviours. The care pathways in this study are for up to 2 years. We therefore
matched our outcome measures onto this time frame, using measures which are capable of demonstrating
changes in dental and gingival health within a number of months rather than years. The health outcomes
selected for this study were gingivitis (bleeding on probing, BoP), dental caries experience, oral symptoms
and OHQoL.
Gingivitis was selected as the primary outcome because it affects over 90% of the population and is
readily measured in a clinical examination, summarises the participant’s personal oral hygiene behaviour
over the preceding days, is responsive to interventions (such as oral hygiene advice or using a new
toothbrush) within 2 weeks, is a proxy for other self-care behaviours (such as the use of fluoride
toothpaste), is an interim outcome for periodontitis (which is a significant public health problem)106–109
and changes are readily demonstrated over a period of 2 years. Gingivitis was recorded as the proportion
of sites with BoP at baseline and at the 24 months’ follow-up.
Other periodontal outcomes were not suitable for use in this study. For example, periodontal attachment loss
occurs so slowly that changes cannot be reliably detected within 2 years.108,110 The basic periodontal
examination records the worst periodontal condition in each of the six sextants of the mouth. However, this
measure (and the Community Periodontal Index of Treatment Needs, its precursor) is not sufficiently precise for
use in evaluative research, is not responsive to treatment of severe disease and there is the added complexity
that changes in one part of a sextant can be masked by changes in other parts of the same sextant.111
Assessment of gingivitis by way of BoP was supported by process outcome data from the incentive
practices taken from the RAG system. As described in Chapter 2, the blended/incentive-driven contract
was designed to encourage a care pathway approach in which all patients have an OHA on joining the
practice and at each subsequent recall. Four sets of information [age group, medical history, social history
(self-care, habits/diet) and clinical assessment] are used to inform a traffic light (RAG) system for patients
with high (red), medium (amber) or low (green) risk of oral disease.
Secondary outcomes included assessment of dental caries experience in which enamel and dentinal caries
and their treatment were recorded. In order to do this in a standardised way, the ICDAS was used to chart
the number and condition of all teeth present with regard to their caries status and treatment history at
baseline and follow-up. The inclusion of enamel caries allows recording of early carious lesions that may
develop and heal as a result of changes in behaviour and the application of fluoride.112–114 Although the
work of Chesters and colleagues112 suggests that changes in dental caries status can readily be measured
within an abbreviated (24-month) clinical trial design by including enamel caries, the measure was included
as an exploratory element of the research as little is known about the prevalence and behaviour of enamel
lesions in the UK population of adults attending general dental practices. However, this is an important
measure in terms of OHImp and the findings of this study will help to inform future research and the
suitability of enamel caries as an outcome measure in clinical dental practice. Training was provided to all
practices on the use of the ICDAS following the 2009 Adult Dental Survey criteria.114 This was
supplemented with training via e-learning.
Oral health-related quality of life was recorded using the OHIP-14.115,116 The OHIP-14 has good reliability,
content and discriminative validity for use in UK dental patients117 and is responsive to the changes
brought about by general dental treatments, periodontal treatment and the provision of dentures.118–120
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Methods
Design and setting
The study uses a non-randomised comparative study design. The three incentive practices were matched
with three existing (traditional) practices working under the nGDS contract in West Yorkshire. The
matching at practice level considered the practice in terms of deprivation index, age profile, size of
practice, ethnicity profile and taking on new patients. Details of the practices are reported in Chapter 3.
Patient demographics across the six practices are summarised in Table 6.
From Table 6 we can see that the ethnicity balance in the 3 and 6 pairing differs from the other pairings in
as much as the proportion of those who classify themselves ‘white’ is much higher than the other pairings
(≈ 90/10 in 3 and 6 compared with ≈ 65/35 in 1 and 4 and in 2 and 5). The loss to follow-up differs across
practices; the lowest is 35% in practice 3 and the highest 74% in practice 1. Differences in recruitment
between practices are expected and reflect the number of GDPs/size of the practices.
Sample
Sample size was estimated based on powering the primary outcome measure. Based on data from the
Clarkson and colleagues’ study,121 we estimated the standard deviation (SD) in percentage sites BoP across
a UK cohort to be 27.5%. We assumed a within-patient correlation in baseline to follow percentage sites
BoP of 0.5 and a common variance in incentive and traditional practices. We assumed a clinically
meaningful mean difference in percentage sites BoP baseline to follow-up in incentive practices of 10%,
versus a mean difference in percentage sites BoP baseline to follow-up in traditional practices of 0%. We
fixed a type I error rate of 0.05 and a power of 0.8. A design effect was included to account for clustering
of patients within the three incentive and three traditional practices, assuming an intracluster correlation
of 0.2. A two-sided two independent samples t-test identified a total of 550 patients to be recruited
(allowing for a 10% loss to follow-up).
TABLE 6 Patient demographics of incentive and traditional practices
Characteristics
Incentive practices Traditional practices
Blended contract: UDA and incentives for
health promotion/prevention activity
Working to 2006 NHS dental contract
(nGDS contract)
Practice Practice 3 Practice 2 Practice 1 Practice 6 Practice 5 Practice 4
Age (years) 47.60 (17.55) 40.30 (13.16) 34.64 (12.08) 40.78 (16.05) 38.48 (13.99) 40.99 (15.29)
Sex: male/female 19/21
(47.50/52.50)
77/75a
(47.83/46.58)
36/40
(47.37/52.63)
15/22
(40.54/59.46)
49/42
(53.85/46.15)
61/55a
(49.19/44.35)
Ethnicity: white/other 37/3
(92.50/7.50)
105/51a
(65.22/31.68)
49/27
(64.47/35.53)
35/2
(94.59/5.41)
59/32
(64.83/35.16)
59/17a
(47.58/13.71)
Recruitment, n 40 161 76 37 91 124
Loss to follow-up, n (%) 14 (35.00) 79 (49.07) 56 (73.68) 21 (56.76) 35 (38.46) 54 (43.55)
SD, standard deviation.
a Counts do not add to recruitment total because of missing data.
Note
Mean (SD) for continuous variables, n (%) for categorical variables, patient recruitment and loss to follow-up referenced to
completion of BoP at baseline and follow-up, respectively.
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Recruitment and inclusion and exclusion criteria
To achieve a recruitment of 550 new patients in the study project, recruitment was initially planned to take
place over a 6-month period, although this was subsequently increased to 8 months. This figure was based
on (1) six dental practices included in the study; (2) an average list size of 1000 adult patients per dentist;
(3) 10% of patients per year will be new patients to the practice (estimated from the dental public health
audit figures of practices in Bradford and Airedale); and (4) of these patients we estimated a minimum
of 50% would agree to participate in the study over the recruitment period. Thus, at a practice level, the
three incentive practices were matched with three existing traditional practices of similar size, deprivation
index, age profile, ethnicity profile and taking on new patients.
At the patient level, the inclusion criteria were that patients must be:
l aged ≥ 16 years (all the patient information leaflets were reviewed by a teenager as suitable to be
easily understood for use with a broad age group in the study)
l willing to be followed up for 24 months and give informed consent
l a new patient to the dental practice
l able to complete the patient-completed questionnaires.
If a translator was needed, the availability of provision of a translation service in the spoken language of
the participant was via the normal dental practice access routes to such services. Study materials were not
translated as the dental practices reported that those accessing the translator services are typically not
literate in their mother language. Given that questionnaires were to be completed only at baseline and at
24 months, after taking advice, we concluded that the provision of a translator was sufficient, and indeed
the best option to maximise inclusion. All other data collected on the participants were from routinely
collected data and were not affected by the language of the participant.
With regard to exclusion criteria, and the specific handling of those who are edentulous, edentulous
patients were not excluded from the sample. However, they would be considered supplementary to the
core sample of 550 patients and would provide additional specific data. Postcode, age and ethnicity of all
patients included within the sample were recorded and profiled during the analysis.
The practices purposefully opened their lists to recruit new patients for our study. All new patients
attending the practice for the first time were invited to participate. Prior to their scheduled appointment
they were sent a letter of invitation and an information sheet and provided informed consent to be part of
the study. Informed consent was taken by members of the dental surgery staff who received training in
taking informed consent. Patients were asked to complete the following questionnaires at their first visits
and at the follow-up visit 24 months later: the European Quality of Life-5 Dimensions questionnaire, 3-level
version (EQ-5D-3L; details of the EQ-5D-3L are presented in Chapter 5, Methods and Results) and the
OHIP-14. The dentist undertook the clinical assessment of teeth and gingivae using the ICDAS and BoP at
both visits. Family/social history was taken at the first visit only. The OHA, using the RAG system, was
completed at baseline and 24 months by the incentive practices.
Patients were contacted by the dental practice around 6–8 weeks prior to their 24-month follow-up date
to arrange an appointment. Contact assumed a variety of media, including telephone, short message
service (SMS) and letter, in order to optimise follow-up. Patients were contacted a minimum of three times
to arrange the appointment.
Ethics approval and archiving
Ethics approval was obtained from the NRES Committee (London – Bromley, REC reference 12/LO/0205)
on 5 April 2012. The study was sponsored by the University of Leeds, Leeds, UK. At the end of the study,
data will be securely archived in line with the University of Leeds’ procedures for a minimum of 6 years.
Data held by the research teams will be locally archived or as instructed by the University of Leeds where it
is typically stored in the university’s archive facility and site data and documents. Following authorisation
from the sponsor, arrangements for confidential destruction will then be made.
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Intervention
Details of the blended/incentive-driven contracts for the incentive practices are described in detail in
Chapter 2. In brief, within the incentive practices, the blended/incentive-driven contracts were aimed at
ensuring evidence-based preventative interventions are delivered in line with identified needs for a defined
population; increased access to dentistry; and that care is provided by the most appropriate team member
to encourage skill mix. Within the contracts, 60% of the contract value is apportioned to delivery of a
set number of UDAs. The remaining 40% is dependent on the delivery of quality: 20% systems, processes
and infrastructure [e.g. cross-infection, policies, Standards for Better Health (latterly becoming Care Quality
Commission domains)] and 20% OHImp.
The traditional practices operated under the nGDS contracts which are based on payment for UDAs
with the number of UDAs based on historic activity and agreed between PCTs and dental practices. The
nGDS contracts meant that the payment mechanism changed from a one-off fee per item of service to a
system whereby providers are paid an annual sum in return for delivering an agreed number of ‘courses of
treatment’ weighted for complexity.
Main outcome measures
The primary outcome of the clinical effectiveness study was the percentage of points from BoP, assuming
32 teeth per patient and 6 points per tooth, reduced by the number of missing teeth (ICDAS codes ‘97’,
‘98’, ‘99’ or ‘P’) that a patient has.
The secondary outcomes were:
1. Percentage of sound surfaces (defined as free of obvious caries, if any of the following ICDAS codes
‘00’, ‘01’, ‘02’, ‘10’, ‘11’, ‘12’, ‘20’, ‘21’ or ‘22’ are recorded), assuming 32 teeth per patient and
five surfaces per tooth (reduced by the number of missing teeth a patient has).
2. Percentage of extracted and filled teeth, assuming 32 teeth per patient (reduced by the number of
missing teeth a patient already has). A tooth was defined as filled if the first digit of the ICDAS code
was ‘3’, ‘4’, ‘5’, ‘6’, ‘7’ or ‘8’ and the second digit of the ICDAS code was not ‘4’, ‘5’ or ‘6’. A tooth
was defined as extracted if the ICDAS code was ‘97’.
3. OHIP-14 total score (integer count between 0 and 56). Each of the 14 individual questions is scored on
a 0–4 scale. Any scores outside of this range are regarded as missing. If one or two of the individual
questions are missing, then median imputation is used to impute the individual question scores.122
If three or more individual questions are missing, then the total score is regarded as missing and the
patient excluded from analysis.
Exploratory analyses of the RAG system were conducted to study the:
1. distributions across categories (RAG) at baseline and follow-up
2. transitions between categories from baseline to follow-up
3. proportion of risk assessments that were manually over-ridden at baseline and follow-up.
Analysis
Multiple linear regression123 is used to model the primary and secondary outcome measures. In our analysis
plan we identified the difference in the measurement from baseline to follow-up as the outcome. However,
given the reduced sample size because of loss to follow-up, to improve power, we used an analysis of
covariance (ANCOVA) approach with follow-up measurement as the outcome and baseline measurement as
a covariate. An important requirement for ANCOVA is that there must be no interaction between the groups
and baseline measure.124 Although it is plausible to assume no interaction within each incentive–traditional
practice-matched pair, it is not clear if an interaction will be present across the three matched pairs. For this
reason we first analyse the matched pairs separately before combining in a single analysis. Because of the
reduced sample size and staff turnover, we have not been able to include practitioner-level variables in our
analyses. Imputation was conducted when constructing the OHIP-14 total score as described above.
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Results
Sample
Recruitment started on 1 June 2012 and the first patient entered the study on 14 June 2012. Recruitment
finished on 31 January 2013. In total 550 participants were recruited to the study at baseline. However,
only 291 participants attended both baseline and a follow-up appointment at 24 months. The reasons for
non-attendance at the 24-month follow-up were recorded by the dental practices and are grouped
as follows.
l Patient non-response: patient did not respond to any letters, text messages (SMS) or voicemails.
l Patient failed to attend: patient failed to attend or cancelled the appointment(s) at the last minute
(i.e. ≤ 24 hours’ notice).
l Change in patient status: patient moved away or was unable to attend because of financial difficulties
or cancelled the appointment as a result of health reasons (e.g. a recent operation) or changed practice.
l Practice decision: de-registered patients or cases in which the practice cancelled the appointment
because of severe weather conditions.
l Practice error: dentist failed to do the follow-up study/assessment.
We should note that for some de-registered patients in the ‘practice decision’ category, no further reason
was provided. For others in the same group, the practice de-registered the patient for a variety of
reasons that included failure to attend multiple appointments and the patient consecutively cancelling
appointments. In addition, this category included de-registration because the patient had moved away.
This last reason overlaps with the change in patient status category and, as such, the interpretation
of these categories should be treated with caution.
Reasons for no follow-up at 24 months were available for 120 of the patients who did not attend the
follow-up. From the answers provided, 27 patients were from the traditional practices and 93 patients
were from the incentive practices. As shown in Figure 5, ‘patient non-response’ in both incentive
and traditional practices is the most frequent reason for not completing the study (45% and 59%,
respectively). In the traditional practices, one patient (4%) did not complete the follow-up because
‘patient failed to attend’, but this number was much higher in the incentive practices – 29% (27 patients).
‘Practice decision’ or ‘centre error’ are not reported in the traditional practices and even for the incentive
practices the percentages are very low (4% and 9%, respectively).
Of the 550 recruited, a BoP was measure at baseline in 529. A total of 291 participants attended both
baseline and follow-up, BoP was measured at both time periods in only 270 (51.04% of those with a BoP
measurement at baseline). Following quality assurance, 188 were included in the BoP analysis (incentive,
n= 90; traditional practice, n= 98). Full details of the sample number available for analyses for each
measure are included in Table 7.
Demographic and baseline outcome measures split by status (completed follow-up/loss to follow-up) are
shown in Table 8. Outcomes data were manually reviewed and quality controlled by a clinician prior to the
modelling reported in Table 9 and onwards. Patients with implausible data were excluded from modelling.
This manual review was conducted only for those with completed follow-up, to enable comparison with
those lost to follow-up. Table 8 uses outcomes data prior to this manual review and quality control process.
Those who are lost to follow-up are generally younger and more likely to be male. In terms of outcomes,
those lost to follow-up have worse oral health, although this is more variable (a higher mean and SD).
This was reflected in the OHIP-14 score, with those lost to follow-up having higher mean scores (indicating
poorer OHQoL). In the practices that undertook a RAG rating, those lost to follow-up were more likely to
have a red rating.
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59%
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Change in patient status
Practice decision
Centre error
FIGURE 5 Reasons for no follow-up. (a) Incentive practice; and (b) traditional practice.
TABLE 7 Sample number available for analyses for each measure
Measure
Incentive practices Traditional practices
Blended contract: UDA and incentives for
health promotion/prevention activity
Working to 2006 NHS dental contract
(nGDS contract)
Practice Practice 3 Practice 2 Practice 1 Total Practice 6 Practice 5 Practice 4 Total
Recruitment, n 40 161 76 277 37 91 124 252
Loss to follow-up,
n (%)
14 (35.00) 79 (49.07) 56 (73.68) 149 (53.79) 21 (56.76) 35 (38.46) 54 (43.55) 110 (43.65)
Available for scrutiny,
n (%)
26 (65.00) 82 (50.93) 20 (26.32) 128 (46.21) 16 (43.24) 56 (61.54) 70 (56.45) 142 (56.35)
Loss to quality control:
BoP, n (%)
3 (7.50) 29 (18.01) 6 (7.89) 38 (13.72) 6 (16.21) 16 (17.58) 22 (17.74) 44 (17.46)
Available for analysis:
BoP, n (%)
23 (57.50) 53 (32.92) 14 (18.43) 90 (32.49) 10 (27.03) 40 (43.96) 48 (38.71) 98 (38.89)
Loss to quality control:
SS, n (%)
3 (7.50) 28 (17.39) 5 (6.58) 36 (13.00) 8 (21.62) 16 (17.58) 23 (18.55) 47 (18.65)
Available for analysis:
SS, n (%)
23 (57.50) 54 (33.54) 15 (19.74) 92 (33.21) 8 (21.62) 40 (43.96) 47 (37.90) 95 (37.70)
Loss to quality control:
E&F, n (%)
3 (7.50) 28 (17.39) 5 (6.58) 36 (13.00) 6 (16.21) 15 (16.48) 22 (17.74) 43 (17.06)
Available for analysis:
E&F, n (%)
23 (57.50) 54 (33.54) 15 (19.74) 92 (33.21) 10 (27.03) 41 (45.06) 48 (38.71) 99 (39.29)
Loss to quality control:
OHIP-14, n (%)
4 (10.00) 32 (19.88) 8 (10.53) 15 (5.42) 6 (16.21) 20 (21.98) 24 (19.35) 50 (19.84)
Available for analysis:
OHIP-14, n (%)
22 (55.00) 50 (31.05) 12 (15.79) 84 (30.32) 10 (27.03) 36 (39.56) 46 (37.10) 92 (36.51)
E&F, extractions and fillings; SS, sound surfaces.
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Bleeding on probing
Figure 6 shows a scatterplot of BoP at baseline and follow-up. The mean (SD) BoP at baseline and follow-up
was 41.88 (SD 47.24) and 32.97 (SD 47.66), respectively. Eighty-two patients excluded were following
manual review for quality control in addition to those lost to follow-up (see Table 7). This comprised 3, 29,
6, 6, 16 and 22 patients for practices 3, 2, 1, 6, 5 and 4, respectively. In addition, four patients with BoP in
excess of 100% had BoP imputed to 100%. This gave a sample for analyses of n= 188 (n= 90, incentive
practices; n= 98, traditional practices).
First we analysed the matched pairs separately using a baseline-adjusted ANCOVA. Table 9 relates to
matched pair 1 and 4, Table 10 to matched pair 2 and 5 and Table 11 to matched pair 3 and 6.
The model in Table 9 implies that BoP was lower at follow-up for patients in traditional practice 4 (than in
incentive practice 1) by an average of 22.55% [95% confidence interval (CI) 4.69% to 40.41%; p= 0.01].
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FIGURE 6 Scatterplot of BoP by practice.
TABLE 9 Analysis of covariance for BoP in matched pair 1 and 4 (n= 14, 48)
Measure Coefficient SE 95% CI p-value
Intercept 29.04 7.50 14.04 to 44.04 < 0.01
Baseline 0.71 0.18 0.47 to 0.94 < 0.01
Practice: traditional –22.55 8.93 –40.41 to –4.69 0.01
CI, confidence interval; SE, standard error.
Reference practice: incentive.
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The model in Table 10 implies that BoP was higher at follow-up for patients in traditional practice 5
(than in incentive practice 2) by an average of 14.57% (95% CI 5.55% to 23.59%; p< 0.01).
The model in Table 11 implies that BoP was higher at follow-up for patients in traditional practice 6
(than in incentive practice 3) by an average of 9.98% (95% CI 2.90% to 17.06%; p< 0.01).
Scatterplots of BoP at baseline and follow-up are shown for the matched pairs in Figure 7. Lines of best fit
from the models described in Tables 9–11 are superimposed.
Combining the matched pairs into a single ANCOVA model produces the output shown in Table 12.
This should be interpreted with caution because of the difference between the matched pairs observed in
the analyses.
The model in Table 12 implies that BoP was higher at follow-up for patients in traditional practices (than in
incentive practices) by an average of 10.24% (95% CI 3.23% to 17.25%; p< 0.01).
A scatterplot of BoP at baseline and follow-up is shown across all the matched pairs in Figure 8. Lines of
best fit from the model described in Table 12 are superimposed.
In summary, for BoP pooled across practices, the 95% CI for the effect size was 3.23 to 17.25, indicating a
positive effect for incentive practices but with considerable uncertainty in magnitude. Together with
reservations about the validity of pooling (because of the heterogeneity of effects across practice pairs)
and differential dropout, the results should be treated with caution.
TABLE 10 Analysis of covariance for BoP in matched pair 2 and 5 (n= 53, 40)
Measure Coefficient SE 95% CI p-value
Intercept 0.38 3.59 –6.76 to 7.53 0.92
Baseline 0.49 0.09 0.31 to 0.67 < 0.01
Practice: traditional 14.57 4.54 5.55 to 23.59 < 0.01
CI, confidence interval; SE, standard error.
Reference practice: incentive.
TABLE 11 Analysis of covariance for BoP in matched pair 3 and 6 (n= 23, 10)
Measure Coefficient SE 95% CI p-value
Intercept 2.10 3.10 –4.24 to 8.43 0.50
Baseline 0.17 0.07 0.03 to 0.32 0.02
Practice: traditional 9.98 3.47 2.90 to 17.06 < 0.01
CI, confidence interval; SE, standard error.
Reference practice: incentive.
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TABLE 12 Analysis of covariance of BoP across all matched pairs (n= 90, 98)
Measure Coefficient SE 95% CI p-value
Intercept 2.95 2.97 –2.90 to 8.80 0.32
Baseline 0.48 0.07 0.35 to 0.60 < 0.01
Practice: traditional 10.24 3.55 3.23 to 17.25 < 0.01
SE, standard error.
Reference practice: incentive.
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FIGURE 8 Scatterplot of BoP by incentive vs. traditional practice across all matched pairs.
International Caries Detection and Assessment System change in
sound surfaces
Figure 9 shows a scatterplot of sound surfaces at baseline and follow-up. The mean (SD) proportion of
sound surfaces at baseline and follow-up was 84.52% (SD 16.45%) and 82.67% (SD 18.09%),
respectively. Eighty-three patients excluded were following manual review for quality control in addition to
those lost to follow-up (see Table 7). This comprised 3, 28, 5, 8, 16 and 23 patients for practices 3, 2, 1, 6,
5 and 4, respectively.
First we analysed the matched pairs separately using a baseline-adjusted ANCOVA. Table 13 relates to
matched pair 1 and 4, Table 14 to matched pair 2 and 5 and Table 15 to matched pair 3 and 6.
The model in Table 13 implies that the proportion of sound surfaces at follow-up was higher for patients
in traditional practice 4 (than in incentive practice 1) by an average of 1.03% (95% CI –2.19% to 4.25%).
This was not a significant difference between traditional and incentive practices (p= 0.52).
The model in Table 14 implies that the proportion of sound surfaces at follow-up was higher for patients
in traditional practice 5 (than in incentive practice 2) by an average of 1.15% (95% CI –2.38% to 4.68%).
This was not a significant difference between traditional and incentive practices (p= 0.52).
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TABLE 13 Analysis of covariance for sound surfaces in matched pair 1 and 4 (n= 15, 47)
Measure Coefficient SE 95% CI p-value
Intercept 5.49 3.33 –1.19 to 12.17 0.11
Baseline 0.94 0.03 0.87 to 1.00 < 0.01
Practice: traditional 1.03 1.61 –2.19 to 4.25 0.52
SE, standard error.
Reference practice: incentive.
TABLE 14 Analysis of covariance for sound surfaces in matched pair 2 and 5 (n= 54, 40)
Measure Coefficient SE 95% CI p-value
Intercept –1.72 6.61 –14.86 to 11.41 0.80
Baseline 1.00 0.07 0.85 to 1.14 < 0.01
Practice: traditional 1.15 1.78 –2.38 to 4.68 0.52
SE, standard error.
Reference practice: incentive.
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FIGURE 9 Scatterplot of sound surfaces by practice.
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The model in Table 15 implies that the proportion of sound surfaces at follow-up was higher for patients
in traditional practice 6 (than in incentive practice 3) by an average of 13.49% (95% CI 4.38% to
22.60%; p< 0.01).
Scatterplots of the proportion of sound surfaces at baseline and follow-up are shown for the matched
pairs in Figure 10. Lines of best fit from the models described in Tables 13–15 are superimposed.
TABLE 15 Analysis of covariance for sound surfaces in matched pair 3 and 6 (n= 23, 8)
Measure Coefficient SE 95% CI p-value
Intercept –5.44 10.05 –26.02 to 15.15 0.59
Baseline 0.91 0.12 0.66 to 1.17 < 0.01
Practice: traditional 13.49 4.45 4.38 to 22.60 < 0.01
SE, standard error.
Reference practice: incentive.
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Combining the matched pairs into a single ANCOVA model produces the output shown in Table 16.
This should be interpreted with caution because of the difference between the matched pairs observed in
the analyses.
The model in Table 16 implies that the proportion of sound surfaces at follow-up was higher for patients
in traditional practices (than in incentive practices) by an average of 4.68% (95% CI 2.18% to
7.18%; p< 0.01).
A scatterplot of the proportion of sound surfaces at baseline and follow-up is shown across all the
matched pairs in Figure 11. Lines of best fit from the model described in Table 16 are superimposed.
In summary, the proportion of sound surfaces (defined as caries free and having initial ICDAS codes 1 and 2)
at follow-up was higher (4.68%) in traditional practices, although in two of the pairings the difference in
the proportion of sound surfaces was non-significant.
TABLE 16 Analysis of covariance of sound surfaces across all matched pairs (n= 92, 95)
Measure Coefficient SE 95% CI p-value
Intercept –2.62 3.46 –9.44 to 4.20 0.45
Baseline 0.98 0.04 0.91 to 1.06 < 0.01
Practice: traditional 4.68 1.27 2.18 to 7.18 < 0.01
SE, standard error.
Reference practice: incentive.
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FIGURE 11 Scatterplot of the proportion of sound surfaces by incentive vs. traditional practice across all
matched pairs.
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International Caries Detection and Assessment System change in extractions
and fillings
Figure 12 shows a scatterplot of the proportion of extractions and fillings (E&F) at baseline and follow-up.
The mean (SD) of the proportion of E&F at baseline and follow-up was 29.36% (SD 27.02%) and 34.19%
(SD 27.89%), respectively. Eighty-one patients were excluded following manual review for quality control
in addition to those who were lost to follow-up (see Table 7). This comprised 3, 28, 5, 6, 17 and 22
patients for practices 3, 2, 1, 6, 5 and 4, respectively. In addition, 10 patients with E&F in excess of 100%
had E&F imputed to 100%.
First we analysed the matched pairs separately using a baseline-adjusted ANCOVA. Table 17 relates to
matched pair 1 and 4, Table 18 relates to matched pair 2 and 5 and Table 19 to matched pair 3 and 6.
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FIGURE 12 Scatterplot of E&F by practice.
TABLE 17 Analysis of covariance for E&F in matched pair 1 and 4 (n= 15, 48)
Measure Coefficient SE 95% CI p-value
Intercept 15.34 2.30 10.72 to 19.94 < 0.01
Baseline 1.01 0.04 0.93 to 1.09 < 0.01
Practice: traditional –15.11 2.63 –20.38 to –9.84 < 0.01
SE, standard error.
Reference practice: incentive.
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The model in Table 17 implies that the proportion of E&F at follow-up was lower for patients in traditional
practice 4 (than in incentive practice 1) by an average of 15.11% (95% CI 9.84% to 20.38%; p< 0.01).
The model in Table 18 implies that the proportion of E&F at follow-up was lower for patients in traditional
practice 5 (than in incentive practice 2) by an average of 0.95% (95% CI 4.32% to –6.21%). This was not
a significant difference between traditional and incentive practices (p= 0.72).
The model in Table 19 implies that the proportion of E&F at follow-up was lower for patients in traditional
practice 6 (than in incentive practice 3) by an average of 2.89% (95% CI –6.92% to 1.15%). This was not
a significant difference between traditional and incentive practices (p= 0.15).
Scatterplots of E&F at baseline and follow-up are shown for the matched pairs in Figure 13. Lines of best
fit from the models described in Tables 17–19 are superimposed.
Combining the matched pairs into a single ANCOVA model produces the output shown in Table 20. This
should be interpreted with caution because of the difference between the matched pairs observed in
the analyses.
The model in Table 20 implies that the proportion of E&F was lower at follow-up for patients in traditional
practices (than in incentive practices) by an average of 4.43% (95% CI 1.34% to 7.52%; p= 0.01).
A scatterplot of the proportion of E&F at baseline and follow-up is shown across all the matched pairs in
Figure 14. Lines of best fit from the model described in Table 20 are superimposed.
In summary, the traditional practices had a lower number of E&F at follow-up by 4.43%. However, for two
of the three pairings there was no significant difference in E&F.
TABLE 18 Analysis of covariance for E&F in matched pair 2 and 5 (n= 54, 41)
Measure Coefficient SE 95% CI p-value
Intercept 7.32 2.05 3.24 to 11.39 < 0.01
Baseline 0.96 0.04 0.86 to 1.05 < 0.01
Practice: traditional –0.95 2.65 –6.21 to 4.32 0.72
SE, standard error.
Reference practice: incentive.
TABLE 19 Analysis of covariance for E&F in matched pair 3 and 6 (n= 23, 10)
Measure Coefficient SE 95% CI p-value
Intercept 4.94 1.82 1.23 to 8.64 0.01
Baseline 0.97 0.04 0.89 to 1.05 < 0.01
Practice: traditional –2.89 1.98 –6.92 to 1.15 0.15
SE, standard error.
Reference practice: incentive.
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Oral Health Impact Profile
Figure 15 shows a scatterplot of OHIP-14 at baseline and follow-up. The mean (SD) OHIP-14 score at
baseline and follow-up was 9.00 (SD 10.37) points and 6.09 (SD 8.08) points, respectively.
At baseline, there were three patients in whom answers to three or more questions were missing, and
thus were excluded, and 12 patients in whom answers to one or two questions were missing (and were
imputed as noted previously). At follow-up (excluding those lost to follow-up), there were 10 patients in
whom answers to three or more questions were missing, and who were thus excluded, and 10 patients
in whom answers to one or two were missing (and who were imputed as noted previously). Overall,
96 patients were excluded following manual review for quality control in addition to those who were
lost to follow-up (see Table 7). This comprised 4, 32, 8, 6, 22 and 24 patients for practices 3, 2, 1, 6, 5
and 4, respectively.
First we analysed the matched pairs separately using a baseline-adjusted ANCOVA. Table 21 relates to
matched pair 1 and 4, Table 22 relates to matched pair 2 and 5 and Table 23 to matched pair 3 and 6.
TABLE 20 Analysis of covariance of E&F across all matched pairs (n= 92, 99)
Measure Coefficient SE 95% CI p-value
Intercept 8.26 1.35 5.61 to 10.92 < 0.01
Baseline 0.96 0.03 0.90 to 1.01 < 0.01
Practice: traditional –4.43 1.57 –7.52 to –1.34 0.01
SE, standard error.
Reference practice: incentive.
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FIGURE 14 Scatterplot of E&F by incentive vs. traditional practice across all matched pairs.
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FIGURE 15 Scatterplot of OHIP-14 scores by practice.
TABLE 21 Analysis of covariance for OHIP-14 score in matched pair 1 and 4 (n= 12, 46)
Measure Coefficient SE 95% CI p-value
Intercept –1.81 1.98 –5.78 to 2.15 0.36
Baseline 0.60 0.10 0.41 to 0.80 < 0.01
Practice: traditional 5.15 1.99 1.17 to 9.14 0.01
SE, standard error.
Reference practice: incentive.
TABLE 22 Analysis of covariance for OHIP-14 score in matched pair 2 and 5 (n= 50, 36)
Measure Coefficient SE 95% CI p-value
Intercept 0.85 1.22 –1.58 to 3.28 0.49
Baseline 0.44 0.06 0.31 to 0.57 < 0.01
Practice: traditional 2.74 1.47 –0.18 to 5.68 0.07
SE, standard error.
Reference practice: incentive.
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The model in Table 21 implies that the OHIP-14 score was higher at follow-up for patients in traditional
practice 4 (than in incentive practice 1) by an average of 5.15 points (95% CI 1.17 to 9.14 points; p= 0.01).
The model in Table 22 implies that the OHIP-14 score was higher at follow-up for patients in traditional
practice 5 (than in incentive practice 2) by an average of 2.74 points (95% CI 5.68 to –0.18 points). This
was not a significant difference between traditional and incentive practices (p= 0.07).
The model in Table 23 implies that the OHIP-14 score was lower at follow-up for patients in traditional
practice 6 (than in incentive practice 3) by an average of 1.63 points (95% CI –5.80 to 2.53 points). This
was not a significant difference between traditional and incentive practices (p= 0.43).
Scatterplots of the OHIP-14 scores at baseline and follow-up are shown for the matched pairs in Figure 16.
Lines of best fit from the models described in Tables 21–23 are superimposed.
Combining the matched pairs into a single ANCOVA model produces the output shown in Table 24. This
should be interpreted with caution because of the difference between the matched pairs observed in
the analyses.
The model in Table 24 implies that the OHIP-14 score was higher at follow-up for patients in traditional
practices (than in incentive practices) by an average of 3.05 points (95% CI 1.20 to 4.90 points; p< 0.01).
A scatterplot of OHIP-14 score at baseline and follow-up is shown across all the matched pairs in Figure 17.
Lines of best fit from the model described in Table 24 are superimposed.
In summary, overall, OHIP-14 total scores at follow-up score were 3.5 points higher in traditional practices,
indicating worse OHQoL. Again, for two of the three pairings there was no significant difference.
Risk assessment traffic light system
Table 25 shows the distribution of risk assessments in the RAG categories at baseline and follow-up.
All patients who reported a risk assessment rating are included regardless of whether or not they had
BoP assessment at baseline and follow-up, or whether or not they were excluded from modelling work
following manual data review for quality control.
Table 25 implies that the most common risk assessment category at both baseline and follow-up was red
(73.93% and 44.14%, respectively) and the least common risk assessment category in both time periods
was green (4.64% and 17.11%, respectively). The table suggests a possible improvement in risk
assessment category from baseline to follow-up, with increasing proportions of patients in amber and
green categories as opposed to red. However, the inclusion of patients lost to follow-up in the baseline
assessments may also account for these changes.
At the practice level, there were two, one and no incomplete risk assessment traffic lights in practices 1, 2
and 3, respectively. At follow-up (excluding those lost to follow-up) the figures were 7, 14 and 1, respectively.
TABLE 23 Analysis of covariance for OHIP-14 score in matched pair 3 and 6 (n= 22, 10)
Measure Coefficient SE 95% CI p-value
Intercept 0.51 1.04 –1.61 to 2.63 0.63
Baseline 0.67 0.11 0.45 to 0.89 < 0.01
Practice: traditional –1.63 2.04 –5.80 to 2.53 0.43
SE, standard error.
Reference practice: incentive.
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TABLE 24 Analysis of covariance of OHIP-14 across all matched pairs (n= 84, 92)
Measure Coefficient SE 95% CI p-value
Intercept 0.27 0.79 –1.29 to 1.84 0.73
Baseline 0.49 0.05 0.40 to 0.58 < 0.01
Practice: traditional 3.05 0.94 1.20 to 4.90 < 0.01
SE, standard error.
Reference practice: incentive.
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
II
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I I
I
II
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
II
I
I I
TT
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
TT
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
TT
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
20
15
10
0
5
O
H
IP
-1
4 
sc
o
re
 a
t 
fo
llo
w
-u
p
0 5
OHIP-14 score at baseline
10 15 20
Incentive
Traditional
Best fit for incentive
practices
Best fit for traditional
practices
I
T
FIGURE 17 Scatterplot of OHIP-14 score by incentive vs. traditional practice across all matched pairs.
TABLE 25 Risk assessment RAG scores at baseline and follow-up
Risk assessment Red Amber Green Total
Baseline 207 (73.93) 60 (21.43) 13 (4.64) 280 (100)
Follow-up 49 (44.14) 43 (38.74) 19 (17.11) 111 (100)
Shown as n (%) for categorical variables.
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Table 26 shows the transitions between categories from baseline to follow-up.
Table 26 implies that, in general, patients’ risk assessments improve from baseline to follow-up. Of the
76 patients in the red category at baseline who attended follow-up, only 47 (61.84%) remained red, with
26 (34.21%) moving to amber and three (3.95%) moving to green. Of the 26 patients in the amber
category at baseline attending for follow-up, 10 (38.46%) moved to green and only two (7.69%) moved
to red. Of the nine patients in the green category at baseline who attended follow-up, six (66.67%)
remained green, with the other three (33.33%) moving to amber. Those patients who were red at baseline
were less likely to attend follow-up (76 of 207, 36.71%) than those who were amber (26 of 60, 43.33%)
or green (9 of 13, 69.23%) at baseline.
Table 27 shows the distribution of risk assessments that were manually over-ridden at baseline and
follow-up.
Table 27 implies that very few risk assessments were over-ridden [13 of 280 (4.64%) at baseline and 8 of
111 (7.21%) at follow-up]. Although it would be unwise to overinterpret the data given these small
numbers, over-rides to red or amber are more common than over-rides to green (92.31% vs. 7.69% at
baseline compared with 87.50% vs. 12.50% at follow-up).
At the practice level, there were 10, 1 and 1 incomplete manual over-ride records at practices 1, 2 and 3,
respectively. At follow-up (excluding those lost to follow-up) the figures were 9, 15 and 1, respectively.
TABLE 26 Risk assessment traffic light (RAG) transitions from baseline to follow-up
Risk assessment
Follow-up
TotalRed Amber Green
Red 47 26 3 76 (68.47)
Amber 2 14 10 26 (23.42)
Green 0 3 6 9 (8.11)
Total 49 (44.14) 43 (38.74) 19 (17.11) 111 (100)
Shown as n (%) for categorical variables.
TABLE 27 Risk assessment traffic light (RAG) manual over-rides at baseline and follow-up
Risk assessment Red Amber Green Total
Baseline 4 (30.77) 8 (61.54) 1 (7.69) 13 (100)
Follow-up 3 (37.50) 4 (50.00) 1 (12.50) 8 (100)
Shown as n (%) for categorical variables.
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Dental practitioners were asked to give reasons for any over-rides made in the risk assessment and thus
the changed care pathway. Over-rides to a lower risk tended to be characterised by general comments
about improved oral health, the patient’s commitment to improved oral health and reference to caries. The
following are typical responses:
l oral health improved
l oral hygiene improved; patient is caries free
l moderate risk for periodontitis and caries
l patient currently amber, but committed to improving oral health
l minor calculus present in two quadrants plus heavy calculus in one gives red, but as everything else is
healthy and the patient is highly motivated moved to amber
l minimum calculus present and committed to improving
l more carious teeth last visit.
There were, however, examples of over-rides related to family health conditions or medication that put the
patient in a higher risk category than the dentist thought warranted:
l patient on hay fever tablets – computer placed on red pathway, over-ride to amber
l diabetes in the family – placed on high risk, over-ride to medium risk.
The over-rides that placed patients on higher risk than indicated by the RAG system included changes
based on the result of investigations within the dental appointment (specifically radiographs) and the
patient’s lack of commitment to their OHImp evidenced through attendance at the dentist:
l after further investigation of the bitewing radiographs taken, bone loss found, which makes the patient
high risk because of compromised periodontal health
l patient failed to attend for treatments
l irregular attender.
In summary, using the RAG system (incentive practices only), among those who attended both baseline
and follow-up there was an improvement with 68% red at baseline and 44% red at follow-up. Those who
were red at baseline were less likely to attend follow-up. A total of 36.71% of those who were red at
baseline attended follow-up; 69.23% of those who were green at baseline attended follow-up. There
were very few decision over-rides on the RAG system.
Discussion
The matched pair design was chosen to help control for important differences between practices in the
absence of a randomised design. However, there are acknowledged limitations inherent in not using a
randomised controlled trial. We match practices on deprivation of location of the practice, the ethnic mix
of the location, the practice profile of patient age and size of the practice. In practice, the matching
process was successful in as much as it resulted in pairs being balanced in terms of ethnicity. Although not
matched for sex, the pairings were well matched in this area. One area that did show differences was the
average age of patients. However, it is important to note that we matched on the practice profile of
existing patients; the profile of participants indicated that the age of new patients differed. Practice 1 had
the lowest mean age, at 34.64 years (matched with practice 4, at 40.99 years), whereas practice 3 had the
highest, at 47.60 years (matched with practice 6, at 40.78 years).
In terms of baseline oral health, the matching produced relative balance in terms of BoP and caries, with
the exception of the 1 and 4 pairing, with practice 1 showing far lower BoP, which is indicative of better
oral health. For those patients who were included in the baseline and follow-up analysis, a mean score of
BoP at follow-up of 6.19 was recorded for practice 1, compared with a mean score of 30.66 for practice 4.
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In respect of OHIP-14 scores, pairings were relatively balanced with the exception of pair 3 and 6
(mean OHIP-14 score of 2.5 points in practice 3 vs. 13.19 points in practice 6 for those patients who are
included in the baseline and follow-up). Despite the pairings being matched for practice size, recruitment
rates in matched pairs differed, especially in pairs 2 and 5 and 1 and 4.
If we pool our results across the three pairings, the results are mixed. Our primary outcome, BoP, is
assessed to be in favour of the incentive practices as are the OHIP-14 score results. Conversely, the
proportions of sound surfaces and E&F taken from the ICDAS data are in favour of the traditional
practices. However, the numbers of patients available for analyses for pairs 1 and 4 and 3 and 6 were
unbalanced. This leads us to question whether or not it is robust to pool the three pairings in single
analyses. If we are not willing to pool them, then the only pairing with balanced numbers for analyses is
the 2 and 5 pairing. The results from this single pairing show a significant difference only for the primary
outcome, BoP, in favour of the blended/incentive-driven contract. It is of note, whether the pooled
analyses or only the analyses from the balanced pairing are used, that the primary outcome of BoP is
significantly in favour of incentive practices, which gives a degree of confidence in this result.
Loss to follow-up also differed among practices, ranging from 35% to 74%. Even at the lower end of the
range this was far higher than the 10% expected;119 this was despite dental practices using a variety of
media to contact patients to optimise attendance at 24-month appointments (letter by post, telephone
and SMS). Individual practices also opened their surgeries out of usual hours (evening and weekend) to
encourage study participants to attend the 24-month recall appointment. Although we do not have
a complete record of reasons for non-attendance, patients not responding to contact from the dental
practices was the most frequently cited reason across incentive and traditional practices. Within the
incentive practices there was also a substantial number of patients who failed to attend pre-booked
appointments. One potential explanation for the difference in loss to follow-up rates between our study
and other studies is that all participants in the study were new patients rather than existing patients who
were regular attenders, as in most previous studies. It is also of interest that the practice with the lowest
loss to follow-up was in an affluent area and had the oldest study population. Conversely, the practice
with the highest loss to follow-up is based in one of the 10% most deprived wards in the country, with
associated adverse income, living environment, education, health and employment indicators. The practice
estimates that approximately 80% of its patients are eligible for benefits. The study population was the
youngest of all the practices.
With regard to data quality, within the study training was provided for all team members in completion of
the ICDAS and BoP charts. This initially took place prior to recruitment of patients. The training was
provided by an experienced clinician on the study team. Training took place on the individual practice
premises over a period of weeks. The training was competence based, with practices encouraged to
request follow-up training until all personnel felt competent in the use of the indices. For some practices
this was a single training session before recruitment began, for others this was two or three sessions.
Online training materials were made available and materials from the training presentations were kept by
the practices. Prior to follow-up at 24 months, all practices undertook repeat training to ensure
comparability. Despite this training, the quality of the data for the ICDAS has proved to be variable.
Although the majority of charts were completed to an acceptable standard, a number of issues were
evident which give cause for caution in interpretation of the results. For example, in some instances teeth
with obvious caries or fillings at baseline were charted as sound at follow-up, even allowing for errors in
the transposition of adjacent teeth. Indeed, concerns about the implausibility and missing data meant that
all the charts for those who completed baseline and follow-up were manually reviewed and quality
controlled by an experienced clinician. The manual review of data resulted in the exclusion of 71 patients
from the analyses. Thirty-five of those patients have impossible transitions such as dentine caries at
baseline charted as sound at follow-up (n= 22); teeth charted as missing at baseline charted as sound at
follow-up (n= 5); and restoration charted at baseline as sound at follow-up (n= 8). Charting errors were
found in a further 17 records [partial data missing, n= 14; single-digit coding, n= 2; ‘illegal’ code,
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n= 1 (an illegal code is one not on the ICDAS range of response codes)]. Nineteen charting pairs were
missing either the baseline or the follow-up chart.
It should be noted that all ICDAS charts were completed by the dental practitioners using a paper form.
Given the comprehensive training provided, future studies should consider electronic completion, which
has built-in automatic error checks. We had intended to use this electronic capture in this study, but,
unfortunately, in some cases computer terminals were not within the dental surgery. As a result of this,
and to ensure no bias resulting from method of completion, we used the paper form of the ICDAS in
all practices.
Use of the ICDAS was exploratory in the study. It has proved to be illuminating in as much as there are
lessons to take forward. The data suggest that there are issues in relation to the capability within practices
of recording this clinical outcome accurately. Indeed, the lack of confidence in the quality of the ICDAS
data means that we have not explored the enamel transitions in the way that we would have wanted to.
Indeed, changes in the ICDAS scores may be the result of multiple factors, such as attrition of study
participants, diagnostic inaccuracies, poor completion, complexity of the ICDAS, difficulty in diagnosing
enamel caries in general dental practice, errors in syntax or the relatively short time frame of the study.
The traffic light (RAG) risk assessment showed improvement from baseline to follow-up, which suggests a
degree of responsivity. However, more work is needed to validate this as there may be some operator bias.
One of the concerns a priori was that it would be impossible for some patients with particular irreversible
medical conditions to move out of the red category. In our sample there were very few over-rides, and
from the small number that had been over-ridden we are unable to ascertain whether or not this a priori
concern was borne out. Explanations for over-rides, especially moves away from red, suggest other
reasons. Only one patient score was over-ridden because of a family medical condition (diabetes). It is of
note that those who were red at baseline were less likely to attend follow-up.
Conclusions
Although the study results favour the blended/incentive model, this is with the caveats relating to sample
size and data quality, given that 16% of participants were excluded from the analyses of the primary
outcome for issues of data quality. However, a large proportion of people in this study who had access
to a dentist did not follow up on oral care. These individuals were more likely to be younger males and
have poorer oral health. Within this patient group, although access to dental services was increased this
did not appear to facilitate continued use of services. Further work is required to understand how best
to promote and encourage appropriate dental service attendance, especially among those with a high level
of need to avoid increasing health inequalities.
Should services consider an oral health-related outcome measure of clinical effectiveness, this study would
support the use of BoP as a potential measure. However, further work is required to validate this
information. In terms of a dental caries, the need for further work is indicated for both accuracy and
validity of recording.
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Chapter 5 Economic study
Introduction
In order to assess value for money of the new blended/incentive-driven contract, this part of the study
provides an economic evaluation of a new service delivery model (incentive) compared with the standard
(traditional) practice model. The evaluation identifies within-study incremental cost-effectiveness ratios
(ICERs) for the incentive model compared with traditional practice. Use of these ratios enables comparison
of any additional financial costs imposed by the new model over standard care practice with any additional
benefits it delivers.
The primary analyses take the perspective of the commissioners of the service, taking into account
differences in contractual payments. Secondary analysis takes the perspective of the service provider
including the cost of dental practitioners’ time and treatment materials. The price year is 2012.
The EQ-5D-3L was used in the analyses to derive quality-adjusted life-years (QALYs).125,126 However, given
the apparent insensitivity of the EQ-5D-3L in oral health,127 the OHIP-14, an OHQoL measure, was also
used.115,116 The analyses will show the cost per QALY and cost per unit change in the OHIP-14 score of the
incentive model compared with that of the traditional care practice.
The OHIP-14 measure has been used extensively in cost-effectiveness analyses in oral health (see, for
example, Stone and colleagues127 and Hulme and colleagues128). However, in the UK the recommended
outcome measure in cost-effectiveness analysis is the QALY.129 Calculation of QALYs requires a
preference-based measure. At the present time there is no preference-based measure specific to oral
health and, given that OHIP-14 is not preference based, QALYs cannot be derived directly from it. Within
this study the OHIP-14 scores will also be mapped using regression techniques to the baseline EQ-5D-3L
scores. Our analysis explores the potential for estimating utility scores that can be used to produce QALYs
based on responses to the OHIP-14.
Methods
Outcome measures
Patient health-related quality of life was assessed using the OHIP-14115,116 and the EQ-5D-3L.125,126 Patients
completed both measures at baseline and at the end of the 24-month assessment period.
The OHIP-14 is a non-preference-based measure of the impact of oral disorders on individuals’ well-being.115
It contains 49 questions (seven questions for each of the seven dimensions of impact of an oral condition)
based on a theoretical model of oral health.130 The OHIP-14 used here is a shorter version based on a subset
of two questions for each of the seven dimensions.116 The OHIP-14 questionnaire asks patients to rate the
problems they had with their mouth, teeth or gums in the last 6 months. It consists of 14 items that capture
seven dimensions of functional limitation, physical pain, psychological discomfort, physical disability,
psychological disability, social disability and handicap. Response options to each of these items ranged
between 0 and 4, with 4= very often, 3= fairly often, 2= occasionally, 1= hardly ever and 0= never.
The total OHIP-14 score was calculated using the additive method (i.e. the sum of the responses to the
14 items). This method was selected because of its operational simplicity and its effectiveness in measuring
OHQoL between groups.117 The total OHIP-14 score ranges between 0 and 56 points, with lower scores
indicating better OHQoL.
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The QALYs were estimated using the EQ-5D-3L. The EQ-5D-3L is a standardised generic instrument for use
as a measure of health outcome.126 It can be applied to a range of health conditions and treatments, and
provides a health-state profile or a utility value index for an individual. In the EQ-5D-3L questionnaire,
patients were asked to rate their health on five health-state dimensions. These dimensions were mobility
(e.g. walking about); self-care (e.g. washing or dressing); usual activities (e.g. work, study, housework, family
or leisure activities); pain/discomfort; and anxiety/depression. Each of the five health states has a three-level
response (1= no problems, 2= some/moderate problems or 3= extreme problems/unable). The item
responses were converted to health-state utility values using an algorithm derived from a UK tariff.131
The health-state values could take negative values (i.e. worse than death), but could not exceed 1
(i.e. full health). These utility values were then used to estimate QALYs using the area under the curve
approach, in which 1 QALY is the equivalent of 1 year of full health. As any effects were observed over 2
years, discounting the QALY and OHIP-14 score was necessary. The recommended rate of 3.5% was used.129
For the mapping exercise, we used baseline data from the EQ-5D-3L, OHIP-14 and information on other
controls, including date of birth and sex. To simplify the analysis, the responses to each of the OHIP-14
items were recoded into three wide groups: ‘never’, ‘hardly ever’ and ‘occasionally/fairly often/very often’.
These groups were also converted into indicator variables with values of zero indicating that there was no
response in that group and values of 1 indicating a positive response in that group. Age was calculated in
years using the reported year of birth and sex was coded 1 for male and 0 for female.
Resource use and costs
To recap, as set out in Chapter 2, within the incentive practices, 60% of the contract value is apportioned to
delivery of a set number of UDAs. The remaining 40% is dependent on the delivery of quality: 20% systems,
processes and infrastructure (e.g. cross-infection, policies, Standards for Better Health latterly becoming Care
Quality Commission domains) and 20% OHImp. With the traditional practices, contracts are drawn up to
deliver a set number of UDAs for an agreed financial value. Thus, all practices were paid the cost of the UDAs
claimed, but incentive practices also received a ‘fixed’ cost equivalent to 40% of the total contract value (TCV).
Units of dental activity are based on three treatment bands (band 1: diagnosis, treatment planning and
maintenance; band 2: simple treatment, e.g. fillings; and band 3: complex treatment, e.g. bridges or
crowns). Each band attracts a set number of UDAs (band 1= 1 UDA; band 2= 3 UDAs; band 3= 12 UDAs)
and UDAs awarded for completed treatments.2
It is important to note that the value of UDAs (i.e. the payment made for each UDA) varies between dental
practices and thus UDA values vary from provider to provider. Typically, the greater the need for NHS
dentists in an area the higher the UDA value.
For the analysis from the commissioner’s perspective, NHS England provided us with the financial value of
UDAs for the traditional practices in the relevant years. The UDA value assigned to the incentive practices
in this analysis includes the 40% of the contract value paid to the practices dependent on delivery of
quality (systems, processes and infrastructure) and OHImp.
Information on the number, and value, of UDAs claimed per patient within the study was collected from
recorded appointment history data from the practices.
The analysis from the service provider’s perspective included information on the number and duration of
appointment; the type of treatment; and the dental professional carrying out the appointment/treatment.
This information was provided by the dental practices and taken from the appointment history of each
patient. Material costs such as the cost of radiographic film or the cost of filling materials are based on the
Kent Express Catalogue132 and are shown in Table 28. The salaries of the different staff involved in the
treatment were obtained from national sources such as the Pay Circular134 and the NHS Agenda for
Change135 and overhead costs were calculated using the same method as in Hulme and colleagues128
(Table 29). Costs and salaries are adjusted for inflation using the CCEMG-EPPI (Campbell and Cochrane
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Economics Methods Group – Evidence for Policy and Practice Information and Co-ordinating Centre) cost
converter.136 Discounting of costs was also necessary and a discount rate of 3.5% was used.129
Cost-effectiveness
The outcome of the cost-effectiveness analyses was the incremental cost per unit change in the OHIP-14
score and the cost per QALY. We present ICERs representing the ratios of the incremental cost and
incremental benefits (OHIP-14 points/QALYs) between incentive and traditional care practices. The ICER
represents the additional cost per one unit of outcome gained, in this case per OHIP-14 point lost/QALY
gained for incentive versus traditional practices. As a guideline rule, NICE129 accepts as cost-effective those
interventions with an ICER of < £20,000 per QALY. The NICE guidelines129 state that, in general, a
treatment that costs > £30,000 per QALY would not be considered cost-effective. In addition, we present
cost-effectiveness plane scatterplots showing the uncertainty surrounding the cost-effectiveness estimates.
The cost-effectiveness planes were derived using bootstrapping with replacement. This stochastic
uncertainty analysis involved running 10,000 bootstrapped estimates of the incremental costs and
QALYs/OHIP-14 scores. The bootstrap approach is a non-parametric method that treats the original
sample as though it was the population and draws multiple random samples from the original sample.
Cost-effectiveness acceptability curves (CEACs) were also generated to illustrate the probability that each
treatment would be cost-effective given a range of acceptable threshold values.137
TABLE 28 Cost of materials and laboratory cost
Material Description Cost (£) Source
Radiograph Optimum film 0.33 Kent Express Catalogue (2014)132
Periapical film 0.28
Amalgam filling 1 spill 0.90
Dycal® Radiopaque calcium hydroxide
cements liner [DENTSPLY International, York,
PA, USA (base 13 g and catalyst 11 g)]
21.20
Laboratory
Denture Full upper or lower only with standard teeth
(× 2 for full over full)
167.05 MGill price list (2011)133
Crown – 116.00
Bridge – 131.00
All material costs include VAT and 15% off the Kent Express Catalogue132 price.
The cost of chemicals used to develop the film is excluded but is minimal.
TABLE 29 Salaries and overheads
Staff Per hour (£) Source
Dentist 32.89 Pay Circular (M&D) 1/2011 reference134
Therapist 16.59 NHS Agenda for Change pay scales–2011/2012135
Hygienist 13.56
Oral health educator 11.17
Overheads % of income Dentist Therapist Hygienist Oral health educator
Wages and National Insurance (per hour) 17.42 £32.89 £16.59 £13.56 £11.17
Overheads (per hour) 12.77 £24.11 £12.16 £9.94 £8.19
M&D, Medical and Dental.
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Sensitivity analyses were further carried out to account for uncertainty in the cost values. For the
commissioner’s perspective, we performed one-way sensitivity analyses by assuming either no change or a
3% increase in the TCV per (financial) year or a 0%, 10% increase or 10% decrease in the number of
patients treated per year. For the analysis from the service provider’s perspective, costs were altered by
± 20%. Although these values are essentially arbitrary, it was considered likely to represent any uncertainty
in the cost values.
Missing data
Following Slade and colleagues,122 we used median imputation if one or two OHIP-14 item scores were
missing. Participants in whom more than two components of the OHIP-14 were missing or or for whom
EQ-5D-3L at baseline and follow-up was missing are excluded from the analysis. Multiple imputation was
also used to attempt to deal with missing EQ-5D-3L/OHIP-14 scores at follow-up; however, the missing
values were not missing at random, making this technique not appropriate to use here (see Appendix 3 for
more details).
Mapping the Oral Health Impact Profile-14 to the European
Quality of Life-5 Dimensions questionnaire
In mapping the OHIP-14 to the EQ-5D-3L, we used the methods set out by Brennan and Spencer.138 Using
baseline data, we split the data into estimation and validation samples. We ran different types of models in
which the observed EQ-5D-3L was the dependent variable and the OHIP-14 items, age, age squared
(to account for a potential non-linear relationship between age and the EQ-5D-3L) and sex were the
independent variables.
First, we ran an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. A common phenomenon observed in the health
profile (EQ-5D-3L) is that its distribution is skewed to the left (i.e. a large proportion of the sample is at full
health – known as a ceiling effect), which we also observed in the data (Figure 18 shows an illustration).
This ceiling effect makes OLS regression inappropriate as it will give biased and inconsistent results.
The Tobit model is proposed as a solution, often used in ‘mapping’ studies.138,139 Simply, in the Tobit
model the unobservable EQ-5D-3L linearly depends on the independent variables. Then, the observable
EQ-5D-3L is equal to the unobserved one whenever the true unobservable EQ-5D-3L is greater than or
equal to the ceiling value (1 in our case). The Tobit model also assumes that the error terms are normally
distributed with uniform variance (homoscedasticity), but evidence suggests that the distribution of utility
scores does not follow these assumptions.140 Therefore, results from Tobit should be interpreted cautiously.
A more flexible approach to address the fact that utility scores usually have mixed distributions (i.e. the
majority of observations are at the ceiling and there is a left-skewed distribution not at the ceiling)
is the two-part model (TPM). In the TPM, the respondents reporting full health in all five health states of
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FIGURE 18 Distribution of observed EQ-5D-3L.
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the EQ-5D-3L are modelled separately from those reporting all other EQ-5D-3L scores. The logic is that
individuals reporting full health in all states are different in some fundamental way from others who report
at least one problem in any of the EQ-5D-3L dimensions. For this reason, in the first stage we used the
logit regression to estimate the probability of reporting full health in the whole sample, whereas in
the second stage OLS regression was used to estimate an EQ-5D-3L score for those without full health.
The possibility of adding more control variables was also examined as there was available information on
the risk of an oral disease. However, the high number of missing values in these variables at baseline made
most of the estimations impossible.
All analyses were conducted using Stata (StataCorp LP, College Station, TX, USA) and Microsoft Excel®
(Microsoft Corporation, Redmond, WA, USA).
Results
Sample
A total of 550 patients were recruited in this study (see Chapter 4). A total of 210 of those patients were
included in the cost-effectiveness analyses. In detail, four patients withdrew prior to their appointment, five
patients did not have appointment history data at baseline and/or follow-up (hence costs could not be
estimated) and 289 patients did not complete the follow-up assessment. From the remaining 252 patients,
42 patients had more than two components of the OHIP-14 missing or were missing EQ-5D-3L at baseline
and follow-up, and were excluded from the analysis (13 patients at baseline and 10 patients at follow-up
had two or fewer OHIP-14 item scores missing so we were able to impute the missing data and include
these in the analysis). Therefore, for 210 patients (108 from incentive practices and 102 from traditional
practices) data were complete [costs, EQ-5D-3L and OHIP-14 (after imputation for those with only one
missing item)] and were included in the cost-effectiveness analyses. Baseline characteristics of the patients
are presented in Table 30. There are no statistically significant differences in age, sex or ethnicity between
those included in these analyses and those lost to follow-up.
Resource use and costs
Table 31 shows the average number of UDAs per person over the 2 years of the study. There are
negligible differences in the average number of UDAs per person if the treatment/appointment was carried
out by a dentist. It is difficult to draw conclusions for the therapist and hygienist as some of the incentive
and/or traditional practices did not have these dental professionals. Table 32 shows the average number of
appointments per person over the study. Patients in the incentive practices had more appointments, on
average, than those in the traditional practices. The picture is similar when looking at the appointments
carried out by a dentist. Patients in both groups had, on average, the same number of appointments with
an oral health educator. Again, it is not possible to compare incentive with traditional practices with
regards to the number of appointments performed by the rest of the dental professionals.
For the patients who were lost to follow-up (and those for whom we had appointment data), the average
number of dental appointments was 7.97 (SD 5.34; n= 152) for the incentive practices and 4.99 (SD 3.53;
n= 131) for the traditional practices. Treatment within these appointments included fillings, dentures and
TABLE 30 Baseline characteristics of the patients
Characteristics Incentive practices Traditional practices
Age (years), mean (SD) 40.66 (14.66) 43.14 (16.34)
Sex: male, n (%)141 47 (45.6) 51 (51)
Ethnicity: white, n (%)141 76 (72.4) 68 (79.1)
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crowns. For example, 72% of patients in the incentive practices and 60% in the traditional practices had
one or more fillings; 77% and 69%, respectively, had radiographs taken; 8% and 20%, respectively, had
dentures made; and 6% and 5%, respectively, had a crown.
For the 210 people included in the health economics study, the mean time spent with the dental
professional by group is presented in Table 33. On average, dentists in the incentive practices spent less
time with patients than dentists in the traditional practices and therapists in incentive practices spent more
time with patients than therapists in traditional practices.
TABLE 31 Average number of UDAs per person
Dental profession Incentive practices, mean (SD) Traditional practices, mean (SD)
All 11.23 (8.08) 10.74 (8.23)
Dentist 10.70 (8.07) 10.58 (8.25)
Therapist 0.65 (1.66) N/A
Hygienist N/A 4.05 (6.10)
Oral health educator 0.80 (1.30) 0.00 (–)a
N/A, not applicable.
a There was one appointment but no UDA was claimed.
TABLE 32 Average number of appointments per person
Dental profession Incentive practices, mean (SD) Traditional practices, mean (SD)
All 8.89 (4.50) 6.63 (2.93)
Dentist 7.13 (4.02) 6.56 (2.95)
Therapist 2.28 (1.60) N/A
Hygienist N/A 1.50 (1.00)
Oral health educator 1.00 (0.00) 1.00 (–)a
N/A, not applicable.
a There was one appointment but no UDA was claimed.
Cancelled appointments are not included.
TABLE 33 Average appointment duration per person
Dental profession
Time (minutes)
Incentive practices, mean (SD) Traditional practices, mean (SD)
Dentist 16.91 (7.35) 24.44 (10.46)
Therapist 23.89 (10.49) N/A
Hygienist N/A 21.25 (8.54)
Oral health educator 22.00 (4.47) 20.00 (–)a
N/A, not applicable.
a There was one appointment but no UDA was claimed.
Cancelled appointments are not included.
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Costs from the perspective of the commissioner
The UDA value paid for each of the practices is shown in Table 34 (the incentive UDA value includes the
40% of the contract dependent on quality and processes).
The mean per-person cost over the study for the incentive practices is £459.77 and for the traditional
practices is £281.57 (Table 35).
Costs from the perspective of the dental provider
As highlighted earlier, the costs to the dental provider are made up of the practitioners’ time, materials
and laboratory costs. In addition, the dental surgeries receive a payment for UDAs delivered (incentive and
traditional practices). The sum of these payments is subtracted from the costs accruing to the dental
provider (time/materials/laboratory costs). These payments are the cost to the commissioner detailed in the
previous section.
The mean cost of the materials and any laboratory cost per person are presented in Table 36.
The costs are combined with the cost of the time spent by the different dental professionals, and the
per-patient cost of UDAs (see Table 35) to find the per-patient cost from the perspective of the service
provider. The mean per-person cost from the perspective of the service provider for the incentive practices
is –£209.26, whereas for the traditional practices the mean cost is –£116.21 (Table 37).
TABLE 34 Unit of dental activity value per practice
Practice Pounds sterling (£)
Incentive practice
1 33.69
2 33.62
3 33.62
Traditional practice
4 27.31
5 25.47
6 28.80
TABLE 35 Per-patient cost of UDAs
Practice Cost (£), mean (SD)
Incentive practice
1 518.37 (269.04)
2 507.22 (287.06)
3 286.26 (181.37)
Traditional practice
4 291.99 (206.09)
5 256.36 (203.20)
6 370.29 (319.10)
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Outcome (quality-of-life) data
Overall, improvement in the OHIP-14 scores between baseline and follow-up is observed in both the
incentive and traditional practice groups (Table 38). However, no statistically significant difference in
EQ-5D-3L score was found between groups or over time. There are no statistically significant differences
in the OHIP-14 scores between groups, but there are statistically significant differences (at the 5% level) in
these scores over time in both groups.
In addition, the changes in the EQ-5D-3L scores by group (or over time) are negligible (Table 39), making
it difficult to draw any conclusions about the impact of the new care practice on the patients’ general
health-related quality of life.
TABLE 36 Per-patient cost of materials and laboratory costsa
Materials
Incentive practices: cost (£), mean (SD) Traditional practices: cost (£), mean (SD)
Dentist Therapist
Oral health
educator Dentist Hygienist
Oral health
educator
Radiographic film 0.75 (0.46) 0.32 (0.00) N/A 0.54 (0.34) N/A N/A
Periapical film 0.46 (0.26) 0.27 (0.00) N/A N/A N/A N/A
Filling 8.59 (7.87) 4.95 (3.78) N/A 8.98 (6.34) N/A N/A
Denture 243.67 (123.31) N/A N/A 234.71 (110.26) N/A N/A
Crown 134.53 (44.49) N/A N/A 162.98 (76.56) N/A N/A
Bridge 132.93 (–) N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
N/A, not applicable.
a Mean cost per patient who had that treatment, for example, all who had at least one filling.
TABLE 37 Total mean per-patient cost to dental providers
Resource Incentive practices: cost (£), mean (SD) Traditional practices: cost (£), mean (SD)
Time of dental professionals 195.63 (102.92) 107.02 (55.55)
Materials and laboratory costs 54.88 (114.47) 58.34 (111.25)
Total 250.51 (186.85) 165.37 (146.28)
Payment to providers 459.77 (278.42) 281.57 (218.71)
Total mean health-care costs –209.26 (123.36) –116.21 (99.16)
TABLE 38 Mean total OHIP-14 scores by group
Time point Incentive practices (n= 108) Traditional practices (n= 102)
Baseline, mean (SD) 8.99 (10.30) 9.12 (10.98)
Follow-up (24 months), mean (SD) 5.60 (7.58) 7.38 (8.89)
Change, mean (p-value) 3.39 (< 0.001) 1.74 (0.051)
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Cost-effectiveness results
Table 40 shows the costs, from the commissioner’s perspective, and changes in OHIP-14 scores for each of
the two groups. The traditional practices had lower costs and higher OHIP-14 scores (i.e. patients in the
traditional practices had worse OHQoL). This represents an estimated cost of £199.22 per 1-point decrease
(improvement) in OHIP-14 score for the incentive practices.
Similarly, Table 41 shows the costs from the service provider’s perspective. In incentive practices, costs to
the dental providers were lower (a greater surplus once costs and income from payments for services
delivered had been taken into account) and health outcomes were better. Thus, from the dental provider’s
perspective incentive dominates traditional practice.
Similarly, Tables 42 and 43 show the costs and QALYs for each of the two groups. They also provide the
incremental costs and benefits (expressed as QALY gains) as well as the ICER. Any interpretation in this
case should be tempered given the negligible differences in QALY gains between the two groups.
TABLE 39 Mean EQ-5D-3L scores by group
Time point Incentive practices (n= 108) Traditional practices (n= 102)
Baseline, mean (SD) 0.880 (0.250) 0.896 (0.232)
Follow-up (24 months), mean (SD) 0.882 (0.207) 0.897 (0.257)
Change, mean (p-value) –0.018 (0.235) 0.014 (0.552)
TABLE 40 Cost-effectiveness results (outcome measure: OHIP-14, commissioner’s perspective)
Practice Costs (£), mean (SD) OHIP-14 score (points), mean (SD)
Incentive 459.77 (278.42) 7.110 (7.673)
Traditional 281.57 (218.71) 8.005 (8.699)
Incremental cost (£) Incremental OHIP-14 score ICER (£/OHIP-14 point)
Incentive vs. traditional practices 178.20 –0.895 199.22
TABLE 41 Cost-effectiveness results (outcome measure: OHIP-14, service provider’s perspective)
Practice Costs (£), mean (SD) OHIP-14 (points), mean (SD)
Incentive –209.26 (123.36) 7.110 (7.673)
Traditional –116.21 (99.16) 8.005 (8.699)
Incremental cost (£) Incremental OHIP-14 score ICER (£/OHIP-14 point)
Incentive vs. traditional practices –93.05 –0.895 –104.03
(incentive dominates)
TABLE 42 Cost-effectiveness results (outcome measure: QALY, commissioner’s perspective)
Practice Costs (£), mean (SD) QALYs, mean (SD)
Incentive 459.77 (278.42) 1.659 (0.451)
Traditional 281.57 (218.71) 1.660 (0.342)
Incremental cost (£) Incremental QALYs ICER (£/QALY)
Incentive vs. traditional practices 178.20 –0.0008 Incentive dominated
DOI: 10.3310/hsdr04180 HEALTH SERVICES AND DELIVERY RESEARCH 2016 VOL. 4 NO. 18
© Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2016. This work was produced by Hulme et al. under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State for
Health. This issue may be freely reproduced for the purposes of private research and study and extracts (or indeed, the full report) may be included in professional journals
provided that suitable acknowledgement is made and the reproduction is not associated with any form of advertising. Applications for commercial reproduction should be
addressed to: NIHR Journals Library, National Institute for Health Research, Evaluation, Trials and Studies Coordinating Centre, Alpha House, University of Southampton Science
Park, Southampton SO16 7NS, UK.
75
Figure 19 shows the cost-effectiveness plane for incentive care practice compared with traditional care
practice using the QALY outcome measure from the commissioner’s perspective. The sample estimates are
spread mainly in the north-west and north-east quadrants, suggesting that incentive care practice is
unlikely to be cost-effective from the commissioner’s perspective. Iteration results seem to be equally
spread in north-east and north-west quadrants, making it difficult to draw conclusions on which of
the two care practices leads to better general health-related quality of life. Similarly, Figure 20 shows the
cost-effectiveness plane for incentive care practice compared with traditional care practice using the QALY
outcome measure from the perspective of the service provider. Iteration results in this case are spread in
the south-west and south-east quadrants, indicating that incentive practices had lower costs than
traditional dental practices.
Figures 21 and 22 show the cost-effectiveness plane for incentive care practice compared with traditional
care practice using the OHIP-14, from the commissioner’s and service provider’s perspectives, respectively.
From the commissioner’s perspective, the estimated ICERs are mostly located in the north-east quadrant,
implying that incentive is more effective with regards to improving OHQoL, but more expensive than
traditional care practice. For the service provider, the ICERs are mostly spread in the south-east quadrant,
suggesting, again, that incentive is more effective than traditional care practice in terms of improving OHQoL.
TABLE 43 Cost-effectiveness results (outcome measure: QALY, service provider’s perspective)
Practice Costs (£), mean (SD) QALYs, mean (SD)
Incentive –209.26 (123.36) 1.659 (0.451)
Traditional –116.21 (99.16) 1.660 (0.342)
Incremental cost (£) Incremental QALYs ICER (£/QALY)
Incentive vs. traditional practices –93.05 –0.0008 122,089.48
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FIGURE 19 Cost-effectiveness plane for incentive care practice compared with traditional care practice
(outcome measure: QALY, commissioner’s perspective).
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FIGURE 20 Cost-effectiveness plane for incentive care practice compared with traditional care practice
(outcome measure: QALY, service provider’s perspective).
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FIGURE 21 Cost-effectiveness plane for incentive care practice compared with traditional care practice (outcome
measure: OHIP-14 score, commissioner’s perspective).
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To account for uncertainty around mean incremental costs and effectiveness, we conducted sensitivity
analyses and non-parametric bootstrapping (Tables 44 and 45). From the commissioner’s perspective, the
univariate sensitivity analysis varied the TCV per year by 0% or 3%. We also looked at the case that the
number of patients treated remained the same per year or increased/decreased by 10%. From the service
provider’s perspective, we added and subtracted 20% of the total costs and assessed the subsequent
impact on the ICERs. The ICER estimates from the bootstrapping were similar to those of the deterministic
base-case scenario from both perspectives.
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FIGURE 22 Cost-effectiveness plane for incentive care practice compared with traditional care practice (outcome
measure: OHIP-14 score, service provider’s perspective).
TABLE 44 Sensitivity analyses (commissioner’s perspective)
Incentive vs. traditional practices
Incremental
cost (£)
Incremental
OHIP-14 ICER (£/OHIP-14 point)
TCV 0% change per year 177.09 –0.895 197.97
TCV 3% increase per year 187.99 –0.895 210.16
Number of patients treated 0% change per year 179.34 –0.895 200.49
Number of patients treated 10% increase per year 179.72 –0.895 200.92
Number of patients treated 10% decrease per year 199.26 –0.895 222.76
Bootstrapping (10,000 replications) 179.75 –0.862 208.59
Incremental
cost (£) Incremental QALY ICER (£/QALY)
TCV 0% change per year 177.09 –0.0008 Incentive dominated
TCV 3% increase per year 187.99 –0.0008 Incentive dominated
Number of patients treated 0% change per year 179.34 –0.0008 Incentive dominated
Number of patients treated 10% increase per year 179.72 –0.0008 Incentive dominated
Number of patients treated 10% decrease per year 199.26 –0.0008 Incentive dominated
Bootstrapping (10,000 replications) 180.42 –0.0088 Incentive dominated
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Figures 23 and 24, the CEACs, show the probability that the incentive care practice will be cost-effective
compared with traditional care practice given a range of threshold values between £0 and £60,000 per
QALY. The curve is based on 10,000 replications. Using the threshold of £20,000 that is recommended by
NICE, from the commissioner’s (service provider’s) perspective the probability that incentive care practice is
effective is 0.37 (0.47), compared with a probability of 0.63 (0.53) for the traditional care practice.
At lower levels of willingness-to-pay thresholds (< £18,000) there is a lower (higher) probability of the
incentive care practice being cost-effective from the commissioner’s (service provider’s) perspective. It is
worth reiterating at this point that, although we have presented the sensitivity analysis and bootstrapping
results, the results should be interpreted with caution given the negligible difference between the QALYs
in incentive and traditional practices.
TABLE 45 Sensitivity analyses (service provider’s perspective)
Incentive vs. traditional practices Incremental cost (£) Incremental OHIP-14 ICER (£/OHIP-14 point)
20% increase in costs –111.66 –0.895 –124.83 (incentive dominates)
20% decrease in costs –74.44 –0.895 –83.22 (incentive dominates)
Bootstrapping (10,000 replications) –92.76 –0.830 –111.82 (incentive dominates)
Incremental cost (£) Incremental QALY ICER (£/QALY)
20% increase in costs –111.66 –0.0008 146,507.37
20% decrease in costs –74.44 –0.0008 97,671.58
Bootstrapping (10,000 replications) –92.79 –0.0098 9483.68a
a The ICER is driven mostly by the incremental QALY; a small increase in the (already small) incremental QALY will have a
big impact on the ICER.
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FIGURE 23 Cost-effectiveness acceptability curve based on bootstrap replications for incentive compared with
traditional practice care (outcome measure: QALY, commissioner’s perspective).
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Results mapping
Characteristics of patients
As described in the earlier Methods section, for this analysis we used only baseline data. We included all
participants who had fully completed the EQ-5D-3L and OHIP-14 questionnaires. Details of our sample in
this part of the analysis are reported in Table 46. Females accounted for slightly more than half of the
sample (50.8%) and the mean age was 40.4 years. The mean EQ-5D-3L was 0.852 with a 95% CI of
0.829 to 0.875. Many patients, more than 30%, reported no symptoms in all OHIP-14 items. Only a few
reported that the symptoms occurred ‘occasionally/fairly often/very often’, with responses ranging from
0.77% for ‘trouble in pronouncing words’ to 14.09% for ‘felt self-conscious’. Symptoms were ‘hardly ever’
for a bigger percentage of the sample, ranging from 18.34% for ‘unable to function’ up to 54.74% for
‘uncomfortable eating’. The mean values for the OHIP-14 items ranged from 0.203 for ‘unable to function’
to 0.710 for ‘uncomfortable eating’.
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FIGURE 24 Cost-effectiveness acceptability curve based on bootstrap replications for incentive compared with
traditional practice care (outcome measure: QALY, service provider’s perspective).
TABLE 46 Characteristics of sample in mapping analyses
Variable n Per cent Mean
95% CI
Lower bound Upper bound
Trouble pronouncing words 519 0.216 0.179 0.253
Never 79.19
Hardly ever 20.04
Occasionally/fairly often/very often 0.77
Sense of taste worsened 519 0.268 0.226 0.309
Never 74.95
Hardly ever 23.31
Occasionally/fairly often/very often 1.73
Painful aching in mouth 513 0.639 0.590 0.689
Never 40.94
Hardly ever 54.19
Occasionally/fairly often/very often 4.87
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TABLE 46 Characteristics of sample in mapping analyses (continued )
Variable n Per cent Mean
95% CI
Lower bound Upper bound
Uncomfortable eating 517 0.710 0.657 0.762
Never 37.14
Hardly ever 54.74
Occasionally/fairly often/very often 8.12
Felt self-conscious 518 0.708 0.648 0.769
Never 43.24
Hardly ever 42.66
Occasionally/fairly often/very often 14.09
Felt tense 514 0.533 0.479 0.587
Never 53.89
Hardly ever 38.91
Occasionally/fairly often/very often 7.20
Diet unsatisfactory 519 0.362 0.315 0.410
Never 67.24
Hardly ever 29.29
Occasionally/fairly often/very often 3.47
Interrupt meals 515 0.400 0.352 0.448
Never 63.50
Hardly ever 33.01
Occasionally/fairly often/very often 3.50
Difficulty relaxing 517 0.478 0.428 0.527
Never 56.09
Hardly ever 40.04
Occasionally/fairly often/very often 3.87
Been embarrassed 520 0.621 0.562 0.680
Never 49.62
Hardly ever 38.65
Occasionally/fairly often/very often 11.73
Irritable with other people 518 0.392 0.341 0.442
Never 66.02
Hardly ever 28.76
Occasionally/fairly often/very often 5.21
Difficulty doing usual jobs 520 0.262 0.220 0.303
Never 75.58
Hardly ever 22.69
Occasionally/fairly often/very often 1.73
continued
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Regression results
Figure 25 shows the actual versus the predicted health-state values. The graphs are presented separately
for the OHIP-14 items as continuous and categorical variables. OLS, Tobit and the TPM seem to perform
similarly in the categorical model. In the continuous model, the TPM seems to better predict the EQ-5D-3L
values than OLS and Tobit.
In support of Figure 25, Table 47 shows the mean values of the observed and predicted EQ-5D-3L scores,
for different ranges of observed health-state values for the continuous model. At high levels of observed
EQ-5D-3L (> 0.8), the mean observed value exceeds the fitted one. The mean observed value is less than the
fitted value at any other level of observed EQ-5D-3L. Similar results are reported for the categorical model
(see Appendix 3, Table 52 for more details) with the only exception that the predicted mean is smaller for
low levels of EQ-5D-3L than the one we obtained from the continuous model in the TPM.
TABLE 46 Characteristics of sample in mapping analyses (continued )
Variable n Per cent Mean
95% CI
Lower bound Upper bound
Life less satisfying 519 0.432 0.379 0.484
Never 63.01
Hardly ever 30.83
Occasionally/fairly often/very often 6.17
Unable to function 518 0.203 0.166 0.239
Never 80.69
Hardly ever 18.34
Occasionally/fairly often/very often 0.97
EQ-5D-3L 507 0.852 0.829 0.875
Age (in years) 528 40.4 39.11 41.76
Sex 528
Female 50.76
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FIGURE 25 Actual vs. predicted health-state values. (a) OLS continuous model; (b) OLS categorical model; (c) Tobit
continuous model; (d) Tobit categorical model; (e) two-part continuous model; and (f) two-part
categorical model. (continued )
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FIGURE 25 Actual vs. predicted health-state values. (a) OLS continuous model; (b) OLS categorical model; (c) Tobit
continuous model; (d) Tobit categorical model; (e) two-part continuous model; and (f) two-part categorical model.
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Finally, in Table 48 we report the mean forecast errors for both the categorical and continuous models.
Mean forecast errors relative to the mean observed health-state value were higher (in absolute values)
when fitted to the categorical model but the magnitude varies depending on the type of regression used.
The forecast errors were higher for the continuous model at each of the different levels of observed
health-state value except for the TPM.
Actual EQ-5D-3L − Predicted EQ-5D-3L
Mean (Actual EQ-5D-3L)
× 100
 
. (1)
TABLE 47 Mean observed and fitted health-state values within categories of observed health-state values:
continuous model
Observed
health-state
category n
Observed values
Fitted values
OLS Tobit TPM
Mean 95% CI Mean 95% CI Mean 95% CI Mean 95% CI
< 0.70 28 0.33 0.22 to 0.43 0.81 0.75 to 0.86 0.81 0.75 to 0.87 0.81 0.75 to 0.86
0.70–0.80 24 0.76 0.75 to 0.78 0.83 0.78 to 0.88 0.84 0.79 to 0.89 0.84 0.79 to 0.88
> 0.80 151 0.98 0.97 to 0.99 0.88 0.86 to 0.89 0.88 0.87 to 0.90 0.88 0.86 to 0.90
All 203 0.86 0.83 to 0.90 0.86 0.85 to 0.88 0.87 0.85 to 0.88 0.87 0.85 to 0.88
TABLE 48 Mean relative forecast errors within categories of observed health-state values for categorical and
continuous models
Observed
health-state
category n
OLS Tobit TPM
Mean 95% CI Mean 95% CI Mean 95% CI
Continuous model
< 0.70 28 –55.85% –66.47% to
–45.24%
–56.10% –66.65% to
–45.55%
–55.68% –66.68% to
–44.69%
0.70–0.80 24 –8.36% –13.79% to
–2.93%
–8.59% –14.12% to
–3.05%
–8.6% –13.76% to
–3.45%
> 0.80 151 11.77% 9.88%
to 13.66%
11.59% 9.68% to
13.49%
11.58% 9.5% to
13.66%
All 203 0.06% –3.77% to
–3.89%
–0.13% –3.97% to
3.7%
–0.08% –3.97% to
3.8%
Categorical model
< 0.70 28 –53.38% –66.17% to
–40.59%
–53.51% –66.3% to
–40.73%
–38.51% –66.68% to
–44.69%
0.70–0.80 24 –8.25% –16.12% to
–0.39%
–8.51% –16.44% to
–0.58%
–3.75% –13.76% to
–3.45%
> 0.80 151 10.60% 8.64% to
12.56%
10.37% 8.4% to
12.35%
13.38% 9.5% to
13.66%
All 203 –0.45% –4.33% to
3.42%
–0.67% –4.54% to
3.2%
4.2% –3.97% to
3.8%
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Discussion
A total of 210 participants were included in the cost and cost-effectiveness analyses. There were no
statistically significant differences in age, sex or ethnicity between those who were included in these
analyses and those lost to follow-up. It is of note that those lost to follow-up had multiple appointments.
Specifically, those in the incentive practices had attended, on average, around eight appointments. Of those
lost to follow-up with details available of their appointment, 72% of participants in the incentive practices
and 60% in the traditional practices had one or more fillings. Reasons for not attending follow-up were
outlined in Chapter 4. As stated in Chapter 4, although we do not have a complete record of reasons for
non-attendance, patients not responding to contact from the dental practices was the most frequently cited
reason across incentive and traditional practices. Within the incentive practices there was also a substantial
number of patients who failed to attend pre-booked appointments. Given the multiple appointments that
this group did attend prior to the 24-month follow-up and the treatment carried out there are two likely
explanations for non-response for follow-up and/or non-attendance at pre-booked appointments. The first
is that participants did not feel that the recall was timely given their previous dental treatment. The second
is that the problem they had visited the dental surgery for had been rectified and, in the absence of any
current dental problems, they did not wish to visit the dentist for a ‘check-up’ (this aligns with previous
figures that suggest that around one-third of the population in the UK go to the dentist only when they
have a problem).2 In the absence of further details outlining the reasons for no follow-up, the explanations
we propose are speculative but have implications for research and practice. If the first scenario holds,
the time over which treatment is delivered warrants further consideration in planning future research in
dentistry that includes a follow-up visit. If the second scenario or explanation holds, then this has
implications for how to encourage appropriate preventative dental visits.
Cost and cost-effectiveness
The cost-effectiveness analyses were undertaken from two perspectives: the commissioner and the service
(dental) provider. The analyses from each perspective uses two distinct outcomes: first, use of the OHIP-14
scores and, second, QALYs derived from the EQ-5D-3L. The analyses revealed negligible between-group
differences in QALY gains, and no statistically significant difference in the EQ-5D-3L score was found
between groups or over time. Although the EQ-5D-3L is the NICE-recommended outcome of choice for
economic evaluation,129 the apparent insensitivity of the EQ-5D-3L in oral health led to the use of the
OHIP-14.127 The EQ-5D-3L has been reported to have adequate construct and convergent validity, but may
not be as sensitive as specific measures of OHQoL.142–144
Although we found no statistically significant differences in the OHIP-14 scores between groups, there
were statistically significant differences (at the 5% level) in these scores over time in both groups,
suggesting an overall improvement in OHQoL for both the incentive and the traditional groups. The
magnitude of change in scores did not achieve the level that corresponds to a minimal important
difference (MID). The MID is defined as ‘the smallest difference in scores in the domain of interest which
patients perceive as beneficial and which would mandate, in the absence of troublesome side effects and
excessive cost, a change in the patient’s management’.145 Locker and colleagues118 suggest a 5-point
difference in OHIP-14 score could be considered the MID. In this study, the mean improvement in OHQoL
over the 24 months was 3.39 in incentive practices and 1.74 in traditional practices. However, it is
important to note that the OHIP-14 score is a secondary outcome; the study was powered on changes in
BoP and thus changes in OHIP-14 scores should be treated with caution.
Given the negligible between-group differences, in the EQ-5D-3L and the derived QALY at least, the cost
of the two services was driving the cost-effectiveness ratios. The cost of the incentive practices from the
commissioner’s perspective is based on the contractual terms, which specify a UDA value and payment
for quality indicators (systems, processes, infrastructure) and OHImp. In these analyses the UDA values
assigned to the incentive practices included the payment for quality indicators. Traditional practices are
based purely on UDAs – no additional payment is made. The value of the UDA is based in part on the
practice location, for example whether or not it is in an area of need, and, for the traditional practices,
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historical data relating to previous work carried out. (In the cases of the incentive practices, these were
brand-new practices when the contract terms were agreed and thus there were no historical data to take
account of.) The incentive practices were located in areas where there was no, or limited, provision of
NHS dentistry with the aim of increasing access to NHS dentistry, and this is likely to have been influential
in negotiation of the UDA payment value, which was higher in the incentive practices than in the
traditional practices.
In fact, over the study period, for the 210 participants included in the economic analysis, the incentive
practices showed, on average, a higher number of UDAs claimed per patient than the traditional practices
(11.23 vs. 10.74); this was accompanied by an overall higher number of appointments per patient (8.89 vs.
6.63). The differences in the number of appointments might in part be explained by skill mix within the
two different types of practice. The blended/incentive-driven contracts were designed to facilitate provision
of dental care by the most appropriate team member to encourage skill mix. It was intended that all the
incentive-driven practices would fully utilise skill mix including, for example, dental therapists, hygienists
and extended-duty dental nurses. There are indications in our data that more use was made of skill mix
within the incentive practices with fewer appointments with the dentists and more appointments with the
dental therapist in incentive practices. The dentists within the traditional practices had a marginally higher
number of appointments per patient and the mean duration of those appointments was over 40% higher
(16.91 minutes in incentive vs. 24.44 minutes in traditional). Within the incentive practices, on average,
patients saw the therapist 2.28 times over the 24 months; in the traditional practices, on average, patients
saw the hygienist 1.5 times. The difference in use of different practitioners will inevitably be because of
staff configuration and thus the availability of, for example, dental therapists and hygienists. For example,
one traditional practice did not employ any dental therapists or dental hygienists. However, the incentive
practices were actively encouraged to increase skill mix as part of the bidding process for the dental
contracts, which might go some way to explain the more prevalent use of dental therapists and the fewer
appointments with dentists in the incentive practices.
Mapping from the Oral Health Impact Profile-14 to the European Quality-of-Life-5
Dimensions questionnaire
There are two areas worthy of particular discussion with regards to the mapping exercise. The first is the
choice of the model for mapping from the OHIP-14 to the EQ-5D-3L. The second is the strengths and
weaknesses of this approach.
We presented results from OLS, Tobit and TPMs in order to account for the prevalence of full health-state
values in the sample – the ceiling effect. Estimation results did not seem to differ, at least in terms of
significance, but when looking at the plots of the fitted versus the observed health-state values, the TPM
seems to be the best way to proceed; the regression line is closer to the observed outcomes especially
when the OHIP-14 is continuous (i.e. each subgroup of the 14 questions is a dummy variable). When the
OHIP-14 is included as a categorical variable in the estimation, the results between the different techniques
are more obscure.
The availability and inclusion of more personal characteristics such as ethnicity or marital status in the
estimation analysis can potentially improve the estimation results. For example, it can be argued that black
minorities face worse health than their white counterparts146 or that having a partner can improve an
individual’s health, especially among the older population, as one partner can act as a carer for the other.
In this study, marital status was not available and the response rate to the ethnicity question was low,
making it impossible to test these arguments.
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The mapping exercise shows that it is possible to perform economic evaluations when a general health-state
outcome is not available using mapping but the approach has severe limitations, especially for those
patients reporting a low EQ-5D-3L score. This is because, consistent with other mapping studies,138,147
we fail to predict correctly low levels of EQ-5D-3L (i.e. the mean of the predicted EQ-5D-3L is by far greater
than the mean of the observed EQ-5D-3L). This, however, may be related to the different time frame set for
the two measures; the OHIP-14 asks about problems with oral health in the ‘last 6 months’, whereas the
EQ-5D-3L asks about health ‘today’. It may also be related to how well an oral health measure can predict
a more general heath outcome such as the EQ-5D-3L. It would be interesting to explore how much
information from the OHIP-14 is ‘transferred’ to the EQ-5D-3L, but this remains for future research.
Conclusion
Although the cost analysis from the commissioner’s perspective has shown the incentive group to attract
higher costs, overall OHQoL was higher for participants in the incentive practices than it was for those in
the traditional practices. This represents an estimated cost of £199.22 per 1-point decrease (improvement)
in the OHIP-14 score for incentive practices. However, this is caveated in as much as the improvement did
not represent a MID. It is also important to note that the OHIP-14 score is a secondary outcome; the study
was powered on changes in BoP and thus changes in OHIP-14 scores should be treated with caution.
In addition, interpretation of the cost per QALY results should be treated with caution given the negligible
differences in the QALYs. It should also be noted that the time frame in which participants were followed
was relatively short, at 24 months. The blended/incentive-driven service model’s aim of quality and OHImp
and the move towards preventative dentistry requires behaviour change by both the dental provider and
the patient; the long-term impact of blended/incentive-driven contracts on OHQoL will likely provide better
insight into the achievement of these aims.
There are indications that skill mix was utilised in the incentive practices to a greater extent than in the
traditional practices. Although, on average, incentive patients saw practitioners more times over the study
period, in the incentive practices the number and duration of appointments with dentists was lower as use
was made of dental therapists. This would warrant further research to explore OHImp and potential cost
savings from the use of dental therapists, hygienists and extended-duty dental nurses.
The acceptability of the blended/incentive-driven contract to dental providers is important. The analysis
from the perspective of the provider, including the time spent in appointments with patients and the
materials and laboratory costs, indicated that despite the increased number of appointments per patient,
overall the new contract was estimated to provide greater financial returns than those observed in the
traditional practices. However, for the incentive practices in this study, although the analysis included
overheads (included in the practitioner time element of the analysis), the costs associated with setting up
the new dental practices were not included and these are unlikely to be insubstantial.
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Chapter 6 Discussion and conclusions
Introduction
Primary care dental services have been contracted by the NHS since its inception in 1948. Initially, contracts
were centrally determined and relatively undemanding in terms of performance monitoring.85 However,
since the 1990s, contracts have evolved. The PDS pilots (1998–2006)148 encompassed a wide variety of
configurations, but concerns were expressed about how they met local needs for service provision, the
absence of measures of success or appropriate goals for commissioning and missed opportunities to
harness skill mix.2,9 In 2006, the current nGDS contracts were introduced with dental commissioning
devolved to a local level. The nGDS contracts are activity based, with weighted bands of dental activity.
However, there are concerns among dental practitioners about whether or not the nGDS contracts have
achieved their goal and some believe that insufficient time is allocated for prevention16 and that they
restrict access to new patients and those requiring complex treatment.17 More recently, in 2011, as part
of the Department of Health dental contract reform programme, a series of NHS dental contract pilots
were initiated, with the aim of exploring how the focus can shift from treatment and repair to prevention
and oral health by introducing a new clinical pathway and new remuneration models.2 The forthcoming
prototypes represent the next stage in the evolution of the NHS dental contract reform programme.75
This evolution is set in the context of a substantial increase in demand for dental care and barriers to
dental attendance which include access, cost and dental anxiety.11
The aim of this project was to evaluate a new model of dental service provision implemented in West
Yorkshire in the north of England. The model uses a blended/incentive-driven approach to commission
improved health outcomes through the incentivised delivery of evidence-based prevention care pathways,
utilising a wider skill mix and increasing access to dentistry in response to identified local NHS dental
needs. Our objectives were (1) to explore stakeholder perspectives of the new service delivery model;
(2) to assess the effectiveness of the new service delivery model in reducing the risk of and amount of
dental disease and enhancing OHQoL in patients; and (3) to assess the cost-effectiveness of the new
service delivery model in relation to OHQoL.
There has been a substantial move towards the introduction of blended, incentivised contracts in NHS
primary care dentistry following the Steele report,2 specifically the introduction of the national dental
contract pilots and more recently the proposed prototypes. Although the contract evaluated in this
project pre-dates the NHS dental contract pilots, it reflects the ethos of the report on which the national
pilots were based,2 providing an opportunity to evaluate an innovation in health-care delivery and
complementing the pilots with greater granularity. It therefore offers substantial potential benefit for
patients and the future commissioning and delivery of dental services throughout England.
Principal findings
Using a non-randomised study design we compared the effectiveness of treatment in the three newly
commissioned blended/incentive-driven (incentive) dental practices with three matched existing (traditional)
practices working under the nGDS contract. Gingivitis was selected as the primary outcome because
it affects over 90% of the population, is readily measured in a clinical examination, summarises the
participant’s personal oral hygiene behaviour over the preceding days, is responsive to interventions
(such as oral hygiene advice or using a new toothbrush) within 2 weeks, is a proxy for other self-care
behaviours (such as the use of fluoride toothpaste) and is an interim outcome for periodontitis (which is a
significant public health problem)107–109 and because changes are readily demonstrated over a period of
2 years. Secondary outcomes included assessment of caries, quality of life and cost-effectiveness.
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The results of the quantitative analysis were mixed. We found that the results of the assessment of BoP
favoured the blended/incentive-driven model of service delivery, although the results should be treated
with caution given the high attrition and issues of data quality.
The health economics analyses showed the blended/incentive-driven contract was more costly for the
commissioner. In respect of our secondary measure of quality of life, overall OHQoL, assessed using the
OHIP-14, was higher for participants in the blended/incentive-driven practices than it was in practices
under the traditional UDA-based contract, but it did not represent a minimal important clinical difference.
It is also important to note that the OHIP-14 is a secondary outcome; the study was powered on changes
in BoP and thus changes in OHIP-14 scores should be treated with caution. The differences within and
between groups for the EQ-5D-3L were negligible. The last result was not entirely unexpected. Although
the EQ-5D-3L is the NICE-recommended outcome of choice for economic evaluation,130 the apparent
insensitivity of the EQ-5D-3L in oral health led to use of the OHIP-14.129 The EQ-5D-3L has been reported
to have adequate construct and convergent validity, but may not be as sensitive as specific measures
of OHQoL.143,145
Use of the ICDAS was exploratory in the study. It has proved to be illuminating in as much as there are
lessons to take forward. Although the majority of charts were completed to an acceptable standard, a
number of issues were evident which give cause for caution in interpretation of the results. For example,
in some instances teeth with obvious caries or fillings at baseline were charted as sound at follow-up, even
allowing for errors in the transposition of adjacent teeth. Lack of confidence in the quality of the ICDAS
data means that we have not explored the enamel transitions in the way that we had originally planned to.
As highlighted earlier, in addition to problems with data quality for the ICDAS, data quality for BoP was
also an issue, with a substantial number of participants excluded from the analysis following quality
assurance. Dentition charting has been highlighted as a problem with the national dental contract pilots.2
Early on it was found that data on charting were incomplete or absent for many patients.30 These findings
are interesting in as much as in our study charting was completed by the dental practitioners using a paper
form. For the ICDAS, in particular, we had intended to use electronic charting, which incorporates built-in
automatic error checks. However, in the pilots there was a requirement for practices to keep patient
records in electronic form and they reported that ‘the evidence to date, however, suggests there have
been inconsistencies in the quality of electronic data recording from practice to practice and within
practices, from clinician to clinician’.20 It would seem that charting and dentist recording of data is a
challenge whether paper based or electronic and despite the training given in the INCENTIVE study, many
of the issues the pilot sites experienced appear to be replicated in our study, including misinterpretation
and lack of understanding of what is required.
In relation to access to dental services, within our qualitative study we identified perceptions that the
blended/incentive-driven contract increased access to dental care, with the contract determining dentists’
and patients’ perceptions of need, their behaviours, evaluated and subjective health outcomes and patient
satisfaction. These outcomes were then seen to feed back to shape people’s predispositions to visit the
dentist. However, an important, and unexpected, finding of the study was the high ‘fail to return’ rate.
A large proportion of people in the study who had access to a dentist did not follow up on oral care.
These individuals were more likely to be younger males and have poorer oral health. Within this patient
group, although access to dental services increased, this did not appear to facilitate continued use of
services. Although the reasons for non-attendance recorded by the dental practices was incomplete,
of the reasons recorded the most frequently cited was no response to contact from the dental practices
and, in the blended/incentive-driven practices, a substantial number also failed to attend pre-booked
appointments. Interestingly, those lost to follow-up had multiple appointments and treatments, including
fillings, crowns and bridges. One possible explanation for this may be that the problem they had visited the
dental surgery for had been rectified and, in the absence of any current dental problems, they did not wish
to visit the dentist for a ‘check-up’. Indeed, one patient talks about attitudes in the past which meant she
only went to the dentist if there was a problem, although she goes on to say that she thinks attitudes have
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changed now. A dental therapist talks about high levels of need and there being ‘a lot of neglected
mouths. Some haven’t seen a dentist in years. Some have lost their motivation because of this’. Another
patient recalls not going to the dentist for about 3 years, saying ‘I don’t know why I didn’t go, I just
stopped going and I think then you get thrown off the register’. This aligns with previous figures that
suggest around one-third of the population in the UK go to the dentist only when they have a problem.2
The failure of some individuals to attend pre-booked appointments may, in part, be attributed to dental
anxiety, a recognised barrier to dental attendance.11 One patient spoke about cancelling an appointment
for a filling because she was ‘panicking and worrying’. Another talked about her partner being ‘scared to
death of the dentist’ and how ‘trying to get him through the door of the dentist was a real effort’.
Another possible explanation for the unexpected high loss to follow-up within our study, and indeed the
difference between estimated and actual loss to follow-up, is that all the patients in the study were new
patients. This suggests that we had inadvertently selected a sample that were not regular dental attenders,
although this may still be representative as one-third of the population falls into this classification.2 The
study sample size (including allowance for attrition) was powered on a previous study.121 In the study by
Clarkson and colleagues,121 the authors outline their inclusion criteria; eligible patients were dentate adults
who had already made an appointment for a routine check-up and had in whom probing of gingiva was
not contraindicated at the time of the appointment. This indicates that their sample included primarily
regular dental practice attenders rather than new patients who may not have attended a dental
appointment for some time. It also indicates, given that contrandication to probing of gingiva was an
exclusion criterion, that their sample had better oral health than those included in our study.
Furthermore, groups of new patients might be likely to include a larger proportion of patients who are
migrants. Most research on the dental attendance of migrants has been conducted in the USA or
Australia. This work consistently describes the barriers to access among migrants.149,150 Brennan and
Spencer149 noted that service utilisation patterns were related to cultural factors within populations and it
may be that groups who have little history of dental attendance do not adopt this behaviour immediately.
The low rate of reattendance for regular dental care (thereby implying a pattern of emergency care)
provides support for the care pathway approach recommended in the Steele report,2 which legitimises
irregular dental attendance for those who choose it. High proportions of patients adopting this pattern will
shape the practices in these areas. Such practices will be characterised by the provision of more emergency
care and more of the time-consuming initial assessments. This burden might be considered in the
commissioning of services in these areas.
Skill mix was of particular interest in our study given one of the aims of the blended/incentive-driven
contract is to improve health outcomes through wider skill mix utilisation. In England there has been a
steady shift in the make-up of the dental practice team with an expansion of numbers of, for example,
dental therapists and dental hygienists.151 Our analyses indicate that skill mix was utilised in the blended/
incentive-driven practices to a greater extent than the practices under the traditional nGDS contract.
While on average incentive patients saw dental practitioners more often over the study period, in the
incentive practices the number and duration of appointments with dentists was lower, as use was made of
dental therapists. The difference in use of different practitioners will inevitably be influenced by current
staff configuration and thus the availability of, for example, dental therapists and hygienists. However,
the incentive practices were actively encouraged to increase skill mix as part of the bidding process for the
dental contracts, which may go some way to explain the more prevalent use of dental therapists and
the lower number of appointments with dentists in the incentive practices. Collectively, the patients in
incentive practices had, on average, more appointments than patients in the traditional practices. In this
regard the commissioning strategy was seen to be effective.
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There are obstacles to overcome to realise any benefits of the greater deployment of skill mix. Dentists may
need support in these areas and to recognise the differences between caring for individual patients and
caring for segments of the population, such as that formed by the patient base of a practice. In addition,
one incentive practice experienced a higher turnover of its dentists than the other practices, which was
attributed in part to lack of opportunities to carry out complex treatments. This echoes evidence from
elsewhere of tension between ‘acknowledging that less qualified practitioners can contribute directly to
dental treatment and the unwelcome consequences of a modularised approach’.152
Intuitively, the delegation of treatment to staff specialised in only a specific range of treatments could
reduce costs and increase access to care.132 The acceptability of the blended/incentive-driven contract to
dental providers is clearly important, not least because of the financial implications. Primary care dentist
practices, unlike many other medical providers in the UK, are operated as businesses,84 with NHS provision
of dental services governed using quasi-market principles.90 It has been suggested that under the current
nGDS contract remuneration structure there are financial barriers that ‘prevent the profitability and
effective use of skill mix’.84 Our analyses included assessment of costs from the perspective of the dental
provider. This included the time spent in appointments with patients and the materials and laboratory
costs. The analysis showed that, despite the increased number of appointments per patient, overall, the
new contract was estimated to provide greater financial returns than those observed in the traditional
practices. However, for the incentive practices in this study, although the analysis included overheads
(included in the practitioner time element of the analysis), the costs associated with setting up the new
dental practices were not included and are likely to be substantial.
The unit of analysis for the costs in this study was the practice; the financial implications for the individual
GDPs in the practices are unclear given that one of the most important barriers is referral by the dentist to,
for example, a dental therapist, preventing further earning potential for additional band 1 treatments.84
However, in the qualitative study dental therapists were perceived to increase the availability of care and
patient satisfaction. Practices increased the utilisation of dental therapists by not reducing the payments to
individual dentists who referred their patients to them. Although seemingly paying two staff members for
the same treatments, this approach incentivised referral, thus liberating dentists’ time for patient OHAs
and more remunerative complex treatments. This might be further explored and evaluated in the
evaluations of the forthcoming contract prototypes.75
The data hint at appreciable challenges related to a general refocusing of care and especially to
perceptions about preventative dentistry and use of the risk assessments and care pathways. The
quantitative data from the RAG assessment showed > 30% of the participants in our sample to be in
the highest risk category (red) and < 7% in the lowest category (green) at baseline. There was an
improvement from baseline to follow-up which suggests a degree of responsivity. In addition, there were
very few over-rides of the RAG system (4.64% at baseline and 7.21% at follow-up). Although it would be
inappropriate to make direct comparisons with findings from the dental contract pilots with regard to
changes over time, the proportion of patients in each category at the initial OHA (6% in green and 26%
in red for the national pilots and 7% and 30% in the INCENTIVE study) indicate a similar distribution of
patients.30 One of the concerns a priori in our study was that for individuals with particular irreversible
medical conditions it was not possible to move out of the amber category. Unfortunately, because of the
small number of pathways that had been over-ridden, we are unable to ascertain whether or not this a
priori concern was borne out. Explanations for over-rides, especially moves away from red, suggest other
reasons. Only one patient score was over-ridden because of a family medical condition (diabetes). It is of
note that those who were red at baseline were less likely to attend follow-up.
The OHA RAG system is key to the current national dental contract pilots and integral to the incentive
contract. Within our study, practitioners were concerned that it was not sufficiently precise and, as
illustrated above, rarely overrode the assessments, even though they could. In practice applications,
dentists’ assessments may be prone to allocation bias as treatments are apportioned according to the
ratings, and to measurement bias changes in status which are used for contract monitoring. Further
research is required to validate the RAG assessment, but in its primary guise for risk assessment, and also
in this application as a tool for evaluation.
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Strengths and limitations
Overall the evidence of the effectiveness of use of contracting and incentives in health providers is still
emerging, with further experimental research needed – specifically the impact on patient outcomes.27
The study design reported here has enabled a direct comparison of practices offering incentive-driven
preventative dentistry with those offering traditional, solely activity-driven dentistry operating under the
nGDS. This enhances early findings from the ongoing national dental contract pilots introduced following
the Steele report2 which have focused on patients’ and practitioners’ views of the new clinical pathway,
reporting them to be strongly supportive.30 Within more recently reported findings focus has lain on
adaptation to the new system but these findings also report positive indications about clinical benefits in
terms of a reduction of risk and health improvement (measured through the RAG system and a basic
periodontal examination). This study adds value to the current evidence base of blended/incentive-driven
contracts. The study is the first to systematically evaluate the impact of a dental service provision on oral
health outcomes by comparing those operating under the traditional nGDS and those driven in part by
incentives that have been developed in partnership with the dental practices.
One of the challenges in undertaking the study was the pragmatic study design. Neither the practices nor
the participants in the study were randomised. There will inevitably be a degree of bias given that all the
practices were self-selected. The three incentive practices had competitively tendered to operate practices
under the new contract, and as such may be thought of as early adopters and may well be atypical of
dental practices in England. Similarly, while the traditional practices were matched to the incentive
practices, they chose to take part in the study. One stumbling block when recruiting traditional practices
was that all the study participants had to be new patients. For some practices this was not viable and as
such those practices declined our invitation to take part in the study.
The study is also limited by the high loss to follow-up. As highlighted, attrition was much higher than
anticipated. Although we have been able to shed some light on reasons for this, it has meant that two of
the three matched practices were unbalanced in terms of participant numbers (pairs 1 and 4 and 3 and 6).
This leads us to question if it is robust to pool the three pairings in single analyses. If we are not willing to
pool them then the only pairing with balanced numbers for analyses is the 2 and 5 pairing. Although there
is some reassurance that the effect size for the primary outcome (BoP, pooled across practices) is similar to
that included in the original power calculation (10.24% observed vs. 10% in calculation) and achieves
statistical significance (p< 0.01) this cannot guarantee the study achieved power of 80% for the primary
outcome (as originally specified in the study design). The original power calculation required numbers
available for analysis of 500 participants split equally across incentive and traditional practices, whereas
188 were available for analysis (37.60% of those required to achieve power of 80% at a significance level
of 5%). There was some further indication of differential dropout among males and younger patients.
Post-hoc power analysis is best avoided.153 Instead, consideration of a sample is better based on CIs.
For the primary outcome (BoP pooled across practices) a 95% CI for the effect size was 3.23% to 17.25%,
indicating a positive effect for incentive practices but with considerable uncertainty in magnitude. Together
with reservations about the validity of pooling (because of heterogeneity of effects across practice pairs)
and differential dropout, results should be treated with caution and followed up with further study.
However, this loss to follow-up also exemplifies the challenges of running a dental practice in order to
improve patients’ oral health, and from this perspective the data have greater external validity than a
highly controlled study with artificially high rates of reattendance.
For the cost-effectiveness analysis there remains a tension between use of a preference-based utility
measure as recommended by NICE129 and use of a condition-specific measure that is posited to be more
sensitive to changes in oral health. The OHIP-14 measure has been used extensively in cost-effectiveness
analyses in oral health (see, for example, Stone and colleagues127 and Hulme and colleagues128), but is
not preference based and therefore cannot be used to produce QALYs. At the present time there is no
preference-based measure specific to oral health. In this study the OHIP-14 scores were mapped using
regression techniques to the baseline EQ-5D-3L scores to explore the potential for estimating utility scores
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that can be used to produce QALYs based on responses to the OHIP-14. Unfortunately, consistent with
other mapping studies,139,147 we fail to predict correctly low levels of the EQ-5D-3L, that is the mean of
the predicted EQ-5D-3L is far greater than the mean of the observed EQ-5D-3L. This, however, may be
related to the different time frame set for the two measures; the OHIP-14 asks about problems with oral
health in the last 6 months whereas the EQ-5D-3L asks about health ‘today’. It may also be related to how
well an oral health measure can predict a more general heath outcome such as the EQ-5D-3L.
It should also be noted that the time frame in which participants were followed was relatively short,
at 24 months. Although we have confidence that changes to the primary outcome (BoP) can be readily
demonstrated over a period of 2 years, the blended/incentive-driven service model’s aim of quality and
OHImp and the move towards preventative dentistry requires behaviour change by both the dental
provider and the patient; the long-term impact of blended/incentive-driven contracts on OHQoL will likely
provide better insight into the achievement of these aims.
The selection of outcomes in evaluative research is difficult, and the rationale for our choice is presented in
Chapter 4. BoP was selected because it is responsive to change and readily measured. It can be changed
by dental teams’ behaviours, including preventative advice and treatment, but is also subject to changes
in patients’ behaviours and measurement error. It is quite likely that the influence of patient behaviours
and measurement error would be random and would attenuate the apparent relationships between
the contract types and the patient outcome. The estimates of the treatment effect may therefore be
underestimated in this study. It is possible that measurement bias may have favoured one or other contract
type, but this seems unlikely. The contract type was associated with improvements in this clinical outcome.
Few other studies have assessed clinical outcomes in relation to dental contracts. Nevertheless, the utility
of BoP as a surrogate for other oral health outcomes warrants further investigation.
Caries and treatment increments (measured with the ICDAS) were selected as a secondary outcome
because changes in caries levels may be modest among adults at times of low caries incidence.
Furthermore, there were no data on the responsiveness of the ICDAS on which to base power calculations.
The ICDAS may need more evaluation and greater utility before it can be used for this purpose.
The effects of the mouth on everyday life (as measured with the OHIP-14) correlate only weakly with
clinical status. The OHIP-14 is therefore unlikely to be measurably affected by dental treatment or to reach
a minimally important difference in a natural experiment for which patients were arriving with different
levels of impact and receiving different interventions. It was included as a secondary outcome to
incorporate patient-reported outcomes and for inclusion in the health economic analysis.
A further potential limitation in the economic evaluation is the use of national salary costs for the dental
workforce rather than actual contractual agreements between the workforce and provider. Within any
economic evaluation there is tension between making the evaluation specific to a particular setting and
the generalisability of the results across settings. This is particularly pertinent to primary care dentistry as
dental practices assume different commercial guises (e.g. social enterprises, independent providers and
large corporate providers). Within these models there are a wide range of workforce contracts. For
example, therapists may be salaried, on an activity-based contract linked to UDAs or paid an hourly rate.
The type of contract adopted varies within and across providers. In this case we took a pragmatic view.
Although we included the actual commissioning contracts for the practices (i.e. UDA values for each of the
traditional practices and the actual contracts for the incentive practices), we assumed national salary rates
to increase generalisability.
Within our qualitative study we used the Andersen model of access. It provided a useful taxonomy for the
data and allowed identification of the effects of the new contract. This fit is unsurprising as the model
was developed over a 40-year period and remains among the most widely cited models of access to health
care.63,64,67,87 However, although the model was broadly sustained in the data it might be enhanced by
greater conceptual clarity, not regarding contextual and individual factors in sequence and by the
incorporation of additional factors.
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Patient and public involvement
We were committed to patient and public involvement (PPI) throughout the INCENTIVE research cycle and
patient contributors worked as integral members of the research team from conception of the research
idea to shape our research questions and aid delivery, project management and final data interpretation
through to reporting. They ensured our research was of relevance to patients and the NHS and would
contribute to shape and improve reform of the dental contract to maximise a service designed to address
patient needs in terms of improved oral health outcome through a paradigm shift from restorative to
preventative oral health care and access to NHS services. Details of how PPI input informed different parts
of the study are detailed below.
Identification and/or prioritisation of the research questions and
development of the research design
We worked closely with two PPI contributors, each bringing a unique perspective as current users of dental
services but covering different age and societal groups – middle-aged participants and parents (Susan) and
working young adults/students (Alex) – that we considered may have differing expectations and use of
dental services that would be of relevance to INCENTIVE. We also sought specific advice from a third PPI
advisor (Rosie, 84 years of age) on an ad hoc basis; she did not attend the advisory group meetings.
The qualitative enquiry was informed from discussions with the PPI contributors and the sampling matrix
was codesigned to include criteria linked to the objectives of the programme including demographic
factors (age, sex, ethnicity, socioeconomic status). Access to dental services was seen as a priority by the
PPI contributors and they were central in ensuring that we also collected data from non-patients to
understand barriers to access to NHS dentistry. Rosie helped shape the inclusion of elderly patient groups,
lobbying for a broad entry criteria and to ensure that patients > 65 years were included in the cohort.
Susan and Alex welcomed the idea that we were addressing the utilisation of the wider skill mix in our
analysis of the contracts.
Our PPI contributors regularly attended the project advisory group meetings and had additional input on
a needs basis; for example, they made a significant contribution to the preparation and internal
development and review of the ethics application to ensure it was understandable yet not patronising, to
ensure informed consent was readily achievable and the study not too onerous for participants by carefully
considering the volume of paperwork participants would need to complete.
Dissemination
The PPI contributors codeveloped the participant information leaflets and are currently assisting in the
preparation of materials for the dissemination event and ensuring that the study material will improve
participant understanding of the importance of INCENTIVE in redesigning the dental contracts as we move
forward. Our PPI contributors have ensured our dissemination strategies are inclusive and accessible to
research participants, patients and the public.
Patient and public involvement identification and training
Two INCENTIVE PPI advisors sit on the study advisory group, and all PPI advisors were willing to be
contacted by the researchers to contribute to individual work packages as required.
Patient and public involvement contributor training and mentorship
The INCENTIVE PPI contributors were offered training and mentorship to increase their confidence in
working in partnership. Similarly, the INCENTIVE research team were also trained in how to work with PPI
contributors as equal partners. We provided mentorship and personal support to PPI contributors before
and after meetings, addressing queries, language and documentation. The PPI contributors were also
provided with a ‘jargon buster’. The researchers received training to facilitate inclusive project meetings
with PPI representatives by knowledge transfer from the ‘getting involved in shaping research and building
partnerships’ workshop.
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Throughout we adhered to INVOLVE guidelines and reimbursed PPI members according to
INVOLVE recommendations.154
Conclusions
The policy context in which the INCENTIVE study was funded has remained remarkably constant in its aims
for NHS dentistry over the course of the research. The Steele report of 20092 examined how dental services
in England could be developed, advocating a commissioning approach to align dentistry with the rest of
the NHS services, to commission for health outcomes and to develop blended contracts rewarding not only
activity but quality and OHImp. The report recommended that payments explicitly recognise prevention and
reward the contribution of the dental team to improvements in oral health, reflected in patient progression
along the pathway, adherence to nationally agreed clinical guidelines and the achievement of expected
outcomes.2 Commissioners were asked to support dentists to make the best and most cost-effective use
of the available dental workforce.2 Despite pre-dating the Steele report2 the incentive contracts introduced
in West Yorkshire proved themselves to be forerunners of these new blended contracts.
Since the Steele report2 we have seen the development of the national dental contract pilots which sat
alongside the incentive contract. Currently national dentistry is moving apace towards a more advanced
stage which would test a prototype of a potential new system.75 The aim of the prototype retains the
same ethos as set out in the Steele report2 with focus lying on the shift of NHS dentistry towards
prevention and oral health rather than treatment and repair through a new clinical pathway and new
remuneration models. The prototypes have three elements: (1) the use of comprehensive assessments in a
pathway approach; (2) remuneration for quality of care and remuneration to encourage continuing care;
and (3) prevention as well as activity. They aim to test different balances of remuneration for the different
elements and will form a stage in the evolution of the contract rather than preparing a large one-off
change. With this in mind the findings of this study remain directly relevant to the further evolution of the
NHS dental contract. Some of those findings relate to access to care, the use of gingivitis as an outcome
measure, the use of the RAG system in risk assessment, communication and contract monitoring.
Findings from the evaluation of the national dental pilots have been relatively positive, although they
highlight challenges in a number of areas including use of the OHA, data and feedback, and skill mix.
Although the two evaluations (the evaluation of the national dental contract pilots and the INCENTIVE
study) differ in many respects, our conclusions below highlight where findings converge and lessons for
future commissioning of NHS dentistry. The final sections summarise the recommendations for future
research and implications for practice.
Access and inequalities
Access can be assessed using list size as a proxy (as in the national dental contract pilot evaluation).20
The incentive practices were new practices and, therefore, still establishing their patient base, thus we
were unable to assess increased access in this way. However, the siting of the incentive practices in areas
of high need associated either with deprivation and disease or with the poor availability of NHS care meant
that access to dental services increased within these communities. But many people who had access to a
dentist in these practices, and many of the new patients included in the study in traditional activity-based
practices, did not continue with their oral care. These individuals were more likely to be young men and
have poorer oral health.
The qualitative data suggested that this was in part a consequence of taking on many new patients who
might not wish to receive continued care. Some patients may also have come from minority ethnic groups
not used to attending the dentist regularly. Thus, although the new practices increased access, further
work is required to understand how best to promote and encourage appropriate dental service attendance
especially among those with high level of need to avoid increasing health inequalities.
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Oral health assessment and skill mix
As described earlier in the chapter (see Principal findings), use of the RAG risk assessment in our study
showed improvement from baseline to follow-up which suggests a degree of responsivity. Although the
RAG ratings were used in risk assessment, participants were concerned that it was not sufficiently precise
and rarely over-rode the assessments, even though they could. In practice, dentists’ assessments may be
prone to allocation bias as treatments are apportioned according to the ratings, and to measurement bias
where changes in status are used for contract monitoring. The risk assessments were less frequently used
as an aid to patient communication. Within the national pilots sites, communication of the care pathway
from practitioner to patient was also mixed.20 Further research is required to validate the RAG assessment,
in the following guises: risk assessment, communication aid, contract-monitoring tool and also as a tool
for evaluation.
The evaluation of the national pilots also reports that the pathway model takes longer to operate per
patient than the previous model. Within the INCENTIVE study, although patients had a greater number of
appointments in incentive practices, the duration of the appointment was on average shorter than the
practices operating under the UDA-based contract. The incentive practices were set up in areas of high
need and poor access to dental services and therefore it is not surprising that they had more appointments
and a higher level of treatment. Although it is not possible to draw any firm conclusions from the figures,
the qualitative data hint at appreciable challenges related to a general refocusing of care and especially
to perceptions about preventative dentistry and use of the risk assessments and care pathways. There are
also obstacles to overcome to realise any benefits of the greater deployment of skill mix. One potential
solution would be for contractual drivers to change to be supplemented with educational efforts to
support the refocusing of care, perceptions about preventative dentistry, internal practice business models
on the use of skill mix, the role of evidence-based dentistry, working with care pathways, communication
skills and the need for a greater understanding of the difference between caring for individual patients
and a population.
Clinical effectiveness and clinical outcomes
The findings with respect to the clinical effectiveness of the blended/incentivised contracts are mixed.
Although the results of the primary outcome of gingivitis (BoP) favour the blended/incentivised model,
and there is some reassurance that the effect size is similar to that included in the original power
calculation, the results should be treated with caution given the reduced sample size and data quality
issues (discussed in more detail in Data quality), and reservations about the validity of pooling data.
Few studies have assessed the clinical effectiveness of contracting in dentistry; for example, the national
pilots’ evaluation looks at clinical response using the RAG status between assessment and review.20
Should services consider an oral health-related outcome measure of clinical effectiveness, despite the
challenges, this study would support the use of BoP. BoP is readily measured and responsive to change.
It can be changed by dental teams’ behaviours including preventative advice and treatment but is also
subject to changes in patients’ behaviours and to measurement error. Random changes in patient
behaviours and measurement error would attenuate the apparent relationships between the contract types
and BoP identified in this study. The estimates of the treatment effect may therefore be underestimated.
It is possible that measurement bias may have favoured one or other contract type, but this seems unlikely.
Few other studies have assessed clinical outcomes in relation to dental contracts. Nevertheless, the utility
of BoP as a surrogate for other oral health outcomes warrants further investigation.
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Data quality
The data quality issues with BoP were also seen within the ICDAS. In respect of caries assessment, which
favoured the traditional practices, although the majority of ICDAS charts were completed to an acceptable
standard, a number of issues were evident that give cause for caution in interpretation of the results.
Use of the ICDAS was exploratory and changes in the ICDAS scores may be the result of multiple factors,
such as attrition of study participants, diagnostic inaccuracies, poor completion, complexity of the ICDAS,
difficulty in diagnosing enamel caries in general dental practice, errors in syntax or the relatively short time
frame of the study. Further work is indicated on both the utility and the validity of recording dental caries
and treatment experience with an indicator such as the ICDAS as a contract outcome. The precision of this
system (the number of categories and levels) mean that it is time-consuming to use and dental caries and
treatment experience may not change sufficiently quickly for contract monitoring. Standardisation of the
dental practice software could facilitate the use of this and other clinical outcomes.
Data quality and dentist data recording have recently been flagged as challenges within the dental
contract pilots, with the recommendation that there should be a strong driver in the contract for data to
be collected accurately and for appropriate training and support provided for practices.20 Evidence from the
INCENTIVE study supports this.
Cost-effectiveness
The economic analysis showed the INCENTIVE arm of the study to attract a higher cost for the dental
commissioner but to be financially attractive for the dental provider at the practice level. Caveats also apply
to these findings given the high attrition rate and further research that is required to assess the financial
impact of the contract, in particular the impact of an increase of skill mix on the individual practitioner,
in order to support the model.
Finally, within dentistry, the OHIP-14 measure has been used extensively in cost-effectiveness analyses in
oral health but cannot be used to produce QALYs. Within this study the OHIP-14 scores were mapped
using regression techniques to the baseline EQ-5D-3L scores to explore the potential for estimating
utility scores that can be used to produce QALYs based on responses to the OHIP-14. Unfortunately,
consistent with other mapping studies, we fail to predict correctly low levels of EQ-5D-3L. This suggests
that there is a need for the development of a condition-specific utility measure for use in oral health for
economic evaluation.
Recommendations for future research
Further research is required to:
l understand how best to promote and encourage appropriate dental service attendance, especially
among those with a high level of need to avoid increasing health inequalities
l assess the financial impact of the contract and particularly the increase of skill mix on the individual
practitioner in order to support the model
l validate the RAG assessment as a risk assessment, communication aid and contract-monitoring tool
and as a tool for evaluation
l explore further the utility of BoP as a surrogate for other oral health outcomes
l explore both the utility and the validity of recording dental caries and treatment experience with an
indicator such as the ICDAS as a contract outcome
l develop a condition-specific utility measure for use in oral health for economic evaluation.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
NIHR Journals Library www.journalslibrary.nihr.ac.uk
98
Implications for practice
l The blended/incentive-driven contracts were perceived to increase access to dental care, with the
contract determining dentists’ and patients’ perceptions of need, their behaviours, evaluated and
subjective health outcomes and patient satisfaction.
l A large proportion of people in the study who had access to a dentist did not follow up on oral care.
This supports the care pathway approach recommended in the Steele report,2 which legitimises
irregular dental attendance for those who choose it.
l For dental practitioners, there are challenges within the blended/incentive-driven contracts related to a
general refocusing of care around preventative dentistry, risk assessment and a care pathway approach
rather than the focus on treatment inherent in the UDA-based contract.
l There are obstacles to overcome to realise the benefits of the greater deployment of skill mix.
Intuitively, the delegation of treatment to staff specialising in only a specific range of treatments could
reduce costs and increase access to care but, as previous research indicates, there may be financial
barriers that prevent the profitability and effective use of skill mix.
l Data quality and dentist data recording, particularly dentition charting, was challenging. This supports
the view that there should be a strong driver in the contract for it to be collected accurately and
appropriate training and support provided for practices.
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Appendix 1 Theoretical framework
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Appendix 2 Topic guides
INCENTIVE: improving the organisation and 
delivery of dental health care to patients. 
Qualitative Interview Topic Guide & Schedule for lay people  
Settling in  • Introduce yourself, have something light to say 
• Ask about them & things they are interested in (small talk). Who are they? 
• People often have a good story to tell about the dentist! – Tell me about your 
experiences of the dentist/thoughts of the dentist 
• How do they come to be taking part in project? 
Predisposing 
Factors 
Explore what their experience of going to the dentist has been in the past. 
• Had they, or anyone else they knew, been less or more inclined to go to the dentist? 
• What do they think about going to the dentist nowadays?  
• Things that stop/help you get dental care? 
• Explore issues such as costs and affordability. 
o How do you feel about paying for dentistrty?  
o Is having an NHS dentist important? 
• Has the practice they are attending done anything to encourage awareness of oral 
health? 
• Time ? 
Enabling 
Resources 
Did they notice anything different about their practices? i.e. was it different to other 
practices or changes in these practices? 
Had anyone they knew taken part in advising their practice? - observations on user forum.  
Did it make a difference? What did they like? What would they do differently? 
Had there been any change in ease of getting appointments? 
Did they know people who had joined the practice or been refused? 
Had the practice any different ways of working? 
• Did feel of practices change in other ways? 
• Did practices do anything differently? Explore any changes regarding preventing 
problems –either by advising the patient i.e. exploring how to improve their oral 
health 
Skill-mix 
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• Did they become aware of different team members being present? 
• How did it affect them?  Did they like/dislike? 
• Right volume, blend?  
• Any advantages or disadvantages (more time, extra visits, a new face) 
Have there been any differences in cost? 
Cap off with open question about practice overall (eg quality – access, relevance, cost, 
effectiveness, efficiency, fairness) 
Need Some practices have started advising patients about their risk of developing problems and 
have changed their treatments because of this. 
• Have you noticed the dental team doing this? (within this you might explore if they 
are aware of the traffic light system, what do patients feel about this?) 
o Do you change your behaviour?  
• How did (would) it make you feel? 
• Did it affect your treatment in anyway? Did you have different treatments or more 
or less appointments? 
• How did you feel about that?  Did it make you act differently? 
• Did you do anything to try to get into a different category? 
• Do you think the dental team should do this type of thing? 
• Do you think the team focussed on the right things? 
• Did the team communicate these things well? 
Oral Health 
Behaviours 
• Have they changed the way they look after their mouths? 
• Oral hygiene, diet, tobacco use, going to the dentist? 
• Had they thought about these things? 
• Did the advice of the dental team prompt any of these changes?  Was it related to RAG rating? 
Interview Topic Guide & Schedule for commissioners 
Settling in  • Introduce yourself, have something light to say 
• Ask about them & things they are interested in (small talk). Who are they? 
• People often have a good story to tell about the dentist! 
• How do they come to be taking part in project? 
Predisposing How would they describe the people in the area served by the practice? 
Has the practice had any effect on those people?  If so what and how? 
Had the practice done anything to change awareness of oral health? 
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Interview Topic Guide & Schedule for Dental Teams 
Settling in  • Introduce yourself, have something light to say 
• Ask about them & things they are interested in (small talk). Who are they? 
Enabling Has the practice has changed the way it is working? 
Had there been any lay involvement? Did it make a difference? What would they do 
differently? 
Had there been any changes in access to the practice?  Increases/decreases? Hard 
measures? Other indicators?  Types of people? 
What were the consequences of the new ways of working?  Advantages/ 
disadvantages? Cost implications, efficiency, value for money 
How were they quality assuring the practice?  Which quality indicators? Other 
indicators?  Patient complaints? Which of them worked? 
Other administrative /commissioning roles 
Skill-mix 
• Right volume, blend? 
• Any advantages or disadvantages (efficiency, cost, assessment) 
Had there been any differences in cost? 
Cap off with open question about practice overall (eg quality – access, relevance, cost, 
effectiveness, efficiency, fairness) 
Need 
Had there been any feedback on the RAG rating?  Differences it made? Difficulities 
Had the RAG rating influenced other outcomes from their perpective? 
Behaviours Had there been any indication that the local people or patients were acting differently 
More or less attendance, more care seeking? 
Any other indicators 
Outcomes Are they aware of any outcomes arising from care at the practice?  -health, patient 
satisfaction, complaints,  outputs, efficiency 
Unanticipated outcomes – positive and negative 
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• How did they come to be a dentist/nurse/ therapist etc 
• How do they come to be taking part in project? 
Predisposing How would they describe the people in the area served by the practice? 
Has the practice had any effect on those people?  If so what and how? 
Had the practice done anything to change awareness of oral health?  How successful had it 
been? Was it a good idea? 
Enabling Does the practice try to engage patients to influence the way the practice worked?  How? 
How effective is this? Does it have the intended (or any unintended!) consequences? Is it 
satisfactory? 
How do the practice and the commissioners assure quality in the practice? Which 
indicators does it use?  Do the indicators influence the way the practice works? (eg doing 
things they are paid for, not doing what not paid for, or in any other ways).  Are the 
indicators appropriate? 
Does the practice have protocols for prevention?  Who does this work? Does it work? 
Could the  systems be improved? 
 
How is payment working for you? Are you happy with this? 
Is it easier for patients to get appointments nowadays? New patients or existing? Does the 
practice seem more patients? Are there different types of patients nowadays (follow up 
with non-attenders, high risk and demographic groups). How do patients get into the 
system? Has that changed? 
Has the type or amount of work done by the practice changed?  If so, is it doing more or 
less appropriate work?  
Has the team been reconfigured? Is the configuration appropriate? What are the advantages 
and disadvantages of the configuration? How would they change it? Is the amount of 
delegation in the practice about right? Have there been benefits to patients or the practice 
in terms of efficiency or release of time. Have the patients commented? 
Do you think the service you are providing is better or worse value for money for patients 
and the NHS? 
 
How is it better than other models? Is it better? 
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Need 
How do they assess patient need in the practice?  Do they communicate this to the 
patients?  Did they have a formal system for doing this?  Do judgements about patients’ 
health risk influence treatment? 
 
How do they feel discussing this with the patient?  Do patients mind if they cannot have 
specific treatment because of their levels of risk? Have they changed a risk category for a 
patient – either immediately or after a period of time? 
Behaviours Does the way that the practice works help patients look after themselves?  How? What 
things to do they try to influence? 
How effective is this?  How do they assess all this? 
Outcomes How do they think of oral health? 
Do they think the way the practice works maximises health outcomes for patients? 
How do they assess this?  Hard measures or other indicators? Are the measures they use 
appropriate?  Do the measures they use tally with other indicators 
Are they aware of any outcomes arising from care at the practice?  -health, patient 
satisfaction, complaints,  outputs, efficiency 
Unanticipated outcomes – positive and negative 
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Appendix 3 Lost to follow-up and missing
at random
In Figure 26 we can see the distribution of missing EQ-5D-3L scores in the sample over the study. Morethan half of the patients at follow-up had all or some of the EQ-5D-3L components missing (279 and
12 patients, respectively, each highlighted in the figure with a dashed line box). From the patients who did
the follow-up, 16 (10) had all (some) EQ-5D-3L items missing and with regards to the missing OHIP-14
items: 16 patients had all items missing and only two patients had some items missing. Adding to this,
those patients who did not complete the study had worse OHQoL (i.e. a higher total OHIP-14 score) than
the patients who did complete the study in either traditional or incentive practices (Table 49). Differences
in either OHIP-14 or EQ-5D-3L scores between those who did and those who did not complete the
study are mostly significant at the 5% level, suggesting that many patients in this study only visited the
practice when they had a problem and did not come back.
Complementary results mapping
Tables 50 and 51 show the regression results of health-state values by OHIP-14 score for the continuous
model and categorical model, respectively. Table 52 shows the mean observed and fitted health-state
values within categories of observed health-state values for the categorical model.
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TABLE 49 Differences in total OHIP-14 scores and the EQ-5D-3L between complete and lost to follow-up cases
Practice Complete (n= 210), mean (SD) Lost to follow-up (n= 340), mean (SD) Change, mean (p-value)
Baseline (OHIP-14)
Traditional 9.12 (10.98) 12.30 (2.12) –3.18 (0.033)
Incentive 9.00 (10.30) 13.52 (12.45) –4.52 (0.002)
Baseline (EQ-5D-3L)
Traditional 0.896 (0.232) 0.835 (0.020) 0.061 (0.135)
Incentive 0.880 (0.250) 0.828 (0.023) 0.052 (0.047)
TABLE 50 Regression results of health-state values by OHIP-14 score: continuous model (n= 281)
Variable OLS Tobit TPM
Trouble pronouncing words –0.028 (0.042) –0.028 (0.040) –0.014 (0.039)
Sense of taste worsened –0.047 (0.039) –0.048 (0.038) –0.013 (0.032)
Painful aching in mouth –0.077* (0.032) –0.079** (0.031) –0.093* (0.030)
Uncomfortable eating –0.014 (0.030) –0.015 (0.028) –0.011 (0.026)
Felt self-conscious –0.030 (0.030) –0.033 (0.029) –0.015 (0.028)
Felt tense 0.047 (0.035) 0.046 (0.034) 0.014 (0.031)
Diet unsatisfactory –0.0003 (0.043) 0.001 (0.042) –0.013 (0.041)
Interrupt meals 0.059 (0.044) 0.058 (0.043) 0.065 (0.040)
Difficulty relaxing –0.029 (0.040) –0.029 (0.039) –0.037 (0.040)
Been embarrassed –0.031 (0.040) –0.029 (0.038) –0.032 (0.034)
Irritable with other people –0.004 (0.045) –0.002 (0.043) –0.008 (0.043)
Difficulty doing usual jobs 0.076 (0.058) 0.078 (0.056) 0.071 (0.056)
Life less satisfying –0.079*** (0.043) –0.082*** (0.042) –0.060 (0.039)
Unable to function –0.058 (0.053) –0.058 (0.051) –0.026 (0.049)
Sex (male) 0.007 (0.031) 0.011 (0.028) 0.017 (0.026)
Age (years) –0.008*** (0.005) –0.008*** (0.005) 0.006 (0.004)
Agesq (years) 0.0001 (0.00001) 0.0001 (0.0001) 0.0004 (0.0004)
Constant 1.1275* (0.106) 1.181* (0.100) 1.142* (0.089)
F-stat (p-value) 3.07 (0.000) 3.31 (0.000) 3.13 (0.000)
Notes
*, ** and *** denote 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance, respectively (robust clustered standard errors in parentheses).
The F-stat (testing the significance of the model) is reported for the second stage of the TPM.
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TABLE 51 Regression results of health-state values by OHIP-14 score: categorical model (n= 281)
Variable OLS Tobit TPM
Trouble pronouncing words
Hardly ever –0.054 (0.044) –0.055 (0.040) –0.027 (0.039)
Occasionally/fairly often/very often 0.646* (0.223) 0.678* (0.225) 0.504** (0.217)
Sense of taste worsened
Hardly ever –0.051 (0.036) –0.050 (0.034) –0.031 (0.033)
Occasionally/fairly often/very often –0.211 (0.199) –0.242 (0.207) –0.027 (0.207)
Painful aching in mouth
Hardly ever –0.027 (0.032) –0.031 (0.290) –0.043 (0.028)
Occasionally/fairly often/very often –0.407* (0.107) –0.405* (0.102) –0.414* (0.105)
Uncomfortable eating
Hardly ever –0.014 (0.033) –0.015 (0.030) –0.009 (0.026)
Occasionally/fairly often/very often 0.065 (0.081) 0.058 (0.075) 0.034 (0.075)
Felt self-conscious
Hardly ever –0.024 (0.033) –0.025 (0.030) –0.024 (0.030)
Occasionally/fairly often/very often –0.096 (0.072) –0.100 (0.068) –0.065 (0.070)
Felt tense
Hardly ever 0.031 (0.107) 0.028 (0.031) 0.012 (0.030)
Occasionally/fairly often/very often 0.074 (0.045) 0.075 (0.101) –0.023 (0.087)
Diet unsatisfactory
Hardly ever –0.011 (0.150) –0.010 (0.042) –0.006 (0.041)
Occasionally/fairly often/very often 0.127 (0.042) 0.152 (0.154) –0.006 (0.156)
Interrupt meals
Hardly ever 0.088** (0.157) 0.088** (0.040) 0.077 (0.040)
Occasionally/fairly often/very often –0.064 (0.128) –0.079 (0.151) 0.019 (0.167)
Difficulty relaxing
Hardly ever –0.044 (0.035) –0.045 (0.033) –0.054 (0.034)
Occasionally/fairly often/very often 0.087 (0.180) 0.085 (0.170) 0.074 (0.193)
Been embarrassed
Hardly ever –0.039 (0.044) –0.038 (0.040) –0.023 (0.039)
Occasionally/fairly often/very often 0.024 (0.082) 0.031 (0.078) 0.031 (0.067)
Irritable with other people
Hardly ever –0.003 (0.047) –0.003 (0.044) 0.007 (0.046)
Occasionally/fairly often/very often 0.021 (0.122) 0.027 (0.116) –0.062 (0.119)
Difficulty doing usual jobs
Hardly ever 0.074 (0.058) 0.075 (0.055) 0.091*** (0.055)
Occasionally/fairly often/very often –0.011 (0.127) –0.015 (0.120) –0.076 (0.101)
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TABLE 51 Regression results of health-state values by OHIP-14 score: categorical model (n= 281) (continued )
Variable OLS Tobit TPM
Life less satisfying
Hardly ever –0.019 (0.043) –0.020 (0.040) –0.043 (0.041)
Occasionally/fairly often/very often –0.297* (0.101) –0.310*** (0.098) –0.188*** (0.098)
Unable to function
Hardly ever –0.031 (0.051) –0.030 (0.047) 0.018 (0.042)
Occasionally/fairly often/very often –0.203 (0.199) –0.207 (0.186) –0.142 (0.181)
Sex (male) 0.008 (0.030) 0.011 (0.027) 0.019 (0.025)
Age (years) –0.007 (0.005) –0.007 (0.004) –0.005 (0.004)
Agesq (years) 0.00004 (0.0001) 0.0001 (0.0001) 0.0002 (0.0004)
Constant 1.120* (0.104) 1.128* (0.095) 1.086* (0.089)
F-stat (p-value) 5.91 (0.000) 6.48 (0.000) 10.91 (0.000)
Notes
*, ** and *** denote 1, 5 and 10% level of significance, respectively (robust clustered standard errors in parentheses).
The F-stat (testing the significance of the model) is reported for the second stage of the TPM.
TABLE 52 Mean observed and fitted health-state values within categories of observed health-state values:
categorical model
Observed
health state Observed values
Fitted values
OLS Tobit TPM
Category n Mean 95% CI Mean 95% CI Mean 95% CI Mean 95% CI
< 0.70 28 0.33 0.22 to 0.43 0.79 0.70 to 0.87 0.79 0.70 to 0.88 0.66 0.53 to 0.79
0.70–0.80 24 0.76 0.75 to 0.78 0.83 0.76 to 0.90 0.83 0.76 to 0.91 0.79 0.68 to 0.91
> 0.80 151 0.98 0.97 to 0.99 0.89 0.87 to 0.90 0.89 0.88 to 0.91 0.87 0.84 to 0.89
All 203 0.86 0.83 to 0.90 0.87 0.85 to 0.89 0.87 0.85 to 0.89 0.83 0.80 to 0.86
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